1. Introduction

Science or scientific praxis is nothing more or less than a particular, historical, social praxis and part of a specific socio-cultural order. Different cultures create different forms of science and every dominant scientific praxis organizes its people and problems in ways and by means that aims at the same Ends as the culture as a whole. Relations between scientific praxis and culture are dialectical. A dialectical relationship is one in which the participants in the relations co-condition each other and inter-act; one part dominates the others, and the relations, historically and dynamically; and the whole collapses if one part is annihilated, removed from the unity, or reduced to a critical seize of functional level. So present scientific praxis is dialectically determined by modern capitalist culture and has not existed before, and will not exist after the epoch of modern capitalism, i.e. from 1945 until the capitalism is subsumed the criteria of the survival of our species; a prominent step in that direction was the Rio-Conference 1992.

Scientific praxis, however, is not a homogeneous phenomenon, but a heterogeneous one. It contains parts and relations that belong to former epochs and some that might dominate future cultural formations. A vital and essential feature of modern capitalist culture is the fact that this culture is the very first one that is global and colours – and de-colours – the life of every village on Gaia – and thus every thought, speech, and activity of every individuality on Gaia.
Linguistics as a life-science

Surprisingly, many linguists seem to understand language as if it was a mechanical tool for interaction between machines and do not seem to understand that linguistics is a life-science in general, and a life-science of and for human linguistic communication in particular.

Being a life-science, linguistics has to be developed in and by a dialogue with the very best methods and most inspiring ideas of Biology.

Among the trends in modern 21st Century linguistics, eco-linguistics is the one most closely related to an understanding of the implications of practising linguistics as a life-science. Eco-linguistics is an umbrella term for a rich variety of different schools, traditions, and individuals. Some of the branches of eco-linguistics have evidently internalized the ideologen of linguistics as a sort of life-science.

The life-sciences of the deepest interest in this context are medicine and biology. The latter because it is centred on the development, regulations, and regeneration of life-systems. Modern biology is cultivated as a sort of systemic and orientated towards living systems and their relationships with, and in the environment; therefore biology belongs to the sciences of ecology. The former because it is concerned with the human illnesses and human health; therefore, it is an axiological science with an explicit ethics. The medical praxis is committed to try to enhance a healthy development of human beings and to restore the health of any human being. Eco-linguistics has to enhance a healthy development of the linguistic qualifications of human beings and the constitutions of situations in which human beings are able to use language to create healthy cultures and life-forms.

Health, Sickness & Language

The well-known surgeon and author Bernie S. Siegel writes:

Our daughter Carolyn handed me a cartoon one day that showed a gentleman waking up and saying: “I feel great, what a beautiful day, I’ll call in sick.” Of course, we often think we have to get sick literally in order to get the rest or pleasure we need in our lives. Bobbie and I therefore taught our children when they were younger that if they need a day off from school, they should just say that and take a health day, not a sick day. That made them look at life differently. I think all of us need to rethink our attitudes toward health and sickness.

The text has different interesting aspects concerning (i) illness and health, (ii) medicine and linguistics, and (iii) language and life.

First, it is important to notice that we normally want to take a day off when we feel great. Usually we tell our employee that we are sick, or we allow our children to stay at home and write a note to their school saying that Carolyn was sick yesterday. We hide under a false or misleading description of our situation – and because we need it or want it. It is remarkable that in English “want” means both “need”, “wish”, and “is short of”.

Modern research in medicine shows, however, that there is an intimate connection between our use of language and the state of our cells and organs. In some sense it is as-if we talk both to ourselves – our mind, so to speak – and to our body, both when we are talking with an inner voice and when we are talking aloud to ourselves and others.

We propose that we start regarding our language-use as **life-significant**, i.e. that our talk has both a socio-logical significance and a bio-logical significance. When language has a socio-logical significance it influences and co-conditions our social life. When language has a bio-logical significance it influences and co-conditions our biological life.

There is, however, even more at stake. When we talk, our talking has an ideo-logical significance, too. Our language-use colours and co-conditions our thought processes, even though they are not present in a linguistic medium, but in pictures, images, feelings, emotions, sensations, or perceptions.

The socio-logical significance of telling your employee that you are sick, when you feel great on a beautiful day, is, however,

a) that it makes it **legal** for you to stay at home,

b) that you **legitimate** that lying is OK in order to take care of yourself,

c) that you tell your children that it is morally right to cheat your employee and lie about your health.

Every act is, however, an act of self-identification, just as every linguistic activity is a self-description and self-definition.

If you want to stay at home when you feel great, you do not feel at home on work; and **not feeling and being at home** is a feeling of **alienation**.

