

*Anna Vibeke Lindø & Jeppe Bundsgaard (eds.)*

# **Dialectical Ecolinguistics**

**THREE ESSAYS FOR THE SYMPOSIUM  
30 YEARS OF LANGUAGE AND ECOLOGY  
IN GRAZ DECEMBER 2000**

SIDE 1

University of Odense  
Research Group for Ecology, Language & Ideology



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Three essays for the symposium  
30 Years of Language and Ecology  
in Graz december 2000

Nordisk institut, University of Odense.

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SIDE 4

Research Group for Ecology, Language & Ideology

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# Preface

The present essays on Dialectical Ecolinguistics are the Danish, dialectical contributions to the symposium 30 Years of Language and Ecology which took place in Graz, Austria, in december 2000.

In 1990, Jørgen Chr. Bang & Jørgen Døør founded the research group on Ecology, Language and Ideology (ELI). Our common theoretical and ethical basis is the danish dialectical theory of language which is an approach to ecolinguistics that was elaborated since the early 1970'ies by Bang and Døør and currently developed in cooperation with the rest of the members of the ELI Research Group.

The dialogical viewpoint of the theory implies that linguistics is regarded as a life-science, particularly for human communication. Being a life-science, a crucial area for linguistics - and language teachers and makers, too - is to be and become aware of and discuss the important question on what characterises healthy texts and a healthy interpretation and description of texts.

In the three essays, this vivid question is articulated, unfolded and given tentative answers, but from quite different perspectives.

Odense, december 2000

Anna Vibeke Lindø & Jeppe Bundsgaard

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# **The Dialectics of Ecological Morphology**

## **– or the Morphology of Dialectics**

### *0. Presentation*

Within the dominant linguistic theory of the last century, the European – or Saussurean – structuralism, a fundamental notion is that of the *Sign*. In this key term all the central theoretic ideas of structuralism are embedded. Among these are the arbitrariness of the sign, the semiological system, the notion of *valeur*, the distinction between diachronic and synchronic linguistics and the distinction between *langue* and *parole*.

These terms all date back to the *pater sine qua non* of structuralism, Ferdinand de Saussure (cf. *Cours de linguistique générale*, 1916). The breakthrough of this new linguistic paradigm was due to a change in the sociology of science, which took place in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and which might be described as a bureaucratization of the scientific community – a parallel to the modern Western bureaucraties as described by Max Weber. In this development, scientists made attempts to define their fields in a mutually exclusive way. Within the field of linguistics, Saussure did so by claiming a special object of study, *la langue*, which, he claimed, was unattainable for other scientific approaches.

Although the Saussurean terms are forming a theoretical whole, it could be argued that especially one is a constituting basis of structuralism, namely the *arbitrariness of the sign* (cf. Steffensen 2000). The *arbitrariness of the sign* is indeed a crucial constituting factor in the structuralist view of language as a self-contained closed system of linguistic signs.

Within the linguistics of this 21<sup>st</sup> century there are several hyphenated linguistic disciplines, all descending from the Saussurean inheritance. But there is one remarkable exception, and that is *ecolinguistics*. Ecolinguistics is an "umbrella term" which covers a rich diversity of theoretical approaches (cf. Fill 1996). In this context we find it more fruitful to draw the attention to the similarities of the diverse ecolinguistic approaches than to the differences. Following Haugen's definition – according to which ecolinguistics is "the study of interactions between any given language and its environment" (Haugen 1972:325) – the environmental constitution of language is an important research field of ecolinguistics. This means, in our point of view, that structural linguistics and ecological linguistics are *incompatible*, since the former denies the very theoretical (or axiomatic) starting point of the latter. Furthermore, we suggest that a recognition and discussion of the different approaches to the environmental constitution of language is crucial for maintaining and developing ecolinguistics as a forum of friendly and democratic dialogues. It is fundamentally undemocratic to exclude the study of language from public discussion by claiming that other persons than linguists do not even know what the "true" questions regarding language "really" are.

Within *Danish Dialectical Linguistics*, or *The Odense School of Ecolinguistics* (developed by Jørgen Chr. Bang & Jørgen Døør since the 1970s, and within *The ELI Research Group: Ecology – Language – Ideology* since 1990), we consider language to be a constitutive and constituted part of a *social praxis*: Language is a social product of human activities, but at the same time language changes or modifies the human activity and the social praxis. This means that there is a *dialectical relation*<sup>1</sup> between language and social praxis. In our point of view, the social praxis is the dominating and language the dominated individuality<sup>2</sup> of this dialectical relation, since a social praxis without language is a logical possibility, but language without a social praxis is historically and logically impossible: The former is *utopian*, the latter is *atopian* (cf. Bang & Døør 1990:5).

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<sup>1</sup> We define a dialectical relation, or a dialectical determination, or a dialectical implication, as a "relation between (i) to different individualities, (ii) who are parts of a whole, (iii) and who condition and restrict each others modus of being, (iv) and one of them is the historically dominating." (our translation of Døør 1998:64)


<sup>2</sup> We quote Jørgen Døør's definition of *an individuality* (in Danish and in English): "Jeg bruger [...] termen "**individualitet**" til at betegne et individ, der hverken er autonomt eller udeleligt." (Døør 1998:14): "I use [...] the term "**individuality**" to denote an individual [as opposed to a species, jb&ss] which neither is autonomous nor indivisible." (our translation, jb&ss).

The dialectical relationship between language and social praxis means that the scientific investigation of language at the same time is a scientific investigation of our social praxis. And it means that a theory of language is also a theory of social praxis. This goes for all (linguistic) theories, whether they acknowledge it or not. The democratic implication of such a view is that language studies are the matter of everyone interested, not reserved for a scientific élite.

### The three-dimensionality of the social praxis

Danish Dialectical Linguistics is characterized by (i) *explicitating* the axiological and political implications of our (and others) doing linguistics, and by (ii) formulating our linguistic theories in relation to an explicit dialectical theory of the social praxis – historically and transhistorically (cf. Døør 1998). Two important aspects of our dialectical theory are (i) the *Core Contradictions* and (ii) the *three-dimensionality of the social praxis*. In this presentation we focus on the latter which we present by quoting Bang & Døør’s *Dialogue Model* (Bang & Døør 1995:47):<sup>3</sup>

#### Dialogue Model



The *three-dimensionality of the social praxis* can readily be seen as Bang & Døør’s, or the Odense School’s, theoretical frame – or basis – of understanding and explaining the environmental constitution of language.

The three dimensions are dialectically determined and determining. The three logical dimensions are interrelated historical and dynamic systems of recurrent

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<sup>3</sup> Shortly, S<sub>1</sub> is the text producer(s), S<sub>2</sub> the text consumer(s), S<sub>3</sub> the subject(s) that – incarnated or not in the dialogue situation – restrict(s) the communication. O is the referred-to objects of the communication.

invariances, patterns and tendencies (cf. Døør 1998:65). The *ideo-logical* dimension is about our individual and collective mental, cognitive, ideological and psychic systems. The *socio-logical* dimension is about the ways we organize our interrelations in order to maintain a collectivity of individuals, whether these individuals love each other (eg. in a family and between friends), know each other (eg. between neighbours or in a tribe) or are strangers to each other (eg. in political systems, like a region, a state or the EEC). The *bio-logical* dimension is about our biological collectivity and our coexistence with other species (animals, plants, soil, oceans, microorganisms, macroorganisms etc.) – within *Gaia* or outside of *Gaia*.

No phenomenon is mono-logical or mono-dimensional, according to our dialectical theory. Our way of *breathing* is not just determining our bio-logical being and well-being, but also our mental and social well being (cf. the breathing exercises within all kinds of meditation). *Capitalism* is not just a specific socio-logical order of production, distribution and consumption within and between social classes. It is also a specific ideo-logical configuration of capitalist ideologemes like "more is better", "growth through production", "competitiveness", "profit" and the like. Also it is a specific bio-logical configuration of exploitation, pollution and ecological unsustainability.

This three-dimensionality of the social praxis means that also *language* is a three-dimensional entity in a social praxis. Therefore *linguistics* needs to describe language in these three dimensions. *Structuralism* described language only as an individual and collective ideo-logical phenomenon. One of the greatest predecessors of our dialectical tradition, the Marxist linguist V.N. Vološinov (cf. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, 1930/1973) described language as a purely socio-logical phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> On this point we disagree with as well the structuralist tradition as with Vološinov.

In our opinion, *ecolinguistics* is the study of the interrelations of bio-, socio- and ideo-logical dimensions of language. The *ecological* well-being of *Gaia* and the mental and social well-being of mankind go hand in hand. Therefore our efforts in favour of ecological sustainability – and ecolinguistics – are inseparable from our critique of the capitalist and bureaucratic societies and ideologies.

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<sup>4</sup> "The laws of language generation are *sociological* laws." (Vološinov 1930/1973:98).

## 1. Why Morphology?

Science and society are inseparable. This means that normal science (cf. Kuhn 1962, Sjørup Simonsen 2000) inevitably must be compatible with the dominant ideology of society in order to obtain economical support from *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. We have chosen to work with the concept of *morphology* for two reasons. First, because the discipline of *morphology* possesses a central position in traditional linguistics, which means that traditional *morphology* is inscribed in – or compatible with – an ideology which is a part of the ecological crisis. Second, because *morphology* touches upon central linguistic questions like the individual and collective creation and creativity of language.

We ask the question whether it is possible to create and develop an *Ecological Morphology* – or *Ecomorphology* – that makes us become more aware of our environmental problems. This we do in the same way as Bang & Døør on the ecolinguistic section of AILA 1993 in Amsterdam suggested a *radical* approach to the *ethical* dimension of the ecological crisis:

One part of the research community tries to handle the serious ethical problematic of our ecological crisis by applying traditional and well-established ethical theories and concepts to ecological problems.

Another part of the research community has realized that traditional ethics is part of the problematic and are co-producers of ecological contradictions and dilemmas. Therefore, what is needed is a fresh approach to ethics and the ethical dimension of the ecological crisis. (Bang & Døør 1995b:36)

The axiological and methodological implication of this point of view is that we must make a radical re-interpretation of what *morphology* is.

### Traditional definitions

Before we reach our attempt to formulate an ecological morphology, we will quote five traditional linguistic definitions of morphology.

1. Within the Danish Dialectical Linguistics, we often refer to the encyclopedic writings of David Crystal because they have a canonical status of presenting *social sense* definitions of linguistic terms. This is Crystals definition of morphology and of a morpheme:

**morphology** (*gram*) The study of word structure, esp. in terms of morphemes.  
[...] **morpheme** (*gram*) The smallest contrastive unit of grammar. (Crystal 1998:432)

We might add that Crystal defines *contrast* as "Any formal difference that serves to distinguish meaning in a language." (Crystal 1998:424).

2. One of the best over-all treatments of morphology is probably P.H. Matthews' "Morphology" (1974, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. 1991). This book is part of the "Cambridge textbooks in linguistics"-series, which gives it a canonical status within linguistics. Matthews defines morphology in this way:

'Morphology', therefore, is simply a term for that branch of linguistics which is concerned with the 'forms of words' in different uses and constructions. (Matthews 1991:3)

[...] we can say that **morphology** is, briefly, the branch of grammar that deals with the internal structure of words. (Matthews 1991:9)

3. In (one of) the newest handbook(s) of morphology, "The Handbook of Morphology" (1998), the editors, Andrew Spencer & Arnold M. Zwicky, open their "Introduction" with this proclamation:

Morphology is at the conceptual centre of linguistics. This is not because it is the dominant subdiscipline, but because *morphology is the study of word structure*, and words are at the interface between phonology, syntax and semantics. (Spencer & Zwicky 1998:1; our italics, jb&ss)

4. Also Saussure himself offers us some thoughts on morphology. Naturally, what he has to say about morphology is coloured by the philologism of the contemporary academic milieu. When Saussure in *Cours* claims that "Linguistiquement, la morphologie n'a pas d'objet réel et autonome; elle ne peut constituer une discipline distincte de la syntaxe" (Saussure 1916/1973:186), he is merely alluding to the isolated paradigms of declination (*puer, puerum*, etc.) and conjugation (*sum, es, est*, etc.). But elsewhere Saussure actually does define morphology, namely in a manuscript from ca. 1894-1895 which is quoted in Robert Godel's *A Geneva School Reader in Linguistics* (Bloomington & London 1969). Here Saussure states:

*Définition.* La morphologie est la science qui traite des unités de son correspondant à une partie de l'idée, et du groupement de ces unités. [...] Le vrai nom de la morphologie serait: la théorie des signes, et non des formes. (Godel 1969:28)

5. Finally, we present one of the great Danish linguists, Viggo Brøndal (1887-1942). Brøndal was not directly a part of the Copenhagen School of Hjelmslev (actually they couldn't stand each other!), but in many ways his thoughts were quite close to those of the contemporary structuralists. His definition of morphology is (in Danish and in our translation):

*Morfologi*, i vid Forstand defineret som Logisk Systematik, betragter udelukkende Ordenes indre Form, Kategorier og Systemer, – men ikke deres Combinationer. (Brøndal 1932:8)

*Morphology*, defined – in its broadest sense – as Logical Systematism, considers exclusively the inner form, categories and systems of the words, – but not the combinations of these. (Brøndal 1932:8; *our translation*, jb&ss)

We identify three main problems in these definitions of morphology and – explicitly or implicitly – of morphemes. These problems are (i) *The problem of meaningfulness*, (ii) *The problem of relationality* and (iii) *The problem of 'smallest unit'*. We discuss these three points in 2-4.

## 2. *Meaning in Ecolinguistics*

*The problem of meaningfulness* is for instance seen in Crystal's definition. His definition of the morpheme isolates the notion of *meaningfulness* from our human experiences with what makes sense. Crystal does not ask the question: What makes sense – and how does it make sense?

We get a hint of the answers to these questions if we just for a second consider the etymology of the word '*morpheme*'. Etymologically, '*morpheme*' constitutes and is constituted by the morphemes '*morph-*' and '*ema*'. '*morph-*' means '*form-*', and '*-ema*' is used in greek nominalized verbs, and indicates what is remaining after a given action. The structuralist use of the suffix '*-eme*' seems to ignore this processual background, thus leaving the '*-emes*' at any given level as an ahistorical and de-personalized distinctive unit or element. An ecolinguistic definition should be based on the processual *forming* and *creation* of meaningfulness. To quote Vološinov:

For a person speaking his native tongue, a word [or, a morpheme; jb&ss] presents itself not as an item of vocabulary but as a word that has been used in a wide variety of utterances by co-speaker A, co-speaker B, co-speaker C and so on, and has been variously used in the speaker's own utterances. (Vološinov 1973:70)

Thus, a morpheme definition must take its starting point in the dialogical reality of fluent speech. As human beings we were capable of communicating already in the uterus (Bang 1987). When we were born we continued developing this capacity – by crying, moving, making facial expressions etc. Later we started cooing and babbling, and later again we started uttering words and sentences. And all the time we developed our awareness of actions and utterances of our parents, brothers, sisters and others. Through this growing awareness we noticed differences and similarities of their speech, and our awareness of these differences and similarities depended on our way of sensing the rhythms of language – or the melody of language – and the rhymes of texts, words and

parts of words. We did not perform structuralist *commutation tests*, we heard the melody of our mother tongue.

It was our co-creative re-productions of these differences and similarities that led us to our own speech. It was our acts of interpreting, re-producing and re-creating rhymes and rhythms that made us able to distinguish those parts of our family's speech that made sense in relation to a particular situation. And at the same time we learned that the recurring patterns in their speech depended on the situations and intentions of their speaking. This is how we first found out about *morphemes* – not as independent building blocks in the construction of a sentence, but as concrete individualities in the creation of meaning. In a sense we met the complete utterance as a textual whole or as an individuality with an understandable meaning, depending on – and derived from – the situation. But we soon became aware of smaller individualities which made sense within the utterance. We performed acts of natural linguistic analysis and creativity, thus creating and developing our own speech. Morphemes are produced and consumed as individualities that are dialectically constituted by and constituting an utterance in a dialogue.