A criterion for **alienation** is that you and your life or some situations are defined by:

(i) the **negation** of friendship as the dominant relation, or

(ii) the **privation** of friendship as the dominant relation.

3
Language and Communication
Every child knows that similar words and sentences usually are used to indicate one conjuncture of meanings when the mother utters them and a different meaning conjuncture when the father utters them. And furthermore, that the same person, e.g. the mother, means something different when she uses similar words and sentences in different situations, i.e. situations constituted by different persons, or types of persons, and circumstances. And furthermore, that different persons “put” similar meanings in different words and one person “puts” similar meanings in different words in different situations.

It is a basic knowledge and experience for all of us that similar signs are differently related with meanings, dependent of the relation to the individual person, individual meaning, and to the sort of social situation, social import. And that similar meanings are related with different signs by and for different persons and by and for different situations.

And all of us know that we are ourselves a part in determining the conjuncture of meanings, both by our interpretations and by our uttering linguistic and other signs.
From our dialectical point of view we define the linguistic signs as parts of human communication, not as the basic unit of communication. The human communication constitutes the linguistic signs that are becoming linguistic signs when the persons in communication produce and interpret them as linguistic signs in the communication. The “basic unit” of linguistic communication, and linguistic signs, is a situation and dialogue dialectically constituted by at least three persons, i.e. (S1) the person(s) who utters the signs, (S2) the person(s) to whom the signs are addressed, and (S3) the other person(s) being part of the situation and communication. These three personal parts determine – dialectically – what is to be considered a linguistic signs, what is to be considered the relationship between the linguistic signs, what is to be considered significant signs, and what is to be considered the significance of the signs. Some of the considerations may be shared by the three parts, some of them may be differ-
ently identified, and much of the situational whole may be unidentifiable parts and non-parts.

We sometimes present the model, Fig. 1, in order to indicate the three-partial dialectics of the identification of the text, or discourse, the parts of the text, the meaning of the text and the parts of the text.

The model indicates that the phenomenon a text, or a discourse, exists by the identifications created by the personal parts of a communicative situation, and these identifications may differ and be similar from one person to the other. Who knows what are the shared and the different parts of the identifications but the persons in their communicative relations with each other. The text is a part of the persons’ situation and may be a part of their communication. The text is not the Means of their communication but they may use their communication to make the text, or parts of the text, a part of the communication. The personal communication is the basic condition for the existence of a text as a text. A text cannot be identified neither as a linguistic form nor as a meaning indicator without persons who identify it as part of human communication. The text or discourse is an object for different persons in communicative relations.

We sometimes use a different model, Fig. 2, to indicate the dialectical relations of a text (an object) and the persons making that object to a common part of their relations.

The two models indicate the contextual, the personal and situational constitution of a text, or discourse.

Sometimes we meet something that looks like a text, e.g. a book, a sheet of paper, a letter, some acoustic signals from a tape or radio, i.e. some phenomena that could be a part of a communicative situation, could be a more or less shared part of communication between persons in communication. Thus we sometimes become a part of a communication with some other persons without being in direct communication with each other; then a text could be used as a means for indirect communication between persons in different situations, differently located and/or being aware of the text at different times. Please notice, that we consider a text to be a potential for indication of shared and different meanings among persons in communication, a medium in and for communication. A text is not “the direct message” but is an indirect part of direct communication; a text has no meaning in itself, does not direct the meanings or the communication. A text may indirectly be and become a part of human communication of meanings. A text cannot determine or convey meanings. But a text might be an important part of human communication, if persons let it be an important part.
Again and again we emphasise this basic, this ontological, dialectics of the constitution of text and language: any text, any part of a text, any language, or part of language, is constituted by the persons who use the part, the text, the language, as a part, a medium, of and for human communication. What the text or language conveys of meaning is not in the text or language, but is co-created by the persons and their relationships.

The ethnocentricity of the category ‘Subject’
By defining or realizing the human parts of textual communication as “subjects” we are making a categorization or classification that is partially an ethnocentric point of view. Therefore we emphasize the partial status of our models when we present them; furthermore we indicate by dialectical symbols that the relational subject-constitution of text and language and communication is dialectically constituted with the (practical) wholeness of the situation and the environment in the three basic dimensions of biologics, sociologics, and ideologics. Furthermore we emphasize that the models should illustrate the human constitution of inter-human linguistic communication, and not every communication between every beings constituting life, earth, and universe. Languages and texts are considered from the point of view of a human community as intra-specietal, or intra-societal, symbolic inter-subjective activities as parts of communication between members of the same species. Of course any human being is in communication with (members) of other species and non-species as a basic condition for any (living) existence – every individual body has to participate directly in the dialectical metabolism between animals, plants, air,
water etc. as a forth going process without lethal interruptions in order to continue the existence as a living individuality. The human society is not to be understood as an isolated intra-system for internal distribution among its individual members, or as a common system with one common port for export and one common port for import. The social organisation cannot dispense from the fact that any member is the active part in that part’s living communication with “the members of other classes and non-classes”. This point is of vital importance in modern societies that primarily promote the ideologen that the real, or important, values are the social symbolic values, e.g. money, scores, point, information, social status etc. Any symbolic system relies dialectically upon the symbiotic of the living beings that constitute that symbolic system. And the vital symbiotic of any living creature imply both the symbiosis with the other creatures of the species, i.e. socio-symbiosis, e.g. mother-father-child, and with the creatures and non-creatures of other species and non-species, i.e. metabolically symbiosis. In our relationship with the non-human beings we are constituting inter-species-”societies”, we are a subject of one species in biotopical relation with subjects of other species and non-species.