In order to distinguish the significance of the utterance from the significance of the smaller individualities of the utterance, Vološinov talked about *theme* and *meaning*:

Let us call the significance of a whole utterance its *theme*. [...] The theme of an utterance itself is individual and unreproducible, just as the utterance itself is individual and unreproducible. [...] By meaning [...] we understand all those aspects of the utterance that are *reproducible* and *self-identical* in all instances of repetition. [...] Theme is the *upper, actual limit of linguistic significance*; [...] Meaning is the *lower limit* of linguistic significance. (Vološinov 1973:99-101)

We widely agree with Vološinov, although we do not consider morphemes to be "self-identical in all instances of repetition." Identity is always situational and there is thus no absolute self-identity, but only more or less identical textual phenomena, produced and consumed by human beings. It follows from this that a *reproduction* is not an identical *copy* or *repetition*, but a situational re-creation of those textual phenomena we have experienced.

### **A dialectical morpheme definition**

These comments lead us to suggest a dialectical or ecolinguistic definition of the morpheme:

**Definition.** Morphemes are rhythmical and rhymic identifiable textual individualities which: (i) Are constituted by and constituting a textual whole (text, utterance, sentence, word). (ii) Are creatively formed, co-formed and con-formed individualities in a dialogue situation (socio-, bio- and ideo-logical). (iii) Are individualities in our cognitive and bodily configurations of knowledge and memory – and thus recreatable in a dialogue situation (bio-, socio- and ideo-logical).

The forming, co-forming and con-forming of morphemes as parts – or shares – of dialogical utterances are always situational and personal. The morphemic *forming* is an act of the text producer (S<sub>1</sub> or 'the speaker'). The *co-forming* is an collective act of all subjects present in the communication situation (S<sub>1</sub>, S<sub>2</sub> and S<sub>3</sub>). And the *con-forming* is the subjects' uttering of that social and cultural order that to a certain degree pre-organizes our linguistic actions. We emphasize that linguistic actions have two interdependent dimensions: Form and content. We reproduce a certain meaning by reproducing a certain form. Our linguistic forming, co-forming and con-forming of form is our forming, co-forming and con-forming of content.

When we learn our mother tongue we (unconsciously) internalize a social and cultural order (cf. Døør 1998:42). In our modern Western societies, we generally internalize different aspects of a capitalist and unecological way of living, thinking and communicating. This internalization is inevitable. In our living, thinking and communicating we can more or less support or non-support (trans-form or con-firm) the internalized social and cultural order. We do not learn our mother tongue once and for all, but in a lifelong creative, co-creative and con-creative process. Therefore we always have a possibility of *changing* our way of living, thinking and communicating – but this takes thorough reflexions.

The *subjects* of the internalization process are both those who (knowingly and unknowingly) internalize and those who (knowingly and unknowingly) utter the social and cultural order as the neutral background for our living, thinking and communicating. We are all subjects of internalization processes – as loving and caring parents and as teachers, examiners and scientists.

We consider it to be a task for ecolinguists to promote healthy ways of becoming aware of these internalization processes. Being aware is the only way of identifying the subjects and interests at work in a given situation. Without this awareness we are confronted with the *anonymous third*, ie. a cultural and societal order that presents itself (sic!) as-if it was neutral and objective.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The term '**anonymous third**' is coined by Jørgen Døør, cf. Døør 1998:40.

In the third point of our definition we propose that we know or remember morphemes in order to recreate them. This knowledge or memory is as well cognitive as bodily, because our *experiences* are as well cognitive as bodily.<sup>6</sup> At the same time our knowledge or memory is *situational*. We do not remember atomized units, waiting to be used in utterances. We remember parts/shares of situations (and probably also our mood and feelings in that situation), and we recreate these shares in our present situation. And sometimes we forget such shares, especially if we rarely use them. We tend to forget 'perlocutionary' rather than 'we'!

### 3. *Relationality in Ecolinguistics*

All of the structural definitions quoted in 1.1. have one thing in common: They only treat the *inner relations* of the *word*, and this they do in isolation from all other textual and contextual phenomena. Two key terms in structural morphology therefore seems to be: *Word* and *Internality*. In these definitions there is an implicit claim that the word can be isolated from other textual aspects, and that *inner relations* can be isolated from other types of relations.

We disagree with such an explanation. We consider every individuality (ie. person, group, word, text, etc.) to exist in three relational dimensions: Intra-relationality, inter-relationality and extra-relationality. Intra-relations are relations within the individuality. Inter-relations are relations between an individuality and other individualities of the same kind or species. Extra-relations are relations between an individuality and other individualities of other kinds or species.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Also, we do not just produce utterances by speaking. We gesticulate, we make facial expressions, we have eye contact and so on. Probably, our cognitive and bodily interpretations of such communicative acts are on a par with our knowledge of textual morphemes. If this is so, an ecolinguistic morphology might also touch upon these kinds of communications, especially since they prototypically are inseparable from our verbal communication. In this paper we do not elaborate further on this point.

<sup>7</sup> Please notice that we still refer to an *individuality* in Jørgen Døør's sense, cf. note 2. Expressed in terms of relationality, an individuality can be seen as an entity whose intra-relations are relatively constant and dominating in relation to its inter- and extra-relations. This relative independence is to be interpreted as a dominating self-organisation and not as autonomy of the individuality: My being a living human being is relatively independent of what I eat and where I am, but only to a certain degree. If I have no food to eat or oxygene to

Our starting point in our linguistic analyses is always texts in dialogues. When we work with *textual* phenomena, our theoretical basis for a description of relationality is the “*Triple Model of Reference.*” This model was produced by Jørgen Chr. Bang and Jørgen Døør – together with Harry Perridon, Amsterdam University – in 1990 (Bang & Døør 1990:30). The *Triple Model* describes (1) the traditional term for referential parts of a text (“Dimension of reference”), (2) the relationality of the referential part of the text – ie. inter-/intra-/extra-relationality (“Dominating reference”) and (3) what the part of the text refers to, ie. whether the referred-to is *cotextual*, *intextual*, or *contextual*. The Triple Model is presented here:

### Triple Model of Reference

Dimension of reference	Dominating reference	Reference to
Lexical	Inter-textual	COtext    social & individual    } lexicon & grammar
Anaphoric	Intra-textual	INtext    cataphoric (forward) anaphoric (backward) symphoric (simultaneous)
Deictic	Extra-textual	CONtext    C-prod    } Persons C-comm    } Time C-cons    } Place C-derivated    } Logics

- C-prod        = the context of the producer(s)
- C-comm       = the context of the communicator(s)
- C-cons        = the context of the consumer(s)
- C-derivated = the context of the recontextualizer(s)

Furthermore, it could be added that the inter-textual reference is primarily a *semantic* category, the intra-textual reference primarily a *syntactic* category, and the extra-textual reference primarily a *pragmatic* category. This means that our description of the inter-textuality of morphemes is primarily a semantic description – or a description of *morphological semantics*. Similar points go for the intra- and extra-textuality (respectively *morphological syntax* and *morphological pragmatics*).

Traditional definitions of morphology are incompatible with these relational principles, since there is no such notion as extra-textuality in traditional morphology, only the intra-textual function of morphemes is acknowledged. We

breathe I would not be able to maintain my intra-relational constancy. My extra-relations would in that case dominate my intra-relations.

suggest that an ecolinguistic morphology takes all three kinds of relationality into consideration.

Haugen's definition of ecolinguistics is primarily concerned with the extra-relations of language, and indeed that is exactly what structural linguistics and morphology has ignored. But Haugen does not in his definition of ecolinguistics take into account that the extra-relationality of language (ie. the environmental interactions) changes the intra- and inter-relationality of language. Seen from our dialectical point of view, ecolinguistics is the study of intra-, inter- and extra-relations and of the relations between these relations.

In the following we shall shortly comment on the inter-, intra- and extra-textual function of morphemes.

### **The inter-textual function of the morpheme**

We start with the inter-textual function of the morpheme because we already have touched on that subject in 2. It is one of the most crucial and beautiful things about language that it is *learnable* for each new generation. Indeed, there would be no language if our children could not consume it and (re)produce it. Language is not a closed circuit between two homogenous adults, and therefore Saussure's "*circuit de la parole*" – and for that sake Chomsky's theories – are not theories on language, but on calculations of language.

Most words have an ideo-logical existence for us (we know them, can produce and consume them), because they first have had a socio-logical existence for us (we have heard them in a dialogical situation in a social praxis).<sup>8</sup> The sustainability of language depends on this ability of the language producers and consumers<sup>9</sup> to *remember* and to *reproduce* language. The relation between our consumption of language in one situation, our memory and our reproduction in another situation is an *inter-relation* between the linguistic phenomena in the two situations. In our morpheme definition we understood the linguistic memory as a *morphemic* memory, ie. our lexicon as a *morphemic* lexicon. This is due to our understanding of morphology as a principle of linguistic (re)creation.

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<sup>8</sup> A very few words, the so-called *neologisms*, start existing in an individual's mind, but by being uttered they enter the socio-logical sphere. If they are never uttered, they disappear with the death of the individual. (Or, if an individual produces too many words of this kind, they disappear in psychotherapy!)

<sup>9</sup> We avoid the term "language users" because it implies that language has an existence independent of the personal production, distribution and consumption. We do not use language, we produce language.

But we do not just remember morphemes, we do also remember the situational background of them. Our parents did not use the same morphemes as our teachers in school, and even if they did we did not understand them in the same way, because they had different institutional status. This is what the great ecolinguist Adam Makkai describes (in "How does a SEMEME mean?" (Makkai 1993:208-231)), as a *sememic* difference between *psychosememes*, *cognosememes* and *technosememes* (cf. Makkai 1993:230). We would like to add that this sememic difference is due to the situational and social environment of our experiences with these sememes or morphemes, and not due to specific sememic, morphemic or cognitive proportions.


Everytime we produce or consume textual shares, ie. morphemes, in a dialogue situation, we reproduce semantic meaning that is non-identical with the meaning of the "same" morphemes in another situation. But even though there is a non-identity between these morphemes in different dialogue situations, the meaning and form of a morpheme is more or less constant in different situations, just as all situations have some general proportions in common.<sup>10</sup> So our semantics has a general dimension, the situational and textual constancy, and a specific dimension, the situational and textual variability.

At the same time meaning can be more or less common for a community. Meaning is at the same time shared between the individualities in a community and individual for each member of the community. In other words, we operate with a universal semantic dimension and a particular semantic dimension. These two dimensions are the constituting axes of the dialectical *Semantic Matrix* that Jørgen Chr. Bang & Jørgen Døør formulated in Bang & Døør 1990. In the Semantic Matrix they constitute four semantic fields that all are simultaneously present in every text: The *Social Sense*, the *Social Import*, the *Individual Meaning* and the *Personal Significance* (For further explanations, see Bang & Døør 1990:14ff.).

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<sup>10</sup> There is a dialectical relation between the linguistic constancy and the situational constancy. As Vološinov pointed out, the dominant class in society will try to prevent changes in meaning, because that will maintain the class' dominant position. The dominant class is always "accentuating yesterday's truth as to make it appear today's." (Vološinov 1973:24). We might add: the dominant sex, the dominant age, etc., cf. the dialectical model of core contradictions. (Bang & Døør 1990:9).

## The semantic Matrix



Some shares of our speech are morphemes in a more social sense, and some shares are morphemes in some persons individual meaning but not in others. Here we disagree with those structuralists, who say that a given utterance always have the same morphemes. We say that it depends on the situation and on what the participants of the dialogue consider to be morphemes in the utterance and in the dialogue.

Finally, one important bio-logical phenomenon is at work in the inter-textual function of the morpheme: We must be able to remember morphemes, and morphemes must be easily reproduced. It is a healthy ecological principle that those words we use most (eg. the personal pronouns *I, you, he, she, it, we, my* etc.) are one-syllabic, and technical terms (eg. *psychosememes*) are poly-syllabic.

### The extra-textual function of the morpheme

Language is always produced in a social praxis, and therefore every dialogue, every text and every part/share of a text are related to the dialogue situation. This relation between text and situation is extremely complex. We try to recognize at least three dimensions of extra-textual reference: A *deictic* dimension, a *modal* dimension and a *metaphoric* dimension.

❖ *Deixis* is a key term in dialectical linguistics. Bang & Døør have now through three decades investigated and explained the social *raison d'être* of texts and dialogues, and this they have primarily done through thorough analyses of deictic phenomena. We quote the newest deixis definition made by Bang & Døør:

**Deixis** A category used to subsume features of languages which indicate  
 (i) personal, objectical, and medial;

- (ii) topical (i.e. temporal-locational features);
- (iii) logical, (iv) modal, and (v) lexical characteristics of
  - (a) the text-context-discourse, or language game,
  - (b) the dialogue-situation, and
  - (c) the form of life/praxis within which an utterance takes place and has its life, whose MEANINGS are dialectically determined by praxis. (Bang & Døør 1998:26)

Traditionally, deixis is exemplified with such words as *I/you/he* (personal deixis), *now/then* (temporal deixis) and *here/there, this/that* (locational or spatial deixis). But also indications of the logical, modal and lexical configuration of the text and situation are deictic phenomena, because there is no such thing as universal logics. The logical and modal configuration of a text is just as sensitive to the situation as the personal configuration is: Compare these two sentences: "If we want welfare goods, then we need to produce them, and unfortunately that *results in* pollution." And: "If we want welfare goods, then we must produce them *so* it does not *result in* pollution." The different situational and modal configuration in these sentences become obvious if we ask, whether the two sentences could have been rationally uttered by the same person? If not so, is then the category of logics and modality not as situationally determined (and determining) as that of person, place and time?

Prototypical examples of morphemes with deictic (ie. extra-textual) functions are the Danish suffixes '-en' and '-et' and the English article 'the' (which Otto Jespersen wisely terms "the defining or determining article," rather than "the definite article", Jespersen 1924:109). They determine the meaning of lexemes to be one particular and situational well known one.

❖ *Modality* is also a traditionally well described category of linguistics, cf. Lyons 1977. When we use this term in relation to the extra-textual reference of a share of a text, we imply a wider use of the term. *Modality* can be defined as the attitudes of the communicating subjects towards the dialogue and its (co-)subjects and objects. When we communicate we do not just convey information; we rationally and emotionally relate ourselves to what we say and hear. Bang & Døør operate with *the principle of dialectical description and indication*, according to which "every description and any indication is always-also at the same time a self-description and self-indication." (Bang & Døør 1998:28). When I describe the capitalist system, I also describe how I relate myself to it, rationally and emotionally. Every utterance – and every part of an utterance – has a specific and dynamic modality.

The *modal* aspect of our utterances can be exemplified by the prefix 'un-'. 'un-' implicates that something referred to by the stem of the word, is negated, eg. in words like *undeveloped* and *uncontrolled*. Thereby the producer of such prefixes operates with a yardstick for the valuation of the described. When we

refer to certain countries as *undeveloped*, we (i) use the conditions of the developed (ie. Western) world as a yardstick for our comparison, and we (ii) maintain that the comparison is in favour of the Western world. Such a geopolitical classification has a bias which directs the political actions of those who accept this term as their descriptive basis.<sup>11</sup> In the same way something '*uncontrolled*' is suspicious. This is a modality that for sure is in accordance with the Western, capitalist urge to control nature.

❖ *Metaphor* is defined by Lakoff & Johnson: "The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5). This 'another' is defined by our particular social praxis, and the metaphoric dimension of extra-textuality is hence a question of establishing an experiential interpretation of the actual situation.

A morpheme that is prototypical for the metaphoric aspects of morphemes is the germanic suffix *\*-lika-* which means 'like'. In English, the suffix is '-ly' (as in friend-ly), in Danish it is '-lig' (as in ven-lig), and in German it is '-lich' (freundlich). Together with the root this morpheme constitutes an adjective that can be used in a nominal syntagma. In such cases, the substantive of the syntagma is experienced and understood in the same way as we normally experience and understand the root in the adjective. "A friendly foreigner" is a foreigner that behaves like friends normally do.

There is a certain degree of coherence in our world view and in the way we talk about this world. The deictic, metaphoric and modal aspects of the morphemes we use indicate our systems of knowledge and belief. Therefore we can criticize our ideological and social praxis by examining morphemes. Furthermore we can put forward alternative formulations and actions and thereby we can trans-form or con-firm certain socio-, bio- and ideological praxes.

### **The intra-textual function of the morpheme**

So far, we have treated morphology in a way that pretty much resembles a general theory of the linguistic sign. The extra-textual function was to indicate ("to deixis") those situational entities referred to. And the inter-textual function was to predicate something about the situational indicated entities. But what is the intra-textual function of morphemes?

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<sup>11</sup> An anecdote tells that Gandhi once was asked what he thought about Western civilisation. His answer was: "That sounds like a good idea!" What would happen if we referred to a non-industrial way of living as "unalienated"? And ecological groceries as "untoxic(ant)"?

Instead of merely pointing at "him" and "her", we can – due to our inter-textual habits – predicate something about their relation: "He loves her" or "she loves him." This is where the intra-textual function comes in. *The intra-textual function of a morpheme is to explicate the relations between textual (deictic or lexical) entities, thus explicating the extra-textual relations of the deictic or lexical indicated entities, as seen from the speaker's (S<sub>1</sub>'s) point of view.*

In some environments a morpheme has a predominantly extra- and interrelational function, while it has a predominantly intrarelational function in other. Certain morphemes have a tendency to have one dominant relational function, regardless of the environment.<sup>12</sup> Eg. in the sentence "That is Peter's hat": In most situations and environments, 'that' has a dominant extratextual (ie. deictic) function, pointing to an object well known in the dialogue situation. 'Peter' and 'hat' have dominant inter- and extratextual functions, referring to a person and an object, probably known to the participants of the dialogue. Finally, the '-s' has a dominant intra-textual function, explicating the relation between 'Peter' and 'hat'. Of course this intratextual function is only possible due to inter- and extratextual experiences with language production and consumption. The last morpheme, 'is' is a *relator*, relating the deictic 'that' to the lexical explanation of what 'that' is.<sup>13</sup> Again it is important to underline that we have so much situational knowledge that we readily would understand a statement like "That Peter hat".

In relation to the referential function of a word like 'Peter's', the stem 'Peter' is the dominant core, while the inflectional morpheme is an adhesive phenomenon. But in relation to the the *syntagmatic* constitution of the utterance, the inflectional morpheme is the dominant core, while the stem is the adhesive phenomenon. As Jørgen Chr. Bang puts it:

In a more semantic sense the former is the core, while the latter is the core in a more syntactic sense, while they pragmatically stick together as a dialectical unity, where the dominancy is historically changing and changeable. (Bang 1995:16; our translation, jb&ss)

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<sup>12</sup> Traditional morphology refers to these as 'free morphemes' and 'bound morphemes', respectively, but this is seen with the optics of the text: A 'free morpheme' is in no way 'free' in relation to the situation.

<sup>13</sup> The term *relator* is coined by Bang to signify a central word class in dialectical linguistics. In this context we might add that relators prototypically are mono-morphemic, ie. they cannot be inflected. Also we operate with a class of verbal relators, ie. verbs that do not indicate som action but relate nominal entities to each other ('he is my son', 'I have a car'), to predicates ('you are beautiful') or to verbs ('I am doing my best', 'he has saved the world').

We found it reasonable to distinguish between some morphemes that prototypically are *more* semantic (ie. lexemic) and some that prototypically are more syntactic (ie. inflectional). Furthermore we operate with a medio-class of semantico-syntactic morphemes, namely the *derivational* morphemes. Between a pair of words like 'friend' and 'friendly' there is as well a semantic difference as a syntactic difference. Semantically, we use such a derivation to change the reference from a person ('the friend') to a specific way of behaving ('the man is friendly'). Syntactically, we use this derivation to incorporate a predicate into the sentential subject (thus creating a new individuality, 'the friendly man'), so we can relate another predicate to the new individuality: 'the friendly man is an outstanding ecolinguist.'

According to our definition of the intra-textual function of a morpheme, we operate with a function of relational *explication*. This implies that we understand morphology on a par with certain syntactic phenomena. If we for instance have four textual entities, 'Eve', 'Adam', 'apple' and 'to give', then we could morphologically (eg. through casus) explicate the textual and contextual relations (like in Latin), or we could do so syntactically: 'Eve gave Adam the apple'. From their situational and linguistic experiences, most people will interpret such a sentence in a way that implies that Eve started having the apple, and Adam got the apple from her, and not the other way round. Another possible syntactic organisation of the same referential entities is 'Eva gave the apple to Adam'. Here we use another *relator* ('to') to explicate the textual and contextual relations between the referred-to entities.

It is a crucial part of a morphological analysis to find out how the morphological, syntactical and prosodic organisation of the textual features explicate the situational relations explicated by the text. Do morphology, syntax and prosody "co-operate" or do they indicate different situational conjunctures? And how is such a textual organisation determined by the situation – and how does it determine the situation? These are questions of textual and situational awareness.

#### ***4. Micro-morphology in Ecolinguistics***

The third problem we identified in relation to the structuralist definitions of morphology was *the problem of 'smallest unit'*. According to these, the morpheme is the smallest meaningful unit in language. Smaller textual units, like phonemes, do not 'mean' anything.

We doubt that this is so. *If* language is at the same time of a socio-, bio- and ideological nature, *then* the bodily – or biological – forming of sounds (phonemes) is interconnected with a certain ideo- and sociological conjuncture. Certain sounds are related to certain feelings, moods, experiences etc., cf. the Hindu tradition of phonetics (eg. Panini's *Astadhyayi*). This means that sounds to a certain degree can be treated as having a meaning. With Jørgen Chr. Bang, we term these meaningful phenomena *micro-morphemes*. Of course the meaning of a morpheme cannot be seen as some sum of micromorphemic meaning. The micro-morphemes 'M', 'O', 'TH', 'E' and 'R' cannot be 'added up' to a resulting morpheme 'mother'. From the micro- to the meso-level there is a qualitative difference.

Roman Jakobson has worked with these phenomena in his article "Why 'MAMA' and 'PAPA'?" According to him, George Peter Murdoch has examined 1.072 words for mother and father in a number of non-related languages. Murdoch has shown that these languages (or rather, the producers and consumers of them) have developed "similar words for father and mother on the basis of nursery forms" (Jakobson 1971:538). For example 55% of the words for mother include the sounds [m], [n] and [ng], while only 15% of the words for father include these consonant classes. This is, as Jakobson points out, no coincidence. The nasal murmur is the only sound that the child can produce while sucking his or her mother's breast. Jakobson argues that this sound is associated to the mother, to food, to satisfaction and other wishes. The problem for Jakobson is of course the structuralist axiom of arbitrariness. Jakobson must maintain that phonemes are meaningless, and therefore he restricts these arguments to this particular area of human life.

But in our dialectical theory of language we do not operate with an axiom of arbitrariness. It makes good sense to maintain that [m], [n] and [ng] has a socio- and ideological meaning because of some natural bio-logical basis. No linguistic phenomenon is mono-logical. Different languages have different conjunctures of logics. So it is not necessarily a falsification of a micro-morphological theory that some languages do not have the exact same conjuncture of the same bio-, socio and ideo-logics.

Jørgen Chr. Bang has worked with these linguistic phenomena, and he focuses his attention on what from an ecological point of view seems to be our basic words, such as deictic words, pronouns, strong verbs etc. Further research must be done within this field. In our point of view, this is an important question of the ecological constitutedness of language – and thus an important question within ecolinguistics.

Besides the micro- and meso-morphemes, we also work with *macro-morphemes*. These are morphemes *bigger* than the word, ie. 'phrases'. An instance of a macro-morpheme is 'so to say'; we use such an expression as an

individuality, we do not form it of the morphemes ‘so’, ‘to’ and ‘say’. Our linguistic perceptions and conceptions are dynamical, and therefore we do not have one level of linguistic memory. Our linguistic memory consists of a dynamical and dialectical whole of micro-, meso- and macro-morphemes, organised individually as well as collectively – in different relations of dominance. With one expression, we refer to micro-, meso- and macro-morphemic individualities as *morphemic fields*.

### ***5. Implications of an Ecolinguistic Morphology***

To show the implications of the morphological theory we have put forward in this paper, we will analyse (a part of) a text. Doing dialectical linguistics, it is vital not to constrain a linguistic analysis to textual phenomena, but to gain an insight in our social praxis through analysis of a living communication. This is an axiological *sine qua non* of our morphological analysis.

We propose a method of investigating the morphological features of this text. It consists of five methodological rules that might give us an insight in texts, on the basis of a morphological analysis:

- R1 Identify the inter-, intra- and extra-textual functions of some vital and interesting (micro-/meso-/macro-)morphemes in the text.
- R2 Identify *key morphemes*, ie. morphemes with a vital deictic and/or lexemic function.<sup>14</sup>
- R3 Identify the relations between *key morphemes* and other morphemes, syntactic structures (sic!) and prosodic features (or – in written texts – the graphemic organisation).
- R4 Compare the situational relations of the subject and objects in the dialogue situation with the textual relations of morphemes, syntax and prosody.
- R5 Discuss and criticise the implications of the text, ie. the conditions of its production and consumption (cf. Bang & Døør 1988:15).

We exemplify this method through an analysis of a text taken from a well-known introduction to the linguistic field of *psycholinguistics*, namely Jean Aitchison’s book *The Articulate Mammal – An introduction to psycholinguistics*, London & N.Y.: Routledge 1998, 4<sup>th</sup> edition, pp. 83-84:

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<sup>14</sup> These might readily be seen as morphemes that could not be done without in order to make a sensitive interpretation of the text and situation.

The grammar of a child of 5 differs to a perhaps surprising degree from adult grammar. But the 5-year-old is not usually aware of his shortcomings. In comprehension tests, children readily assign interpretations to the structures presented to them – but they are often the wrong ones. 'They do not, as they see it, fail to understand our sentences. They understand them, but they understand them wrongly' (Carol Chomsky 1969:2). To demonstrate this point, the researcher showed a group of 5- to 8-year-olds a blindfolded doll and said: 'Is this doll hard to see or easy to see?' All the 5- and 6-year-olds said HARD TO SEE, and so did some of the 7- and 8-year-olds. The response of 6-year-old Lisa was typical:

*Chomsky:* IS THIS DOLL EASY TO SEE OR HARD TO SEE?  
*Lisa:* HARD TO SEE.  
*Chomsky:* WILL YOU MAKE HER EASY TO SEE?  
*Lisa:* IF I CAN GET THIS UNTIED.  
*Chomsky:* WILL YOU EXPLAIN WHY SHE WAS HARD TO SEE?  
*Lisa:* (to doll) BECAUSE YOU HAD A BLINDFOLD OVER YOUR EYES.

Some psychologists have criticized this particular test. A child sometimes believe, ostrich-fashion, that if his own eyes are covered, others will not be able to see him. And he may be partly switching to the doll's viewpoint when he says a blindfolded doll is hard to see. (Aitchison 1998:83f.)

We focus on the quoted conversation between Lisa and Chomsky, and we use Chomsky's and Aitchison's interpretation of the text as a basis for a comparison between their and our analyses. Through this comparison we will suggest some vital axiological and methodological differences between an ecological and structuralist analysis. We present an alternative to the "They understand them, but they understand them wrongly"-attitude, namely a situational understanding in which Lisa's understanding is understandable. Thus, we prefer to ask: How and why do the linguist and the child understand a given sentence differently?

The starting point of our analysis is Chomsky's first line: "IS THIS DOLL EASY TO SEE OR HARD TO SEE?" We analyse according to R1 and R2 in the matrix below. The identification of relevant and/or interesting morphemes is always a question of *topos* and interests. In our analysis of this sentence we work with eight *morphemic fields*, as indicated in the matrix. Some of these morphemic fields have an obvious and necessary deictic function, indicating time and topic of the conversation (cf. "Extra-text" below). All morphemic fields have *meaning*, which we express through the semantic matrix: What is the social sense and the individual meanings involved? The social sense is quoted from *Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (N.Y. 1996), and the individual meanings of the linguist, Chomsky, and the child,

Lisa, are our creative reconstructions. The intra-textual functions indicate a sketch of our dialectical analysis.

R3: We should now identify the relations between the key morphemes and the rest of the text. We see two reasons for Lisa's interpretation: First, the verbal extension 'to see' is usually related to a subject and an object. Lisa's and Chomsky's understanding of the question differs on whether the doll is interpreted as the subject or the object for 'to see'. Second, Chomsky forms her sentence as a question, ie. as an 2.pers. modality ("I ask – you answer"), but there is no 2.pers. pronoun ('you') in the sentence – she starts with the verbal relator 'is' and forms the sentence in a 3.pers. modality. The 'you' as subject is not explicated. Chomsky interprets 'this doll' as object (and Lisa as subject) of the sentence. Lisa, on the contrary, interprets the only nominal entity in the sentence, 'this doll', as subject – not just in relation to the unstressed verbal relator, but also in relation to 'to see'. Furthermore Lisa does not hear the implicit 'you' – she reacts on the explicit 3.pers. modality.

R4: Why is this so? It might be a point – and it is for as well Chomsky as for Aitchison – that Lisa is not yet familiar with the interpretation of the syntactic forming of the passive voice. But seen in a situational context, Lisa's answer is perfectly understandable. What is the relation between 'this' and 'doll'? 'This' indicates that the 'doll' is wellknown, it is visible for the dialogue partners. In such a situation it must seem quite strange to Lisa to be asked whether she can see 'this doll' that is perfectly visible to both of them.

## A matrix of morphemic functions – R1 and R2

	IS	THIS DOLL	EAS-Y	TO SEE	OR	HARD	TO SEE	?
<b>Extra-text</b>	Deixis: NOW- present	Deixis: situational. Modality: wellknown .			Deixis: Logical. Modality: Either-or.			
<b>Inter-text/ Metaphor</b>	3 <sup>rd</sup> pers. sing. pres. indic. of <b>be.</b>	used to indicate a person, thing, idea, state, event, time, remark, etc., as present,	not difficult; requiring no great labor or effort.	to perceive with the eyes; look at.	used to connect words, phrases, or clauses representin g alternatives.	difficult todo or accomp- lish; fatiguing; trouble- some	to perceive with the eyes; look at.	
Social sense								
Individual Meaning of 'Chomsky'	<i>English verb, 3.p. singular, present, indicative , (active).</i>	<i>Deixis and substantive : +plastic +hominid ÷ alive</i>	<i>English adjective: +action +possible ÷effort</i>	<i>English verb, to- infinitive. Di-valent: +subect +object</i>	<i>English equivalent of the logical function √. Frege, Russel and, Wittgenstei n</i>	<i>English adjective: +action +possible +effort</i>	<i>English verb, to- infinitiv e. Di- valent: +subect +object</i>	<i>Question mark ≈ Raising intonatio n = QUESTION</i>
Individual Meaning of 'Lisa'		<i>I have a doll JUST LIKE that</i>	<i>I can do it alone.</i>	<i>I see you and you see me, through eyes, glasses or tv.</i>	<i>Maybe one – maybe other. But not both/ maybe both?</i>	<i>Mum and dad help me.</i>	<i>I see you and you see me, through eyes, glasses or tv.</i>	
<b>Intra-text</b>	Verb- relator. Initial = inter- rogative modality	Nomen	N- predicate [≠eas(i)- ly]	Verbal extension: Subject- medium- object.	Relator	N- predicate [≠hard- ly]	Verbal ex- tension: Subject- medium -object.	Prosody: Question = 2.p. modal.
<b>Key morph.</b>		THIS DOLL	EASY			HARD	TO SEE	

Maybe, in such a situation, she chooses the only interpretation that makes sense: To interpret the question as regarding the doll's ability to see. That is even a quite relevant question since the doll is blindfolded. In other words, Lisa answers as if Chomsky were an interested fellow human being with whom she can create a sensitive and interesting dialogue.