To resume: We are individual members of both human societies and extra-human symbiotic, and both these vital relations of existence are dialectically related with our more or less common and individual ideologies. And our constitution of language. It is completely wrong to identify the language and the text as if they were self-constituted, or self-constituting, individualities. It is completely wrong to define the language and the text as socially significant independent of the individuals in communication. It is completely wrong to define language and text as life significant independent of the human symbiosis with other human and non-human beings.

The dialectics of the external and the internal parts of the text
Nevertheless, by the fact that persons during our social, biological, and ideological life have created texts and languages as medial parts of our communication, some forms of utterances, texts, languages have been identified with similar significance for the persons in several situations to indicate parts of the situational meaning. Thus some parts of texts and languages we recognise as similar with earlier identified communicative utterances, some similar parts used very often by the persons in a community, and some other parts used more seldom. Every person and society create some order of recurrence of similar sign and their uses, a memory of the usual form and the communicative relations that we have experienced to share, more or less, with our social relatives, and more or less with different social relatives. Some linguists seem to maintain that the most recurrent parts should be some sort of the smallest unit of language, and that more seldom parts should be build by combination of the smaller parts,
e.g. that a phoneme, or a grapheme, should be the smallest units, combinable to morphemes, to words, to sentences, to texts, to languages.

**Fig. 3: Dialectical hierarchy of the parts of text and communication**

We emphasize that there is no smallest unit of language. Every part of language exists by the personal relating of the parts to the other parts and to the situation of communication. No part of a text or language is reducible to be a subpart of major parts if the persons in communication do not create such a classification, and any part of language and a text might be of the most indispensable importance as well as of the most dispensable redundancy.

Therefore we have tried to indicate the dialectics of the “inner” relations of the parts of a text and the “outer” relations of the parts and the segmentation by means of the model of “the dialectical hierarchy of the parts of text and communication”. The model is to be understood as a heuristic model.


**2. Classification of texts, language, & communication**

**Ordinary languages & extra-ordinary languages**

There is a class of language forms (or forming) which we call “ordinary languages”, comprising two sub-classes, (i) language for general purpose, and (ii) language for specific purpose.

Language for general purpose, LGP, or *common language*, is the kind of ordinary language that:

a) functions as a medium in linguistic communication in every day life between family, neighbours, friends, and acquaintances; it is the normal medium at home;

b) functions as the medium for the communication between more specialized language forms, and between foreign languages;

c) functions as a medium for the dominant ideologies of the culture or social group.

A paradigm case for the domain and universe of ordinary language is the aforementioned situation and dialogue between father and daughter.

Language for specific purpose, LSP, or *specialized language*, is the kind of ordinary language,

a) that functions as a medium of linguistic communication between specialists;

b) that functions as a medium for communication about specialized objects or situations.

The relation between LGP and LSP as parts of ordinary language is dialectical in nature. Languages for specific purposes – as we know them e.g. in medicine and biology – grow out of common language and act themselves back on common language and become melted into the vernacular; e.g. DNA is now a part of common language.

Secondly, there is another class which we call “extra-ordinary language”.

Extra-ordinary language is the language that is regarded as *paradoxical* in relation to ordinary language (common and specialized language). This class contains four different domains:

a) language of mental disorder, e.g. schizophrenic language;

b) language of poetry;
c) language of mystical experiences;

d) language of controversial – paradoxical – science and theory.

The similarity between the various forms of extra-ordinary languages is that they break some principles or rules of the syntax, semantics, or pragmatics of ordinary languages.