R5: In relation to an abstract linguistic system, maybe Lisa understands Chomsky's question wrongly. But the process of understanding is a creative one – maybe especially for children who do not have that many linguistic experiences as grown-ups. Lisa is used to grown-ups that she can trust, and pragmatically she might expect Chomsky to be wise enough not to ask silly questions. Thus Lisa lets her pragmatic expectations overrule her semantic experiences. As she has done so often, she uses her new pragmatic experiences as a background for extending the semantic field of the utterance in question: "To see must be an act of the doll and not of me." So in relation to the situation she makes the only sensitive interpretation. And we notice that Chomsky actually *confirms* Lisa's interpretation: She does not deny it ("No, she is not hard to see, I can see her, and so can you!"), she accepts Lisa's interpretation as a premise of her next question ("Will you make her easy to see?"). After all, maybe Lisa's answer is not wrong – she answers exactly what the linguist expects her to answer. Chomsky does not cooperate in the process of making sense, and thus she excludes herself as an interested partner in a vital dialogue. Thus, in the dialogue there are deictic references to Lisa, the doll and the blindfold – but not once to the linguist. If Chomsky really wanted to know whether Lisa could see the doll, it would make much more sense to ask "Can you see this doll?" Her question is a trick question, and children are not familiar to that *genre* before school. In school they learn to be aware of "easy questions" – and their ulterior motives!

### **Aitchison's comments**

We will end our analysis with a few comments on Aitchison's interpretation of the dialogue. As we have just seen, Lisa is unfamiliar with the passive voice and she does not notice that the passive excludes one of the arguments of the active form: "I see the doll" – "The doll is seen [by me]". Another way of excluding such arguments is by *nominalizations* of verbs. There is a number of such nominalizations in Aitchison's comments, and we identify them through the derivational morphemes '-ing', '-sion', '-ation' etc. Some examples: 'surprising', 'shortcom-ings', 'comprehen-sion' and 'interpret-ations'. We also find some participles, marked by the morphemes '-ed' and '-ing': 'present-ed' and 'blindfold-ed'.

The nominalized verbs have two functions: First, to implicate subjects (cf. Bundsgaard forthcoming), and second, as a grammatical metaphor (cf. Halliday 1992). In phrases such as "to a perhaps surprising degree" and "structures

presented to them” Aitchison exclude – or implicate – some pragmatic subjects. It is for some reason not necessary for Aitchison to explicate *who* is surprised, and *who* presents. In such phrases we see the logics of structuralist science: There are no subjects influencing the data collection. It does not matter *who* does the presenting. It does not matter *who* talks with the child. This kind of ‘objective’ – ie. non-*subject-ive* – acts are the structuralist yardstick for good data collection.

There are no of the so-called modal verbs – but all verbs indicate a certain modality, thus being ”modal verbs” – and only two modal adverbs (*perhaps*, *usually*) in the text. The verbs are mainly of a constative kind (”we are presenting the facts”): The grammar *differs*, the 5-year-old *is* not aware, children *readily assign* etc. The adult linguist knows the system, and she can judge what ”parts” the child possesses and does not possess. The linguist proclaims eternal and global (non-context-sensitive) truths.

Finally, we notice that a child exclusively is referred to as ‘he’. The female linguist reproduces a specific understanding of the sexes, with the masculine being the neutral gender. As Dale Spender writes: ”for females, the only semantic space in English is negative.” (Spender 1980:161).

## 6. Conclusions & Invitations

The purpose of doing linguistics should be an intervention in a vital and interesting problematics. The purpose of doing ecolinguistics is thus an attempt to intervene in the problematics of our living as human beings in a world of diversity. Our living (ie. our co-living with Gaia) reflects and affects our language, *and* our language affects and reflects our living (ie. our co-living with Gaia). Therefore it makes a difference *how* we think and speak about language.

This is why we attempt to formulate a theoretical alternative to the traditional way of understanding morphology. This alternative, *ecomorphology*, is based on a dialectical view on some vital and basic dynamic and dialectical wholes:

- The dialectics of socio-logics, bio-logics and ideo-logics.
- The dialectics of intratextuality, intertextuality and extratextuality.
- The dialectics of syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
- The dialectics of micro-perspectives, meso-perspectives and macro-perspectives.
- The dialectics of acting, thinking and communicating.

In our final analysis we realised that the concept of morphology only makes sense in relation to a syntactic, semantic and pragmatic analysis (ie. an analysis of intra-, inter-, and extra-textual morphemic functions) of the complex relations between a text and (or: in) a situation. So, on the one hand we might not at all need ecomorphology as an ecolinguistic subdiscipline: Ecolinguistics is about language as a whole, ie. in its pragmatic, semantic, syntactic, morphologic, phonetic, etc. dimensions. On the other hand ecolinguistics is incompatible with traditional a-situational morphology, because this discipline builds on the invalidating dichotomy of 'pure' versus 'applied' – one thing that ecolinguistics must never do. It is a vital concern for ecolinguistics to provide a healthy basis for thinking and communicating about language – not just to apply some traditional linguistic artifacts on a given problematics. We invite our fellow ecolinguists and other to consider morphology in this light. So far, linguists have only *reflected* differently on language – but the point is to *refract* language.

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*Anna Vibeke Lindø og Simon S. Simonsen*

# **The Dialectics and Varieties of Agency – the Ecology of Subject, Person and Agent**

**AN ECOLINGUISTIC READING OF A SCIENTIFIC TEXT**

## ***1. Presentation***

As researchers and teachers of linguistics and science of health with an engagement in trans-scientific experiments, we often make the experience that disciplinary boundaries – unconsciously and therefore unintended – ultimately seem to prohibit real trans-boundary acknowledgments and experience among the professions that are involved. In other words it mostly seems as if the formations of concepts of the insulated disciplines for deep-seated causes – which we'll take up later – are too restricted to embrace the logics of other disciplines in spite of brave resolutions. For both of us, these questions are highly actual: most practitioners and advocates of medical research would probably agree, with us, that modern health research for good and for bad is still rooted in the positivistic philosophy of science and the institutional authority of its philosophy. This tradition finds its vital basis in biomedicine and argues for the idea of a universal biomedical scientific method. But this method has become a fetish. When one talks of the lack of actual succes of e.g. the genetic HGP-project, the advocates of this tradition praise the 'scientific method' as such. The breakthrough will come, they say. Today their hopes are towards genetics, 100 years ago they were towards microbiology. In relation to e.g. cancer, in spite of an extensive scientific and therapeutic offensive, survival rates have only been slightly improved for the most widespread cancers. Instead of waiting

for the big biomedical breakthrough, we hold that a part of the problem for medical research – and thereby for a healthier lifeform – is its insulation – its division of labour (Simonsen, 2000). This process of insulation is both the core and the contradiction in all modern research, also in our disciplines. For us a progressive research within the health sector will seek to overcome this contradiction by means of new philosophies of science. And to us, a nexus with ecolinguistics seems one fruitful path to go.

In mainstream linguistics, on the other hand, the 20th century led to a continuous extension of the idea of the objective of this new science – introduced by Ferdinand de Saussure – from the narrow focus on the language system via speech act theory and pragmatics to the so-called poststructuralism, which holds itself to be indebted to Saussure by hailing the idea of the language as system, but with some modifications which means that they differ from his static and arbitrary structuralism at some crucial points. First and foremost, the poststructuralist claims that the system is dynamic, and that the ongoing changes of that system are due to societal changes. This conception of language means that the constitution and change of discursive patterns should be observed in the societal praxis. The distinction between *langue* and *parole* has weakened – but as far as we can see, the dichotomy still persists as an analytical coercion.

However, the overall objective and interest of today's progressive linguistic theories is to study the use and development of language of cultural phenomena. The fact implies a continuous development towards trans-scientific projects in which the theoretical categories are grounded in each other: the logics of one theoretical framework are partly motivated in the others' logics – because a transscientific project is thematic and does not restrict itself to answer intra-disciplinary questions like an autonomous scientific approach will do.

Thus, our personal and academic experiment is to bring together the study of health and the analysis of dialogues. As a philosopher and a linguist with a partly common institutional *TOPOS* in the Danish academic society, we are socialized into a scientific bureaucracy, in which disciplinary insulation for decades has been – and predominantly still is – an effective means to the disciplination and control of science. We therefore are aware both of our common and subjective prejudices and the imperialising position we risk to take as members of an academic society: we are inevitably part of its discursive power and authoritarian hierarchy. As dialectical researchers, however, we are also aware of the demand for scientific reflexivity and the fact that all descriptions are also self-descriptions: we don't regard science as a mere reflection of an external world, but as a dialogical construction itself. All human beings have a perspective which implies a certain ideal of knowledge, and this ideal is partly constituted by – and is constituting – some complex institutional ideological

constraints which have a regulating effect on the processes of recontextualisation of the scientific processes and products. Thus the question of communication becomes a question of the means whereby legitimate messages could be shared according to some abstract boundary rules. That's the reason why research on human beings, life and being in touch needs an explication of the interpretations of ourselves, i.e. both the researcher and the subject under scrutiny are aware of his or her interpretations in relation to the field under research. As a consequence of this viewpoint we do not regard the absence of neutrality in scientific questions as a problem: in our conception the absence of neutrality is a condition of human life and thus a condition of science that excludes the idea of an absolute truth as the ideal of knowledge.

As Basil Bernstein has pointed out (1981, 1990, 2000), strong disciplinary insulation creates categories that are clearly bounded, with a space for the development of a specialised identity. If a genre more or less suddenly changes, the scientific society will be forced to change its identity, too, because of the space that inevitably arises between it and the new genre which is its context of recontextualisation. As the genre principle creates order and is created by order, the contradictions and dilemmas which necessarily inhere in the principle of the text type conventionally are suppressed by the conventions and ideas of text types. During this process of recontextualisation, however, the text is laid open: the arbitrary nature of the power relations that were disguised behind ongoing processes of naturalization, hidden by the principles of the text type, become visible. Under certain conditions, it might seem as if this change in the principle of genre becomes a threat to the principle of integrity of coherence of the individual. In other words: within the discipline a genre becomes a system of phisic defense against the possibility of the weakening of the genre, which would reveal the suppressed contradictions and dilemmas (Bernstein, 2000). According to this viewpoint. we'll regard trans-scientific cooperative works as a challenge to our disciplinary identity. That's where democratic interdisciplinary dialogues become vital, raising questions like: what do we share? What's the differences? Are we ready to start an interdisciplinary experiment?

Already in 1978 Bang & Døør discussed the implications of the conception of discourse and dialogue as a vital aspect of the societal praxis in an article on 'Language, Institutions and Classes'. As one consequence of this viewpoint institutional texts and contexts are of a certain interest for linguistics, because institutions reflect and ossify explicit and implicit systems of societal values. These values are partially linguistically constituted and are therefore constantly reproduced by linguistic articulations. In our part of the world the institutions are hierarchically defined in a way that implies that the institutions of lower rank become constituents of those with a higher rank. Furthermore, each institution has some internal constituents such as persons and texts. Thus,

institutions are characterized by clashes of interest, and their language use is a conjuncture of these circumstances. Thus, the focus on institutional dialogue points to some vital aspects of language as a social relation, a social process and a social product. And again, this viewpoint leads to a conception of language use as an interdependency between the subject and the persons who articulate that subject, and between the actual and institutional articulations. As a consequence of this, our analysis is not an analysis of the isolated text but of some institutional and scientific logics.

In the article, we present a popularized version of a scientific text on neuropsychimmunology, which we regard as a fruitful and ecological trans-disciplinary theory on the interdependency of physical and mental health including both biomedical and psychological perspectives on body and mind. By means of an analysis of deictic, modal and metaphorical features in the article we'll illustrate how the author tries to come to terms with these logics.

## *2. Ecological linguistics*

Ecolinguistics is an umbrella term for '[...] all approaches in which the study of language (and languages) is in any way combined with ecology'. (Fill, 1993:126). Discussions among ecolinguists concerning the definition of 'ecology' in this particular context (i.e. Alexander, 1996), i.e. the limitation of the object of ecolinguistics have made it clear that while some researchers constrain their objective to awareness of the presentation of environmental problems in texts, others work from a broader perspective. Among these are the founders of Danish Dialectical Linguistics (the Odense School of Ecolinguistics), whose definition says that

'We define linguistics in a dialectical way that should imply an ecologically reflected organization of persons and problems concerned about the phenomena of language.' (1998:7)

From this perspective, a dialectical theory is also an ecological theory because of the relational method of investigation. Furthermore, the perception of environment as ideologically, sociologically and biologically constituted and constituting implies that all vital interpersonal relations are part of ecological questions. This conception of language and linguistics also indicates that all texts (written or spoken) are regarded as potential objectives.

Thus, Bang & Døør's theory of language is itself an ecological theory and a kind of philosophical experimentalism – an aspect that – as far as we are aware of – is unique to ecolinguistics. Not only the object of linguistics, but linguistics

itself is redefined in this theory in which the categories definitely make up with the constraints of former linguistic approaches.


### 3. *The dialogical principle*

We already emphasized the dialogue as a process of increasing insight. But a dialogical life form is also a demanding one: the dialogical process is a process in which the participants are laid open to critics: the person becomes vulnerable, and (s)he must be able to go beyond own experiences in order to elaborate the perspectives. From our point of view, a theory of language that hails the dialogical principle should

- (i) regard the dialogue as the paradigm of linguistics
- (ii) be sensitive to the semantic potentials of dialogues
- (iii) be sensitive to the complex contradictions of the social praxis which is dialectically constituted by these dialogues.

A theory of language that is based on a dialogical conception of language differs from more monological approaches to discourse in its view on subjectcategories:

#### Model of situation



The conception of the constitution of dialogue articulated by the model above implies a diachronic aspect, because it illustrates the situation in which any child develops the idea of production of language; (S)he overhears the dialogues of the grownups, constituted as the third subject in the dialogue and has hereby already made an important experience, namely that dialogues and responsibility are vital and inseparable aspects of human communication.

According to the model above, the three subjects are differently situated in their social praxis and universe of significance. This viewpoint implies that differences and contradictions are regarded as the *raison d'être* of all dialogues and the heterogeneity they constitute a vital potential for the development of democratic dialogues based on shared experiences.


Finally, from our viewpoint, the idea of a third subject makes the model extremely context-sensitive because it operates on a dialectics between societal and individual aspects of semantics: the third subject might indeed appear both as the incarnation of some institutional and societal conventions as a shared dialogue partner, but it might as well originate from individual experiences and express an individual meaning.

#### ***4. The semantic potential of dialogue***

The term *individual meaning* is one aspect of the so-called semantic matrix which illustrates the dialectical interdependency between the social sense, the social import and the individual meaning and personal significance of all texts. The model indicates and implies that no linguistic potential of communication is neutral, but is always a conjuncture of social as well as individual positions.

The semantic aspects outlined in the model are continuously defined by the subjects of the dialogue, and institutional as well as individual circumstances, general as well as specific contexts determine the actual dominating dimensions, the personal significance.

## The semantic Matrix



The personal significance is the individual's unique contribution to the use and non-use and the development of language and is therefore constrained and defined by the actual situation.

### 5. The four contexts

The categories of situation and textual representation of the situation in which a given text was uttered as part of the situation often are considered equivalent as being THE context of the text. From a dialectical viewpoint, however, we consider it more meaningful to distinguish between at least four contexts for a text. One of the points is that each time the text moves from one context to another, questions on ideology, power and control become actualized, because they carry both the power of reproduction and the potential for change. In spite of these indisputable facts, we often discuss the texts as if the derived context is the only and most appropriate one and as if it is superior in relation to the other aspects of contexts.



## ***6. A trans-disciplinary, ecolinguistic analysis of a trans-scientific text***

Up till now, we have sketched out our theoretical perspectives on ecolinguistics as a transdisciplinary science. We'll now exemplify the problem of insulation of scientific disciplines by means of a trans-scientific analysis of deictic, modal and metaphorical features in the text introduced above. The text was published in a Danish magazine on health and life style in 1995.

The text originates from a context of the academic society, which sets some boundaries for what is legitimate knowledge and what could be said and how it could be said. We notice that the subject of the text, psychoneuroimmunology, is an example of regionalisation of knowledge (Bernstein, 2000). The regionalisation of the academic field was developed in the last five decades of the past century as a new principle for distribution of knowledge and is closely connected with the technologisation of knowledge. Secondly, the text is written by an academic researcher with a natural scientific background, but addressed to ordinary people with a certain interest in a holistic conception of health. This complex process of recontextualisation lays the text open for ideological considerations.

We'll refer to Bang & Døørs four categories of context in order to explicate the vital relations between the textual syntax, its semantics and the pragmatics constituted by living persons in communication.

## ***7. The context of the producer and the production of the text***

The author of the text who is a female, former researcher on genetics is now engaged in the development of psychoneuroimmunology which we regard as a sort of an ecological way of carrying out an area of the natural sciences. In the field of psychoneuroimmunology, the subject is responsible for her health and for the process of her own healing. The text was published in 1995 in a Danish magazine titled 'My Health'. The magazine is edited by scientists with a certain interest in holistic research on sociology and health. In the colophon it is stressed that the magazine is independent and has no connections to any sect. We notice that already here the text is double voiced: in one sense, the magazine signals a break with biomedicine – on the other hand the editors stress the interdependency and the policy statement becomes vague. Furthermore, we interpret the use of a negation as the reminiscence of a piece of dialogue with a third, but hidden subject, the biomedical tradition. We conclude from this observation that the editors are deeply subjected to the social import of the insti-

tutional logics which they feel highly indebted to as the contractors of academic identity. Our observations on the phenomena of ‘double voice’ will currently be in focus throughout the following chapter.

### ***8. The context of the communicators and the communication of the text***

In our theoretical presentation we related our ecological linguistic tradition to the dialogical principle and discussed the presence of a third subject in dialogue as an important category of a dialogical theory of communication and we already introduced one possible mute subject which we considered to be that of the academic institution of biomedicine. As academic researchers ourselves, we recognize the dilemma as a recurrent problem which we don’t pretend to have solved either, namely the problem of fixing an order of priority. To whom do we address our writings? To those whom it concerns – e.g. the subjects ‘out there’ or the academic field? To whom do we feel indebted? Mostly, teachers, doctors and other authorities are by convention more interested in social sharing with other authorities than with their pupils, patients and clients – a choice that positions the latter as objects for consideration among academics and not participants and addressors.

We chose the text on psychoneuroimmunology because it shows the author’s exemplary attempt to change unhealthy logics and conceptions of the subject as a machine, subjected to a capitalist societal context. But the text also lays open the dilemmas that are involved. We’ll substantiate this allegation by means of a deictic, modal and metaphorical analysis of the text.

According to The Model of Reference, the reference to the contexts in question are actualised linguistically by means of the deictic categorisation of the text. Thus, the extra-textual references, which constitute the TOPOS of the text, are important focii. Traditionally, deictic categories are limited to include personal pronouns and time/place references. In our dialectical theory of language we also consider the indicators of logics as deictic features. Logical deixis not only comprises the so-called logical terms (all, none, some, many a.s.o.) but also modality. This approach to the category of deixis makes it possible for the analyst to uncover and point out the implicit logics of the text and categorize them as extra-textual features. As linguistic examples of this strategy we’ll draw attention to the frequent use of the zero subject ‘you’ and the fact that this pronoun sometimes refers to the individual as a self reflexive and responsible subject of her/his own life, sometimes to a scientific community with an unlimited power to define The Truth.

The metaphorical features substantiate our initial observations and articulate an implicit submission to capital and bureaucratic logics. Thus we observe several examples of references to SCIENCE as an indisputable authority that also rules attempts to develop new approaches to health:

I dag er der videnskabeligt belæg for, at tanker og følelser fra belastende livsbegivenheder påvirker immun-systemet.	Today it is scientifically proved that thoughts and feelings from embarrassing events of life influence on the immune system.
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We regard the reference to an unmarked ‘science’ and the taking over of the idea of the relation between body and environment as a question of defense (the disease-as-war metaphor). According to Lakoff & Johnson’s categorisation of metaphor, we notice first and foremost that the mind is interpreted as an entity. The following fragments of the text will exemplify our observations. In the translation, we’ve given the voice of the Danish text priority over a ‘correct’ English reproduction. The text begins with the following statement:

Vi bør alle jævnligt se ind i vores psyke og ‘rydde op’.	We all ought to look inside our mind regularly and ‘tidy it up’.
--	--

Den indre livskvalitet er optimal, hvis man forstår at manøvrere der, hvor man psykisk set befinder sig.	The inner quality of life is optimal if one knows how to manoeuvre right there, where one is mentally.
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The idea of the mind as an entity expresses a viewpoint that conflicts with the idea of a holistic science. The traditional biomedical idea of the mind as a machine is also present:

Den proces kan ofte sættes i gang i løbet af få samtaler, hvor en patient hjælpes til at arbejde med ‘at kode det indre bånd om’.	The process can often be started during a few talks where a patient is helped to work on a recoding of the internal tape.
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The aim of capital logic is to produce profit by work. In the text, this logic is promoted by means of several metaphors which are applied to the mental healing of the subject:

Man skal <i>selv</i> ville udføre et stykke arbejde.	You ought to be willing to carry out the job <i>yourself</i> .
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Det kan betale sig at rydde op i sin psyke.	It pays to tidy up one's mind.
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As already suggested, we also meet traces of the disease-as-war-metaphor which has been scientifically described (e.g. by Susan Sontag) and criticized for decades. Thus, our linguistic observations point to this so-called subject-oriented theory as a method to establish a double bind: theoretically, the individual is positioned as responsible for her own life and health – on the other hand, (s)he is subjected by an authoritarian and dehumanized voice, positioned as a consumer of the underlying logics of capitalism. In a further societal perspective we see this double bind as an effect of the ongoing marketization and bureaucratization of institutions of various kind, including the health services, that has increased during the last three decades. We are now aware of the fact that war and war metaphors promote resistance and is a dehumanizing language use and activity. We regard love and trust as the contradiction of war and hatred. But love and trust assumes empathy and interest and first of all words. That's where dialogue comes in. Thus, the resistance against dialogue which characterizes the biomedical philosophy is to be interpreted as an effect of the limiting rationality and sound mind. Medical treatment is, when isolated, a totally anonymous process. The producer of the medicaments is anonymous, the person who makes out the medicine is faceless and so is the user of the medicamental treatment. Thus, this object-dominated approach becomes a contribution to social control and might be used as such to keep the population in check – wordless. Both parts – doctor and patient – avoid a linguistic formulation of what the subject is about.

As an alternative to the depersonalization outlined above, psychoneuroimmunology is expected to be a dialogical science: it is a relatively new branch of medical science that we regard as a new way of reflexion of the interpretation of the body, and disease/health, which has dominated the biomedical approach. We regard psychoneuroimmunology as an attempt to develop an ecological approach to health because of the democratic and relational aspects that are outlined in the underlying theoretical considerations. But a crucial aspect of democratic and relational thinking is to take the Other's world seriously. The Other, however, is absent in the text under scrutiny. As far as we can see, the problem is due to the individualistic philosophy that underlies the text and the hidden subjection to capital logic.

On the other hand we notice that the author is aware of the fact that our linguistic practices are closely bound up with metaphorical conceptualisations, which condition our perception of ourselves and the world and that time has come to break with the cognitive axiology they sustain in order to elaborate alternative cognitive and more ecological orientations: the final part of the ar-

ticle indicates that the author is aware of the need for a metaphorical re-orientation project:

Man kunne betragte mennesket som et væsen, hvis psyke kan lignedes ved en flod.	One might regard man as a creature whose mind can be seen as a river.
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Det kræver mod og energi at ændre retning eller fjerne dæmninger, men energien kommer mangefold igen.	It takes courage and energy to change one's direction or to remove dams, but the energy will come back many times.
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We regard the mind-as-a-river metaphor that is tentatively introduced here as an explicit attempt to break with the mechanistic and antropocentric world view and replace it with a biocentric metaphorical concept. In fact, Alwin Fill also used the water metaphor in his introduction to Ecolinguistics (1993) when he described the difference between structuralism and ecolinguistics:

‘Strukturalismus untersucht und beschreibt den Zustand des Wassers beim Staudamm (Synchronie) oder die Entwicklung einer Welle auf dem Fluß (Diachronie), Ökologie betrachtet das Fließen selbst.’ (1993:5)

### ***9. The context of the consumers and the consumption of the text***

The words we use are already parts of a semantic field as they have already been used by others in multiple local settings, and so they become constituents of actual dialogues trailing meaning from the past. The language producer has to work with the uses others before them have made of the word, reproduce them or change them by adding his or her own intention, own accent, adapting it to our individual meanings. Thus, to speak or write is always essentially dialogic and a life line to history. From this perspective, any utterance is a vital reworking of terms that have already been given meaning elsewhere in the dialogues of others. Hence, the heterogeneity of voices in a dialogue is not only due to the different voices in the text, but also in movements between one voice and another in continuous sequences, so that one is embedded in the other. As already described above, the logics of societal institutions and conventions are the constraints and possibilities among which the author takes a position. And (s)he always has the power to recontextualize them and determine how they'll be presented in the text, which creates a new dialogic ordering among the

boundaries of the discipline. In the text under scrutiny we've seen that the author takes a dual position, she is present at different levels of the text and hereby leaves the reader in confusion. In spite of the presence of diversity of voices in the text, it is finally monological, because medical theory regulates the discourse and subordinates the intentions and perspectives of the original speakers to the order of discourse, regulating the intra-textual dialogues, supplanting the original intentions of the subjects with an authorized system of discursive intentions. Thus it standardizes the local interpretative practices of its participants and sets up a unitary organization of subject positions, determining how the reader can enter into the dialogic relations of the text.

From our point of view, the problem of monologic practices ought to be central to ecolinguistics, for reasons both theoretical and moral. We need to account for the conditions that impede dialogue and so impede ecology as dialogue.

### ***10. The context derived. Conclusions and invitations***

We've chosen Hanne Dreisigs text as an example for presentation on a symposium on ecolinguistics. Once more, the text has been the object for a complex process of recontextualisation. As already pointed out, any process of recontextualisation implies changing positions on an arena of conflict and struggle for authority. The key question here is whether that process will impede reproduction or change. 'Our' text did both. From our point of view, the problems of health will not find a solution with more funding, more rational administration or new technical treatments. We can't handle new problems with old methods. On the contrary, we consider our problems to be a problem within our philosophy of health. Thus, our aim has been to draw the attention to the importance of a discussion on the shared and different conditions that will always be present in trans-scientific work. As trans-scientific researchers we've considered ecolinguistics to be an approach to text analysis which is not exclusively reserved to linguists. On the other hand, ecolinguistics is itself an example of a theoretical field which is aware of conventional categories and the importance of weakening disciplinary boundaries and insulation in scientific research.

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# **Ecology, Ethics & Communication**

AN ESSAY IN ECO-LINGUISTICS

## ***1. Introduction***

Science or scientific praxis is nothing more or less than a particular, historical, social praxis and part of a specific socio-cultural order. Different cultures create different forms of science and every dominant scientific praxis organizes its people and problems in ways and by means that aims at the same Ends as the culture as a whole. Relations between scientific praxis and culture are dialectical. A *dialectical relationship* is one in which the participants in the relations co-condition each other and inter-act; one part dominates the others, and the relations, historically and dynamically; and the whole collapses if one part is annihilated, removed from the unity, or reduced to a critical seize of functional level. So present scientific praxis is dialectically determined by modern capitalist culture and has not existed before, and will not exist after the epoch of modern capitalism, i.e. from 1945 until the capitalism is subsumed the criteria of the survival of our species; a prominent step in that direction was the *Rio-Conference 1992*.

Scientific praxis, however, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but a *heterogeneous* one. It contains parts and relations that belong to former epochs and some that might dominate future cultural formations. A vital and essential feature of modern capitalist culture is the fact that this culture is the very first one that is global and colours – and de-colours – the life of every village on *Gaia* – and thus every thought, speech, and activity of every *individuality* on *Gaia*.

## Linguistics as a life-science

Surprisingly, many linguists seem to understand language as if it was a mechanical tool for interaction between machines and do not seem to understand that linguistics is a **life-science** in general, and a life-science of and for *human linguistic communication* in particular.

Being a life-science, linguistics has to be developed in and by a dialogue with the very best methods and most inspiring ideas of Biology.

Among the trends in modern 21st Century linguistics, *eco-linguistics* is the one most closely related to an understanding of the implications of practising linguistics as a life-science. Eco-linguistics is an umbrella term for a rich variety of different schools, traditions, and individuals. Some of the branches of eco-linguistics have evidently internalized the *ideology* of linguistics as a sort of life-science.

The life-sciences of the deepest interest in this context are *medicine* and *biology*. The latter because it is centred on the development, regulations, and regeneration of life-systems. Modern biology is cultivated as a sort of systemic and orientated towards living systems and their relationships with, and in the environment; therefore biology belongs to the sciences of **ecology**. The former because it is concerned with the human illnesses and human health; therefore, it is an axiological science with an explicit **ethics**. *The medical praxis* is committed to try to enhance a healthy development of human beings and to restore the health of any human being. *Eco-linguistics* has to enhance a healthy development of the linguistic qualifications of human beings and the constitutions of situations in which human beings are able to use language to create healthy cultures and life-forms.

## Health, Sickness & Language

The well-known surgeon and author BERNIE S. SIEGEL writes:

Our daughter Carolyn handed me a cartoon one day that showed a gentleman waking up and saying: "I feel great, what a beautiful day, I'll call in sick." Of course, we often think we have to get sick literally in order to get the rest or pleasure we need in our lives. Bobbie and I therefore taught our children when they were younger that if they need a day off from school, they should just say that and take a health day, not a sick day. That made them look at life differently. I think all of us need to rethink our attitudes toward health and sickness.

(Bernie S. Siegel, *Peace, Love & Healing*. Harper Perennial, 1993:48)

The text has different interesting aspects concerning (i) illness and health, (ii) medicine and linguistics, and (iii) language and life.

First, it is important to notice that we normally want to take a day off when we feel great. Usually we tell our employee that we are sick, or we allow our children to stay at home and write a note to their school saying that Carolyn was sick yesterday. We hide under a false or misleading description of our situation – and because we need it or want it. It is remarkable that in English “*want*” means both “*need*”, “*wish*”, and “*is short of*”.

Modern research in medicine shows, however, that there is an intimate connection between our use of language and the state of our cells and organs. In some sense it is as-if we talk both to ourselves – our mind, so to speak – and to our body, both when we are talking with an inner voice and when we are talking aloud to ourselves and others.

We propose that we start regarding our language-use as **life-significant**, i.e. that our talk has both a *socio-logical significance* and a *bio-logical significance*. When language has a socio-logical significance it influences and co-conditions our social life. When language has a bio-logical significance it influences and co-conditions our biological life.

There is, however, even more at stake. When we talk, our talking has an *ideo-logical significance*, too. Our language-use colours and co-conditions our thought processes, even though they are not present in a linguistic medium, but in pictures, images, feelings, emotions, sensations, or perceptions.

The socio-logical significance of telling your employee that you are sick, when you feel great on a beautiful day, is, however,

- a) that it makes it *legal* for you to stay at home,
- b) that you *legitimize* that lying is OK in order to take care of yourself,

that you tell your children that it is morally right to cheat your employee and lie about your health.

Every act is, however, an act of self-identification, just as every linguistic activity is a self-description and self-definition.

If you want to stay at home when you feel great, you do not feel at home on work; and *not feeling and being at home* is a feeling of **alienation**.

A criterion for *alienation* is that you and your life or some situations are defined by:

- (i) the *negation* of friendship as the dominant relation, or
- (ii) the *privation* of friendship as the dominant relation.


## Language and Communication

Every child knows that similar words and sentences usually are used to indicate one conjuncture of meanings when the mother utters them and a different meaning conjuncture when the fathers utters them. And furthermore, that the same person, e.g. the mother, means something different when she uses similar words and sentences in different situations, i.e. situations constituted by different persons, or types of persons, and circumstances. And furthermore, that different persons “put” similar meanings in different words and one person “puts” similar meanings in different words in different situations

It is a basic knowledge and experience for all of us that similar signs are differently related with meanings, dependent of the relation to the individual person, individual meaning, and to the sort of social situation, social import. And that similar meanings are related with different signs by and for different persons and by and for different situations.

And all of us know that we are ourselves a part in determining the conjuncture of meanings, both by our interpretations and by our uttering linguistic and other signs.

**Fig. 1: Situation Model (1)**



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- B = Background/Environment
- m = Medium
- M = Media Formation
- S = Person
- U = Utterance/Text/Object

From our dialectical point of view we define the linguistic signs as parts of human communication, not as the basic unit of communication. The human communication constitutes the linguistic signs that are becoming linguistic signs when the persons in communication produce and interpret them as linguistic signs in the communication. The “basic unit” of linguistic communication, and linguistic signs, is a situation and dialogue dialectically constituted by at least three persons, i.e. (S1) the person(s) who utters the signs, (S2) the person(s) to whom the signs are addressed, and (S3) the other person(s) being part of the situation and communication. These three personal parts determine – dialectically – what is to be considered a linguistic signs, what is to be considered the relationship between the linguistic signs, what is to be considered significant signs, and what is to be considered the significance of the signs. Some of the considerations may be shared by the three parts, some of them may be differently identified, and much of the situational whole may be unidentifiable parts and non-parts.

We sometimes present the model, *Fig. 1.*, in order to indicate the three-partial dialectics of the identification of the text, or discourse, the parts of the text, the meaning of the text and the parts of the text.

The model indicates that the phenomenon a text, or a discourse, exists by the identifications created by the personal parts of a communicative situation, and these identifications may differ and be similar from one person to the other. Who knows what are the shared and the different parts of the identifications but the persons in their communicative relations with each other. The text is a part of the persons’ situation and may be a part of their communication. The text is not The Means of their communication but they may use their communication to make the text, or parts of the text, a part of the communication. The personal communication is the basic condition for the existence of a text as a text. A text cannot be identified neither as a linguistic form nor as a meaning indicator without persons who identify it as part of human communication. The text or discourse is an object for different persons in communicative relations.


We sometimes use a different model, *Fig. 2.*, to indicate the dialectical relations of a text (an object) and the persons making that object to a common part of their relations.

The two models indicate the contextual, the personal and situational constitution of a text, or discourse.

Sometimes we meet something that looks like a text, e.g. a book, a sheet of paper, a letter, some acoustic signals from a tape or radio, i.e. some phenomena that could be a part of a communicative situation, could be a more or less shared part of communication between persons in communication. Thus we sometimes become a part of a communication with some other persons without being in direct communication with each other; then a text could be used as a means for

indirect communication between persons in different situations, differently located and/or being aware of the text at different times. Please notice, that we consider a text to be a potential for indication of shared and different meanings among persons in communication, a medium in and for communication. A text is not “the direct message” but is an indirect part of direct communication; a text has no meaning in itself, does not direct the meanings or the communication. A text may indirectly be and become a part of human communication of meanings. A text cannot determine or convey meanings. But a text might be an important part of human communication, if persons let it be an important part.

**Fig. 2: Situation Model (2)**



Again and again we emphasise this basic, this ontological, dialectics of the constitution of text and language: any text, any part of a text, any language, or part of language, is constituted by the persons who use the part, the text, the language, as a part, a medium, of and for human communication. What the text or language conveys of meaning is not in the text or language, but is co-created by the persons and their relationships.

**The ethnocentricity of the category ‘Subject’**

By defining or realizing the human parts of textual communication as “subjects” we are making a categorization or classification that is partially an ethnocentric point of view. Therefore we emphasize the partial status of our models when we present them; furthermore we indicate by dialectical symbols that the relational subject-constitution of text and language and communication is dialectically


constituted with the (practical) wholeness of the situation and the environment in the three basic dimensions of biologics, sociologics, and ideologics. Furthermore we emphasize that the models should illustrate the human constitution of inter-human linguistic communication, and not every communication between every beings constituting life, earth, universe. Languages and texts are considered from the point of view of an human community as intra-specietal, or intra-societal, symbolic inter-subjective activities as parts of communication between members of the same species. Of course any human being is in communication with (members) of other species and non-species as a basic condition for any (living) existence – every individual body has to participate directly in the dialectical metabolism between animals, plants, air, water etc. as a forthgoing process without lethal interruptions in order to continue the existence as a living individuality. The human society is not to be understood as an isolated intra-system for internal distribution among its individual members, or as a common system with one common port for export and one common port for import. The social organisation cannot dispense from the fact that any member is the active part in that part's living communication with "the members of other classes and non-classes". This point is of vital importance in modern societies that primarily promote the *ideologen* that the real, or important, values are the social symbolic values, e.g. money, scores, point, informations, social status etc. Any symbolic system relies dialectically upon the symbiotic of the living beings that constitute that symbolic system. And the vital symbiotic of any living creature imply both the symbiosis with the other creatures of the species, i.e. soc-ial symbiosis, e.g. mother-father-child, and with the creatures and non-creatures of other species and non-species, i.e. metabolically symbiosis. In our relationship with the non-human beings we are constituting inter-species-"societies", we are a subject of one species in biotopical relation with subjects of other species and non-species.

To resume: We are individual members of both human societies and extra-human symbiotic, and both these vital relations of existence are dialectically related with our more or less common and individual ideologies. And our constitution of language. It is completely wrong to identify the language and the text as if they were self-constituted, or self-constituting, individualities. It is completely wrong to define the language and the text as socially significant independent of the individuals in communication. It is completely wrong to define language and text as life significant independent of the human symbiosis with other human and non-human beings.

### The dialectics of the external and the internal parts of the text

Nevertheless, by the fact that persons during our social, biological, and ideological life have created texts and languages as medial parts of our communication, some forms of utterances, texts, languages have been identified with similar significance for the persons in several situations to indicate parts of the situational meaning. Thus some parts of texts and languages we recognise as similar with earlier identified communicative utterances, some similar parts used very often by the persons in a community, and some other parts used more seldom. Every person and society create some order of recurrence of similar sign and their uses, a memory of the usual form and the communicative relations that we have experienced to share, more or less, with our social relatives, and more or less with different social relatives. Some linguists seem to maintain that the most recurrent parts should be some sort of the smallest unit of language, and that more seldom parts should be built by combination of the smaller parts, e.g. that a phoneme, or a grapheme, should be the smallest units, combinable to morphemes, to words, to sentences, to texts, to languages.

**Fig. 3: Dialectical hierarchy of the parts of text and communication**



We emphasize that there is no smallest unit of language. Every part of language exists by the personal relating of the parts to the other parts and to the situation of communication. No part of a text or language is reducible to be a subpart of major parts if the persons in communication do not create such a classification, and any part of language and a text might be of the most indispensable importance as well as of the most dispensable redundancy.

Therefore we have tried to indicate the dialectics of the “inner” relations of the parts of a text and the “outer” relations of the parts and the segmentation by means of the model of “the dialectical hierarchy of the parts of text and communication”. The model is to be understood as a heuristic model.

## *2. Classification of texts, language, & communication*

### **Ordinary languages & extra-ordinary languages**

There is a class of language forms (or forming) which we call “**ordinary languages**”, comprising two sub-classes, (i) language for general purpose, and (ii) language for specific purpose.

Language for general purpose, **LGP**, or *common language*, is the kind of ordinary language that:

- a) functions as a medium in linguistic communication in every day life between family, neighbours, friends, and acquaintances; it is the normal medium at home;
- b) functions as the medium for the communication between more specialized language forms, and between foreign languages;
- c) functions as a medium for the dominant ideologies of the culture or social group.

A paradigm case for the domain and universe of ordinary language is the aforementioned situation and dialogue between father and daughter.

Language for specific purpose, **LSP**, or *specialized language*, is the kind of ordinary language,

- a) that functions as a medium of linguistic communication between specialists;
- b) that functions as a medium for communication about specialized objects or situations.

The relation between LGP and LSP as parts of ordinary language is dialectical in nature. Languages for specific purposes – as we know them e.g. in medicine and biology – grow out of common language and act themselves back on common language and become melted into the vernacular; e.g. DNA is now a part of common language.

Secondly, there is another class which we call “**extra-ordinary language**”.

Extra-ordinary language is the language that is regarded as *paradoxical* in relation to ordinary language (common and specialized language). This class contains four different domains:

- a) language of mental disorder, e.g. schizophrenic language;
- b) language of poetry;
- c) language of mystical experiences;
- d) language of controversial – paradoxical – science and theory.

The similarity between the various forms of extra-ordinary languages is that they break some principles or rules of the syntax, semantics, or pragmatics of ordinary languages.

### **Public and Private Texts – Original and Derived**

Some texts we consider as public utterances; by the publication of the utterances the speaker/writer invites acquainted persons as well as non-acquainted persons to be partners of the dialogue, observing the text as a shared object for common consideration in order to share some experiences and meanings. That means that the second person, S2, in some characteristic ways is not a specific individual, or a specific individuality (group, collective) of individuals. The communication is not directly personally inter-personal; let us call the S2 an **anonymous S2**. That does not mean that anybody is equal to everybody in being a potential and real personal part of the communication; somebody is more invited, or selected, as being an acquainted partner than are other ones; the selectivity of the invitation is constituted by:

- a) the author (S1),
- b) the specific media (linguistic and transporting media),
- c) the S3-persons and -institutions that incarnate the social authority for that forms of communication, and
- d) the feasibility of the discursive universe and object in relation to the different experiences and inter-esse-identifications of different groups of persons.

These constituents condition and constraint – more or less powerful – the access for different persons to be a socially accepted S2-partner of the dialogue; i.e. being or becoming a person who's answers, questions, and inventions are considered to be relevant parts of that dialogue.

The organisation of a text and situation constitutes both communication and ex-communication of individuals and categories of individuals; or, turned in a slightly different way, every text and situation is related and reliable to an infinite and indeterminable number and sorts of recursive bases. There's no definite limits of the text, and the meaning of the text, but the practical relations of persons considering and reconsidering the text as a part of specific, situational communication between some persons more than between other persons.

Public texts are originally produced and reproduced in several public copies similar to each other; this “multiplicity” is a characteristic of these texts and their original communicative meaning.

Some texts are of a more **private** nature. Private texts are uttered by persons in personal communication with each other. The persons know each other personally and identify the communication as being privately determined by the members of the group – in the sense that the known persons make the personal and social meanings and the identifications of the parts of speech. That means that the texts, the turns of the dialogues, are shared more exclusively – more private – by persons who are present at the same place and time, engaged in common co-operations.

The persons evidently know who is the S1-part, who the S2-parts, and who are the S3-parts with access to, and awareness on the utterances. The relevant situation and context are shared by the participants sharing the spoken parts as objectified media for communication. The utterances take place and time in a situation, topos and praxis that are obvious and common knowledge for the participants in the original situation, in a way that is critically different from the knowledge and conditions for identifications in the **derived** situation of other persons, e.g. the linguist who didn't participated in the original situation. In the original situation the situational and contextual conditions for identifications of deixis, modality, and metaphors are more evidently existing by the constitutive parts of the situation, so to speak, around the linguistic indications. The utterances have not to describe the situation and context for somebody outside the situation; they are produced in order to create situational developments and shifts of awareness.

Some texts are produced as private texts, but are since made public, cf. the Siegel-text. And vice versa, e.g. when we quote public texts in our private communication. Other texts are neither public nor private, e.g. our text example 4.

### *3. Text & Discourse Examples*

In the following we present, and represent, six text examples of six different categories of texts. The categories are defined, or identified, by the type of situation in which the linguistic utterances originally were produced.

We explicitly present the texts as representations of textual parts in the following way:

In part (0) we indicate a few characteristics of the original situation in order to share some relevant images of the constitutive of that situation with the partners of our communication and situation. You and we are present in our situation(s) and create some more or less shared representations of a non-present situation in order to communicate about the absent situation and some linguistic parts of that situation.

We indicate in the left column who is the speaker of that part, that “turn”, or part of a turn, of the dialogue; our text representation is thus similar to the genre used by the author of a drama.

Thus we try to make it explicit that the utterances originally belonged to a different situation, and that that situation and the participants constituted the universe of discourse of, and for, the utterances partly represented here in our situation. In order to know e.g. the deictic references for the utterances we have to create a fiction of the original situation. Our fictions of the original situation is a constitutive part of our universe of discourse in our situation of communication.

Of course we also use the linguistic parts of the utterances as indicators of the situation, as being similar to some of the constitutive parts of the original situation; that means that we emphasize the dialectical relationship of the text and the context, or, more explicitly, the dialectics of the original situation and the original text as dialectically constituted in and by our situation by our imaginations and presentations of as-if-representations.

Hereby we try to make an important distinction between “look like” and “be”; the distinction is often blurred in both linguistics and stylistics – a blurring which is perhaps a more general cultural disease in modern societies. In this context we use the distinction in order to be aware of the trivial fact that a given linguistic string that looks like, or sounds like, a string usually used in, e.g., a courtroom by the judge announcing a sentence, IS not a juridical sentence when the string is uttered in a different situation by a person with a different competence. That means that we cannot deduce from the form of the linguistic part of an utterance and situation what the text and the meaning of the text is. The category of GENRE is of course a useful category – and is related with our natural identification memory of language and situations. Even though we use

to use some particular, characteristic forms of language in some prototypical sorts of situations, and even though some situations to a high degree are constituted by some ritualized forms of utterances there is no immediately or directly deduction from linguistic parts to situation nor from situation to linguistic parts. Therefore no part of language is to be considered as parts of language games.

### Text 1

#### Ordinary language (language of ordinary perception)

(0):	The dialogue takes place a Saturday morning and afternoon, spring 2000, in an ecological garden belonging to a couple. A group of friends are engaged in developing the garden, sharing meals, meditations and enjoying the co-operation.
(1) Female D:	<i>Do you think we need to dig that deep in order to get rid of the ground elder?</i>
(2) Male L:	<i>Yes, don't you remember last year?</i>
(3) Male J:	<i>We had to work the plot of land over and over again with the cultivator, didn't we? But the soup we made by it was excellent.</i>
(4) Female D:	<i>Yes, it was hard work.</i>
(5) Male O:	<i>What are you doing? We have been working and you have been talking. Right?</i>
(6) Female H:	<i>Right? Yes, indeed it is right to talk and enjoy good company. Why are you that busy?</i>
(7) Male O:	<i>I was just kidding.</i>
(8) Female M:	<i>Oh, I enjoyed the meditation. I feel calm and vigorous now. Let go and flow. Don't you?</i>
(9) Male B:	<i>Yes, but I am hungry again.</i>
(10) Male T:	<i>And I am thirsty.</i>
(11) Male J:	<i>I will provide food and drink – just wait a moment!</i>

#### Comments on Text 1

By means of the presentation in § 0, and my own experiences, I create an idea, an image, of a situation and context of and for the following texts, §§ 1-11. I'm reading the texts (§§ 1-11) to elaborate my idea of the situation and I'm reading the § 0 presentation to create my idea of the context of the dialogue and of the discourse, i.e. “the context of the situational constituents” and “the context of the universe of discourse”.

As ever there is a dialectical relation between the two aspects of the context of producers & production, (a) the more objective constituents and relations of the shared reality (bio-soc dominance), and (b) the more subjective constituents and relations of the shared fictionality (ideo-soc dominance).

The sequence of the segments presented in §§ 5-7 is a brilliant illustration of the every day use of language to create a common conjunction of different identifications of what's real and what's common fiction. The male *O* modalized the utterance (5) as if he was offensive against the group of the female *H*; he defined himself as a member of the working part and the latter as the talking part. Perhaps the female *H* interpreted the utterance in the wrong way, or perhaps in the correct way; she answered the utterance (6) in a modality of defensivity-offensivity against the other part. A wrong interpretation if the first person intended the mood indicated in his next utterance (7): "I was just kidding". And a correct interpretation if the intended mood was offensive. Perhaps the reactive answer of *H* was correct and affected *O* to change his mood in a different modality, a modality of more shared identifications and evaluations of the different activities of the two parts. Perhaps *O* changed his mind and meaning during the dialogue and used his reply to redefine the meaning (potential of meanings) of the first utterance by explicating a different modality as if it had been the intended one for the first utterance, too; even though the syntactico-semantical organization more literally pointed in a different direction. Even a joke is, however, a joke if, and only if, the participants share the conditions for the more fictive and paradoxical interpretation. Perhaps *H* really did interpret the first utterance as a part of a kidding communication and made her utterance (6) an intended part of the kidding, a collective game. If so, she succeeded or failed by doing her utterance and attitude too much realistic, so that *O* didn't understand that *H* had accepted his invitation to play that game.

Who has the correct interpretation of the three utterances is an open question; even among friends kidding by means of offensive language is a dangerous game. The absent linguist cannot tell from the presented text what is the correct interpretation of the utterances in question; what is the modality shared by the participants and what are the differently identified and intended moods of the different participating persons?

The linguist cannot tell if the following utterance (8) of the female *M* – "*Oh, I enjoyed the meditation. I feel calm and vigorous now. Let go and flow. Don't you?*" – is, or is not, a consecution in relation to the dialogue of *O* and *H*. The female *M* was, or was not, a participating part of that dialogue (a S2- or S3-person), and became a speaking part (S1) of that dialogue, or she was an intruder in that situation turning the situation into a new situation initiated by her utterance. Was she commenting the common dialogue by suggesting a shift

of object for common consideration, or was she initiating a new situation without having been a present part of the precedent situation? Again it is difficult to determine the correct identification of the individual utterances in relation to the other utterances, whether they were belonging to the same situation-context, the same universe of discourse, and whether the persons agreed or disagreed in their interpretations and intentions.

Instead of discussing what is the correct interpretation and description of the given parts of a dialogue, or more dialogues, we prefer to discuss healthy comments from the point of view that any utterance is only a part of a dialogue and is more or less restricted as a potential of meanings by the syntactico-semantic organisation of the utterance, by the situational context constituted by the present persons and by the other utterances produced in direct or indirect relation to the utterance in question.

The storyteller told a few characteristics of the situation to which the “direct speech” related. From this I can imagine a Finnish garden in springtime, some persons who are constituting a friendly group and now are going around in the garden doing some cultivating work. Sometimes they are near each other, sometimes some are in one part of the garden while some other are in a different part of the garden. The garden is a locality of a certain area, small enough for the persons to contact everybody by means of their fullest voice, vast enough to let some persons talk with each other in smaller groups private from the more distant persons. Thus the location is a shared room for all the participants, but not like a round table where all the participants address their utterances to one common centre so that everybody hears the same signals from equal positions. I don’t know from the text if my source was moving around during the reported sequence, or if he – or she, or the microphone – was standing at the same place. Neither do I know if the quoted persons were a present part during the whole sequence. Thus I don’t know if all the utterances are parts of an equally person-time-location-shared context. Thus I am not competent to identify what are the relevant inter-textual relations of the uttered parts. Therefore I cannot take for granted that the utterances are part of one, shared, co-operating discourse, being identified as comments to the other utterances, turns of the same dialogue, responses in relation to the previous utterances.

Nevertheless, I will guess from my experiences with similar sorts of situations and dialogues, that there was a group of at least four persons – the female *D* and *H*, and the male *J* and *L* – who shared a co-operation of digging a specific part of the garden and shared the discussion on the solution of an identified problem about the best way of digging “in order to get rid of the ground elder”. They are co-operating in doing the job and in planning the appropriate way of doing the job using their relevant experiences from a similar process last year and the consequences of that way of digging. Moving from a distant part of the

garden the male *O* now entered the scene and tried to be a present part of the group without knowing much of the actual state of affair and history of the group. Perhaps he intended to join the group.

Paradoxically he introduced himself by defining himself (and some other partners) in a conflicting opposition to the group by addressing the members by the deictic 'you' and the predicate 'are talking'. He addressed the 'you' group from a position of being member of a 'we'-group with the predicate 'have been working'. Hereby he used the deictic 'we' in a way that excluded the addressed persons: being the speaker of the utterance he could deictically refer to himself by 1. personal singular pronoun 'I', or by 1.pers.plural 'we'. Furthermore he could address the group by means of 2. personal pronoun 'you', what he did, or he could use 'we' with reference to both himself (1. pers.) and to the addressed group (2. pers.). Furthermore he could use the 'we' including both the 1. and the 2. and the 3. persons, i.e. both the two situationally present parts and the absent parts of the entire group of friends in co-operation in the garden that Saturday.

He introduced a competing relation between the smaller parts of the whole group combined with a derogative evaluation of the part he was addressing. A common joke by equal fellows, perhaps, an "innocent" reproduction of winner-looser-games of the market, the institutions, the wage-labour-job, the families, the party conversations. The attitude of being the dominant part was here presented – and represented – in a different social setting, leisure time among friends, and could be interpreted as a –stupid – demonstration of the freedom from the competing forms of the professional and institutional life. Perhaps the female *H* shouldn't have accepted to be injured, but could have kept the dignity by ignoring the taste of indignity. She reproduces as well the competing and violent form in her answer and made herself an equally fighting part against him. Perhaps the female *M*, and the male *B*, *T* and *J*, were the more ecological part when they turned the common situational awareness towards the mental and physical resources for all the persons, the enjoyed meditation and the provision of food and drink. Perhaps the stupid and violent utterances were symptoms of the needs for food and drink, and not for fighting against each other.

But again, I know very little about the situation, about the individual persons and the individual group and their internal and external constitution, history, vital problems and aims. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the absent social orders and persons sometimes play their destructive roles in the mind, the talking, and the acting of the present participants. Ecolinguistics has to elaborate our knowledge and awareness of the influences of bad patterns of language games, i.e. non-friendly and violent communication and description. We have to elaborate experiments of friendly and non-violent communication in order to

develop language and patterns of language that are more healthy in communication, both in thinking, talking and acting.

It is a bad linguistics that normalizes the patterns of language usually used in competing situations. The language of the winner of a bad game is not to be considered the correct and successful language.

## Text 2

### Extra ordinary language (language of extra ordinary perception)

(0):	The life situation is a group of people gathered in the home of the meditation teacher in Spring 1997. The group has just finished a sequence of deep meditation. There are ten people present and one person gives the following feed back to the group:
(1) Female R (FR):	<i>Just after we have finished the four point meditation a small figure turned up to the right of me. I was a little astonished and a little afraid. He looked so weird.</i>
(2) Meditation Teacher (MT):	<i>Do you wish to know who it was and what he wanted you to learn?</i>
(3) FR:	<i>Yes, I think so.</i>
(4) MT:	<i>Close your eyes gently and recall the image of the figure and give me a nod, when it happens!</i>
(5) FR:	<i>Yes, it is there now, but it is not quite clear.</i>
(6) MT:	<i>Look more closely!</i>
(7) FR:	<i>Yes, it is a small Chinese old man. He seems to be very friendly.</i>
(8) MT:	<i>Ask him who he is and what he will teach you!</i>
(9) FR:	<i>I knew it. It is me. He says that he is me. That is impossible – isn't it? I cannot be both a female and a male at the same time.</i>
(10) MT:	<i>You mean it would be like sitting on your own knees? Might be it is you. Please ask him what he will teach you!</i>
(11) FR:	<i>He says that he needs to tell me to take care of myself. It is a bit frightening. I cannot be both him and me at the same time?</i>

### Comments on Text 2

This example is a presentation of a sequence of an earlier dialogue among several persons gathered in a common room and situation. Some of the persons uttered verbal utterances that hereby became shared parts of the situation. Each utterance might be considered a text and the individual text might be considered a part of a dialogue, a “turn of the dialogue”. The dialogue was constituted by

the persons present in the room. A person became the speaker of a text, the S1-person of that text, when the person uttered that part of the dialogue, and then the other persons became S2- and S3-persons. When the next person uttered a text, that person became S1 and the other S2 and S3. For the linguist who didn't participate in the original situation and only observes the presented and transformed extract, it is impossible to know in what way the persons identify the individual utterances formulated by an individual, as a shared utterance and meaning, as a more or less common formulation of a common meaning and information. Of course the linguist can make some conjectures from the presented verbal parts, the verbal utterances made by the "meditation teacher" (*MT*) and the "female R" (*FR*). The situation and the dialogue implied, however, some more people, and their utterances and activities we cannot learn from Text 2. Indeed we cannot learn the non-reported utterances and activities made by the speaking persons from their reported verbal utterances. We can make conjectures on the communication by means of our own imaginations that depend upon our own experiences and willingness to create co-identifications with the persons of the situation and dialogue.

Of course we could reduce our task and aim to make registrations of words and syntactic constructions, but we couldn't tell whether the words and syntax were appropriate or relevant use of language, without knowing what was the interests, intentions, meanings, knowledge, etc., of the participants constituting the situation.

Any linguistic description and comparison of verbal utterances implies general and specific identifications of the contexts and situations in which the utterances are communicative parts, and any verbal utterance is a more or less redundant and constitutive part of ongoing communication between persons.

We categorize the text (or the sequence of texts) as an example of 'extra ordinary language' and 'language of extra ordinary perception'; the situation is constituted by persons who are engaged in communication on perceptions of phenomena outside the ordinarily "physical, objective, sensational" world; the persons consider the phenomena as being and becoming existent, relevant, interesting, significant, and shared parts of our common world. The language becomes extra ordinary language in the sense that the intra-personal perceptions are considered as being not a mere private or intra-individual fiction but also as being inter- and extra-personally related and existing. The deictic references are not considered to be of a mere metaphoric character without "real objects" or referents, but the language is used to closer examination and re-identification of the object – and in a deeper sense to communicate with the object. Not only to talk or learn about an object but also to become in a more dialectical communication with the object; thus the object turns into a co-subject. This is a

kind of extra ordinary language that – at a different level – can be compared with the person with “green fingers” who is talking with the plants. So to speak, human language is not only for ordinary inter-human communication, but also important for human communication, and interfering, with other species and individualities of other levels of existence. Of course some linguists would prefer to identify such matters as extra-linguistic, or para-linguistic, phenomena, or dimensions, that should be sharply distinguished from linguistic communication and outside the nature or essence of language.

Extra-linguistic and para-linguistic phenomena dialectically constitute linguistic phenomena.

### **Some interesting transformations of the deictic pronominals**

In her first turn (1) the female R, *FR*, tells about “*a small figure turned up to the right of me*”. She refers to the small figure by the deictic indefinite “*a*”, supposedly because the figure is not yet known by the partners of the dialogue. If the figure was known the definite particle “*the*” would be the appropriate deictic indicator. The figure is referred to in conjuncture with the past tense indication “*turned*”, which indicates that the figure is not a present perception now; now “*it*” is a remembered perception of the past. In the past the figure was perceived in a modality of being “*to the right of*” *FR*, i.e. outside the perceiving person, just like an individuality that is a sensational part of the situation, like an object or another person participating in the situation as being a constitutive participant.

*FR* continues her presentation of the figure by means of the masculine pronominal “*he*”, by which the phenomenon by our co-imaginative identification turns into a male human-like person.

The meditation teacher, *MT*, says in his turn (2) both “*it*” and “*he*”; furthermore *MT* in the second part implies that the phenomenon was an individuality of subject-character who could want something in relation to *FR*: “*what he wanted you to learn*”. *MT* is in communication with *FR* in the zero situation, *Sit-0*, and he asks *FR* if she wants to know more about the “*person*” she met in an earlier situation, *Sit-P*. She confirms.

In the following sequence of communication the relations of *Sit-0* and *Sit-P* interrelate in an interesting manner; by reconsidering the past situation *Sit-P* in the present *Sit-0* the person *FR* becomes in a closer, transformed, and present relation to *Sit-P* and the “*weird*” participant:

In (4) the teacher asks *FR* to “*recall the image of the figure*”; in (5) *FR* tells that “*it is there now, but it is not quite clear*”; it is uncertain whether the “*it*” refers to the image or the figure; in the closer inspection the “*it*” – in (7) – becomes “*a small Chinese old man*” who is present and “*seems to be very*

friendly”. By the *MT*-guidance (8) *FR* becomes engaged in a dialogue with the small Chinese old man who tells her, what she now realizes that she already knew, that he is her: (9) “I knew it. It is me. He says that he is me.” The transformation of “it” into “he” into the female “I” seems “impossible” for *FR*: “I cannot be both a female and a male at the same time”, she comments her own identifications. Supposedly at least two different logics are present at the same time, which ordinarily exclude each other from the same universe of communication and discourse; they belong to different levels, or modalities, of reality. Apparently *FR* identifies both him and herself as being herself at the same time; the “impossible” identification(s) frightens her “a bit” (11). Please notice the interpretation problems of the utterance, “*He says that he need to tell me to take care of myself.*” Who says, who needs, who tells whom, who has to take care of whom? Does she realize that “he” is an until now forgotten or ignored part of herself, which she has to take care of? Or, is “he” her angel, or her-self in an earlier incarnation, who teaches her the learning to take care of herself? Or, is she learning herself to heal and unite her divided self?

Perhaps both the questions and the answers have been more developed during the continuation of the dialogues and afterwards. However, our little examination illustrates the fact, that sometimes, perhaps always, several logics might be implied in a dialogue; therefore an appropriate linguistic description should imply more than one logic of rationality and universe of discourse and situation. An important question is: How do we develop the relations of logics in a healthier way, healthier both for the persons directly involved and for the surroundings. That cannot be done by ignoring extra ordinary perceptions or by separating the different levels of reality and imagination.

### Text 3

#### Extra ordinary language (poetic language)

(0):	In a book, <i>British Poetry since 1945</i> by Edward Lucie-Smith (Penguin Book, 1970, p. 131-132), we find the following verse by PHILIP LARKIN. Larking is introduced with the following words: "On balance, Larkin is probably the most important poet to establish himself in England since the war."
(1) PHILIP LARKIN:	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>Days</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>What are days for?</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Days are where we live.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>They come, they wake us.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Time and time over.</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>They are to be happy in:</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Where can we live but days?</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Ah, solving that question</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Brings the priest and the doctor</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>In their long coats</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>Running over the fields.</i></p>

### Text 4

#### Extra ordinary language (language of mental disorder)

(0):	The text is written by a schizophrenic patient and is presented in Bent Rosenbaum and Harly Sonne: " <i>Det er et bånd der taler.</i> " (Gyldendals sprogbibliotek, 1979, p. 28-29):
(1) A Schizophrenic Patient:	<p><i>Dagens brændende Spørgsmaal er det af de Sammensvorne stillede Forslag, som gaar ud paa at fjerne alt levende og dødt imellem Himmel og Jord.</i></p> <p><i>Herved mener disse at kunde give Plads til noget nyt og bedre, som skulde fremkomme af Solens Straaler.</i></p> <p><i>Jeg vil dog indgive Ansøgning om Tilladelse til at danne en Undtagelse.</i></p>
(2) A Translator:	<p><i>Today's burning question is the proposal made by the conspirators for the removal of all things living and dead between Heaven and Earth.</i></p> <p><i>They think hereby to be able to make room for something new and better, which should be produced by the rays of the sun.</i></p> <p><i>However, I'd like to hand in an application for permission to constitute an exception.</i></p>

### Comments on Text 3 and Text 4

Both texts are belonging to the class of 'Extra Ordinary Language', T3 being of the *genre* 'Poetic Language', T4 of 'Language of Mental Disorder'. The difference between the two genres is of contextual nature. The poetic genre is considered social significant, and communicative, in a socially accepted segment of social life, implying socially accepted but extraordinary semantics. The language of mental disorder is identified by considering the utterances being uttered by a socially non-accepted person and, therefore, without social and communicative significance and meaning.

The utterances of the poet are, or are becoming, parts of a social communication; the members of the ordinary public define and interpret the utterances in a way that makes the utterances socially significant, acceptable and valuable texts; the producer of the poetic text is considered being a part of society doing her or his valuable cultural work. Some poetic texts become parts of the shared universe of discourse, the shared social sense, the shared recursive base, the common sense and knowledge, for a minor or a major group of society. The poet is classified as a prominent person among the prominent persons, although of different class-positions depending of the society in question. So to speak, basically the poet and the audience share the identification of the sense and meaning of the text-context-relations; a basic agreement on the ontology of the text and the imaginations, even though there are discussions and disagreements on the most correct hermeneutics.

The situation is different as to the identity of the schizophrenic person and her or his utterances. The ordinary society defines the utterances and the person as non-acceptable; the person becomes more or less a non-person with whom the ordinary persons don't share neither ontology nor hermeneutics, the person becomes an object for observation and treatment, not a partner of communication and shared meanings. If the poet doesn't participate in ordinary dialogues between the extraordinary poetic production and thus shares the identification of what's ordinary and what's extraordinary, then the poet turns into the class of disordered persons, or persons of mental disorder. Sometimes a society has canonized some texts as members of the poetic canon while the producer of the texts has been turned into the category of mad persons; sometimes some texts have been turned into the category of valuable poetry, even though everybody knows that the producer was an unhealthy person.

As a matter of fact it is not to determine from the organization of a text whether or not the text is part of a healthy communication without considering the conditions for its production and producers. To isolate the product from the conditions for production is, however, an ordinary and general mood in the societies of modern capitalism, whether the products are food, clothes, houses,

Olympic records, illness, music, literature, poetry, candidates, or linguistic descriptions and criterials for proper language use.

Both Text 3 and Text 4 might exhibit poetic values for the reader listening to the sound of the language and feeling the depth of the imaginations created by meditative reading. And of course it is possible to use the texts as a means for deeper insight in the nature of language, human mind and the world, and perhaps to be a better and more sensitive listener and speaker/writer. However, by the praxis of ignoring the real conditions for the other relevant parts of the communication, in casu the producer of the texts, the praxis becomes an exercising in non-communication and thus an unhealthy mode of exercising. The depersonalised methods of text interpretation and description turn in reality the social communication into more like the mental disorder than into the poetic form of life and life-relations.

## Text 5

### Ordinary language (Language for Specific Purpose – LSP)

(0):	Our text example is a citation from the beautiful book of GEORGE LAKOFF, <i>Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things</i> . (University of Chicago Press, 1987: p. 540):
(1) GEORGE LAKOFF:	<p>The deictics and the existentials can look similar, as the following examples show (capitals indicate stress).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• THERE's a new Mercedes across the street (deictic)</li><li>• There's a new MERCEDES across the street (existential)</li></ul> <p>Despite the superficial similarities, the deictic and existential <i>there</i>'s differ in at least the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> refers to a specific location; existential <i>there</i> does not.</li><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> contrasts with <i>here</i>; existential <i>there</i> does not.</li><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> occurs independently of the deictic <i>there</i>-constructions; existential <i>there</i> does not occur outside of existential <i>there</i>-constructions.</li><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> is a locative adverb; existential <i>there</i> is not.</li><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> is not a grammatical subject; existential <i>there</i> is a grammatical subject.</li><li>– Deictic <i>there</i> almost always bears stress; existential <i>there</i> almost never does.</li></ul>

### Comments on Text 5

We categorize Text 5 as an example of a) “Ordinary language” and b) “Language for Specific Purpose”. That means, a) we identify the text as being readable by persons sharing ordinary experiences with ordinary relations of a public market text and some more or less common co-texts and contexts; and b) we identify the text as being indicated as primarily interesting for persons belonging to a social segment of the general public, who share some more specific interests, in this case, participation in an academic discussions on language and philosophy of language.

The text example belongs to a major book with the title “Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things”. By such a title the author invites a broader audience – or public – to participate in the dialogue; on the other hand, by the fact that the book is published by the University of Chicago Press the invitation is more restricted to a narrower public part who deals with academic matters of more specific purpose.

We think it is vital that any academic discussion is public, and that it might blur this basic condition for production of science if only a *transformed* part of

science and scientific discussions and decisions is public. In this case we find Lakoff's book beautiful in both aspects in order to increase our awareness on language among both the academic and the everyday creators of language.

The text example is a relatively small part of an extensive text, belonging to page 540 of the book. That means that the example has a lot of preceding text to be co-identified with as constituting parts of the universe of discourse and the constitution of the dialogue and situation of communication. The quoted sequence belongs neither to the introducing nor the concluding part, but is to be considered a sequence of the medial part of the individuality text. Therefore we have to make the imagination that the reader – following the author's line of indications – now and here, p. 540, is familiar with the individual meanings of the author and the more and less shared social import (cf. our semantic matrix). The reader knows the initial presentations of the universe of discourse and has built up some relevant and shared images to which this text part is co-related. The reader knows the situational and contextual deictic relations of the text as a whole individuality related with ontological and hermeneutical existence.

Even though we present more than a single sentence, it is important to be aware of the fact that the presented part is only a little bit of the whole text. We have not to look after primary deictic and modal indications correlating the situation of communication and the fictive universe of the story, because the basic setting is already settled. We are intruders in a forthcoming communication and we know only in general terms and levels what the writer and reader now and here share of common interests and awareness. Nevertheless we here and now participate in the dialogue and make some comments to the referred part, because we find some parts of the part interesting in a general context and in our present context.

Lakoff discusses the phenomenon of 'deictics' in relation to 'existentials'; in the text he appeals to the experiences of the reader introducing the two examples,

- 1) THERE's a new Mercedes across the street (deictic)
- 2) There's a new MERCEDES across the street (existential).

He implies that the reader is aware of the fact that language is present both in written and spoken media when he writes that "The deictics and the existentials can look similar, as the following examples show (capitals indicate stress)". A more explicit formulation could imply an example (0) as follows,

- 0) There's a new Mercedes across the street (orthographic writing)

This example (0) could be presented as (a part of) a written text and we could ask for the meaning potentials of such a (part of) text; then Lakoff could present

the two examples (1) and (2) as being two different interpretations of example (0), implying two differently spoken utterances that do not sound similar. The one implies an interpretation where the speaker indicates the deictic interesting referent to be a specific location of the situation shared by the speaker and the dialogue-partner(s), signaled by means of e.g. a pointing finger or the direction of the view, or by a preceding text-part referring to a specific location. The point is, that example (1) implies an established situation of shared identification, shared by the speaker and the communication partner(s), in which the ‘there’s’ can be used to co-ordinate the specific location of the intended object for shared and present awareness.

The second example implies a different interpretation of the situation and the intentions of the speaker (or writer of (2)). The prominent interesting object for shared awareness is the “Mercedes”, why the Mercedes gets the pointing stress by the speaker, while the location is postponed by means of the locative adverbial phrase, “across the street”, where the deictics is indicated by the deictic part “the”, which implies that the communicating partners share the relevant localization of the street.

Both interpretations imply a pre-established situation shared by the participants, and both interpretations imply a deictic reference to a more specific part of that situation. None of the utterances (1) and (2) is more deictic than the other, but they are used to focus different parts of perhaps different situations.

Both (1) and (2) might be transliterated as (0) and of course “they” look similar written in the same way. Lakoff continues by giving the similarities the predicate “superficial”; that’s misleading, we think, because the implied superficiality doesn’t differ from the superficiality of any written text, i.e. that any written text is to be considered to be a potential of meanings, the interpretation of which depends on the co- and con-texts and situation of communication to which the text is a constituting part. Similar written and oral sequences of language are similar if they are similar, and then the similarity is not superficial but a fact of that point of view and that aspect of consideration. To say that similar sequences of language might imply different meanings is correct. To say that one specific interpretation of a given sequence of language is more superficial than another specific interpretation of the same sequence, is both correct and of vital importance, and is in fact related with the core question, How do we make more healthy interpretations of texts and languages? Neither example (1) nor example (2) is generally the most healthy or deep interpretation of example (0), and none of them indicates the conditions for understanding the deictic references implied. It would be a superficial linguist that said that only of the two interpretations was the correct one, and as a matter of fact the example (0) might be a correctly written form for several different meanings and oral forms, e.g. the following two interpretations using the similar stress indications:

- 3) There's a NEW Mercedes across the street
- 4) There's a new Mercedes ACROSS the street

However, Lakoff focuses on a few contrasting interpretations of the word 'there' used in the initial part of a sentence to indicate a deictic or an existential meaning. The term 'existential' means therefore something different from 'deictic'. We could argue that both meanings, as every use of language, imply a deictic aspect as well as an existential aspect, and that the difference is a difference in dominant specificity; that means, that the Lakoff-called existential use of 'there' indicates a broader and less specific location of the uttered happening, whereas the deictic use indicates a narrower and more specific location of the happening communicated by means of the utterance. The Danish grammarian, Paul Diderichsen, used the term "formal situative", while Kr. Mikkelsen used the term "indefinite subject" for apparently the same aspect which Lakoff calls "existential". Historically, the deictic use is the most prototypical meaning of the WORD "there", and the existential use is derived from the deictical. Today we use the "unstressed" form when we indicate that a location is implied, but is unknown, or of less importance in relation to some other constituents of the story; thus the unstressed deictic (or existential) "there" (or Danish "der") is often used as initiator of fairytales, "Once upon a time there was a king [...]". The phrase is used to indicate a room or place or scene for the following actors and activities and particular locations within that frame of shared fiction. Therefore it is misleading to name the phenomenon "existential", because it doesn't imply real existence, but only existence for our common imagination of fictive or real phenomena.

As Lakoff doesn't conceive the dialectics of the more primary and the more secondary deictic aspect, but tries to make a distinct contrast, a dualism, between deictic and existential, he misses some interesting implications of his contrastive examples. Let us consider a few points concerning grammatical and phonetic descriptions. Lakoff wrote,

- Deictic *there* is a locative adverb; existential *there* is not.
- Deictic *there* is not a grammatical subject; existential *there* is a grammatical subject.
- Deictic *there* almost always bears stress; existential *there* almost never does.

Why is existential "*there*" not a locative adverb, and why is deictic "*there*" not a grammatical subject, and why bears the one stress, the other seldom?

Of course we are able to describe the deictic "*there*" as a grammatical subject, if we say that there might be more than one grammatical subject implied, what we in reality say when we are dealing with subject and subject-

predicative constructions such as “Man is an animal” or “Man is a holy creature and creator”. In the case of “there’s a Mercedes” it is possible to say, that both “*there*” and “*Mercedes*” are grammatical and situational subjects of different prominence according to their deixis-indicating relation to the already established universe of discourse, and that the situational prominence is stressed by phonetic stress while the grammatical might be indicated by the verb-inflection. Sometimes grammatical and situational subject is one and the same subject, e.g. “The Mercedes crossed the street” where “The Mercedes” is both situational and grammatical subject in the way that the Mercedes is presented as a known part of the situation that now becomes the acting part of the sentence.

To say that deictic “*there*” is a locative adverb might be a relevant description if the same could be said about the existential there; existence without locality for existence seems to be a nonsense existence. Both deictic and existential “*there*” imply a dialectical relation to the verb and sometimes to a more substantial subject, and both of them imply some existence in time and space. In Danish we often use both the more deictic “DER” and the more existential “der” (“there”) in the same construction:

- 5) DER er der en Mercedes
- 5b) \*THERE there’s a Mercedes
- 5c) Der er en Mercedes DER
- 5d) \*There’s a Mercedes THERE

To resume: The deictic and the existential aspect are dialectically related; deixis implies the existence of the indicated referent, and existence implies some topos to exist within and withby, some universe of both the situation and the discourse.

It’s fine that Lakoff observes that one and the same written text has to be interpreted in different ways according to different situational meanings. We have to know the situational meaning to decide the correct grammatical description, the correct locational description, and the correct phonetic description.

What is considered to be a grammatical subject, a locative adverb, a stress-bearing part, a deictic part, or an existential part, that is evidently a dialectical question and cannot be decided without knowledge of the relevant co- and contexts and the situations of communication.

Lakoff indicates that there are more than superficial differences between what he calls deictic and existential indication by means of the word “there”. And he indicates correlative differences in some other dimensions: different ways of referring to location, different semantic contrast implication (there:here), different syntactic distribution (occurrence inside, outside and not

outside there-constructions), different word class identification (locative adverb, not adverb), different verb relations (grammatical subject, not grammatical subject), different phonetic identification (stress, not stress).

But he uses himself deictics and existentials as if there's no relevant discussion whether deictics and existentials exist, how and where "they" exist, how and where "they" can be referred to as locational identities or individualities. He writes, "The deictics and the existentials can look similar". By means of "the" he indicates that deictics and existentials exist as phenomena referred to by deictic reference implying a more specific location. He doesn't tell anything about the specific location but implies it as known by the participants of the actual communication. When he furthermore organizes "the deictics and the existentials" as grammatical subject for the verb "can" he implies that "they" are something that *can* do something in our world, they *can* look. He implies that deictics and existentials are physical, visible individualities. Furthermore they are presented as very active individualities, they *refer*, they *contrast*, they *occur* independently and dependently, they *are* (or are not) adverb, grammatical subject, and they *bear* (or bear not) stress. Thus Lakoff subscribes to an idealistical linguistics (and philosophy) making no importance of the different modes of existence and the different locations of existence and the dialectics of the constituents of existence. The implied universe of discourse seems to be the network of linguistic terms constructed by and for linguists relating with a more or less shared conceptual map for descriptions of language in a way that can look like a neutral description without ontological, situational, or hermeneutic implications; and without presentation of the persons and media implied in and constituting the part of language described.

Nevertheless his text implies that there's a dialectical relationship between the different parts of linguistic description and that this dialectics is constituted by the persons in communication.

## Text 6

### Extra ordinary language (avant-garde theory)

(0):	<i>Frontier Perspectives Volume 7, Number 1, Fall/Winter, 1998</i> (The Centre for Frontier Sciences at Temple University) contains an article by GLEN REIN, “Biological Effects of Quantum Fields and their Role in the Natural Healing Process”. He writes (p. 17):
(1) GLEN REIN:	Thus quantum fields act as a bridge between the higher dimensional energies of spirit and classical EM field. EM fields then regulate the biochemical level as demonstrated by the bio-electromagnetics research community. Healing with energy therefore occurs by an infusion of energy from some external source that resonates with the level in the bio-field according to how subtle it is. Healing can also occur through internal sources of energy generated from the individual in a meditative state of consciousness.

### Comments on Text 6

What is a “healthy” text and what is a “healthy” interpretation, description, comment and characterization of a text?

This ought to be a leading and vivid question for any linguist and literary critical and language teacher. And any language maker.

Perhaps we are doing some more interesting communication when we are speaking and listening, writing and reading, than only sharing, producing, re-producing, creating meanings and informations for conceptual purposes. Perhaps a vital aspect of our use of language in verbal communication, or verbal thinking, concerns our individual and inter-individual fields of energies of spirit. And perhaps these fields resonate with each other and our bio-electromagnetic fields, and perhaps some manners of speaking, listening, and thinking are more healthier for all the parts involved than are other manners. Generally speaking it could be plausible that the more friendly and lovely modes of speaking, listening and thinking would imply a more healing resonance in ourselves and our partners (including both the persons engaged directly in the dialogue and the persons and individuals talked, or thought, about); while a more hostile or frightening mode is in dissonance with the healing energies and creative processes.

Such formulations don’t agree with ordinary language in the manner that do the formulations by Lakoff in Text 5. Nor do they immediately belong to an established branch, or a social segment, more or less understood as a part of the mono-cultural division of labour, or science. Then we could categorize the text as mad or outside reasonable science and production of science and theories. Or we can do what we are doing, namely to consider the text as a part of avant-garde theory and theorizing.

Because the text seems reasonable for us and in accordance with our own experiences.

Perhaps it could be a nice challenge for linguistics to be aware of the underlying, or higher level modality of our use of language. To quote the wise words:

*If a child lives with criticism  
she learns to condemn*

*If a child lives with hostility  
he learns to fight*

*If a child lives with ridicule  
she learns to be shy*

*But if a child lives with encouragement  
he learns confidence*

*If a child lives with tolerance  
she learns to be patient*

*If a child lives with praise  
he learns to appreciate*

*If a child lives with fairness  
she learns justice*

*If a child lives with security  
he learns to have faith*

*If a child lives with acceptance and friendship  
she learns to find love in the world.*

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