Public and Private Texts – Original and Derived

Some texts we consider as public utterances; by the publication of the utterances the speaker/writer invites acquainted persons as well as non-acquainted persons to be partners of the dialogue, observing the text as a shared object for common consideration in order to share some experiences and meanings. That means that the second person, S2, in some characteristic ways is not a specific individual, or a specific individuality (group, collective) of individuals. The communication is not directly personally inter-personal; let us call the S2 an anonymous S2. That does not mean that anybody is equal to everybody in being a potential and real personal part of the communication; somebody is more invited, or selected, as being an acquainted partner than are other ones; the selectivity of the invitation is constituted by:

a) the author (S1),

b) the specific media (linguistic and transporting media),

c) the S3-persons and institutions that incarnate the social authority for that forms of communication, and

d) the feasibility of the discursive universe and object in relation to the different experiences and inter-esse-identifications of different groups of persons.

These constituents condition and constraint – more or less powerful – the access for different persons to be a socially accepted S2-partner of the dialogue; i.e. being or becoming a person whose answers, questions, and inventions are considered to be relevant parts of that dialogue.

The organisation of a text and situation constitutes both communication and ex-communication of individuals and categories of individuals; or, turned in a slightly different way, every text and situation is related and reliable to an infinite and indeterminable number and sorts of recursive bases. There are no definite limits of the text, and the meaning of the text, but the practical relations of persons considering and reconsidering the text as a part of specific, situational communication between some persons more than between other persons.
Public texts are originally produced and reproduced in several public copies similar to each other; this “multiplicity” is a characteristic of these texts and their original communicative meaning.

Some texts are of a more private nature. Private texts are uttered by persons in personal communication with each other. The persons know each other personally and identify the communication as being privately determined by the members of the group – in the sense that the known persons make the personal and social meanings and the identifications of the parts of speech. That means that the texts, the turns of the dialogues, are shared more exclusively – more private – by persons who are present at the same place and time, engaged in common co-operations.

The persons evidently know who is the S1-part, who the S2-parts, and who the S3-parts are with access to, and awareness on the utterances. The relevant situation and context are shared by the participants sharing the spoken parts as objectified media for communication. The utterances take place and time in a situation, topos and praxis that are obvious and common knowledge for the participants in the original situation, in a way that is critically different from the knowledge and conditions for identifications in the derived situation of other persons, e.g. the linguist who didn’t participated in the original situation. In the original situation the situational and contextual conditions for identifications of deixis, modality, and metaphors more evidently exist by the constitutive parts of the situation, so to speak, around the linguistic indications. The utterances have not to describe the situation and context for somebody outside the situation; they are produced in order to create situational developments and shifts of awareness.

Some texts are produced as private texts, but are since made public, cf. the Siegel-text. And vice versa, e.g. when we quote public texts in our private communication. Other texts are neither public nor private, e.g. our text example 4.

3. Text & Discourse Examples

In the following we present, and represent, six text examples of six different categories of texts. The categories are defined, or identified, by the type of situation in which the linguistic utterances originally were produced.

We explicitly present the texts as representations of textual parts in the following way:

In part (0) we indicate a few characteristics of the original situation in order to share some relevant images of the constitutive of that situation with the partners of our communication and situation. You and we are present in our
situation(s) and create some more or less shared representations of a non-present situation in order to communicate about the absent situation and some linguistic parts of that situation.

We indicate in the left column who is the speaker of that part, that “turn”, or part of a turn, of the dialogue; our text representation is thus similar to the genre used by the author of a drama.

Thus we try to make it explicit that the utterances originally belonged to a different situation, and that that situation and the participants constituted the universe of discourse of, and for, the utterances partly represented here in our situation. In order to know e.g. the deictic references for the utterances we have to create a fiction of the original situation. Our fiction of the original situation is a constitutive part of our universe of discourse in our situation of communication.

Of course we also use the linguistic parts of the utterances as indicators of the situation, as being similar to some of the constitutive parts of the original situation; that means that we emphasize the dialectical relationship of the text and the context, or, more explicitly, the dialectics of the original situation and the original text as dialectically constituted in and by our situation by our imaginations and presentations of as-if-representations.

Hereby we try to make an important distinction between “look like” and “be”; the distinction is often blurred in both linguistics and stylistics – a blurring which is perhaps a more general cultural disease in modern societies. In this context we use the distinction in order to be aware of the trivial fact that a given linguistic string that looks like, or sounds like, a string usually used in, e.g., a courtroom by the judge announcing a sentence, IS not a juridical sentence when the string is uttered in a different situation by a person with a different competence. That means that we cannot deduce from the form of the linguistic part of an utterance and situation what the text and the meaning of the text is. The category of GENRE is of course a useful category – and is related with our natural identification memory of language and situations. Even though we use to use some particular, characteristic forms of language in some prototypical sorts of situations, and even though some situations to a high degree are constituted by some ritualized forms of utterances there is no immediately or directly deduction from linguistic parts to situation nor from situation to linguistic parts. Therefore no part of language is to be considered as parts of language games.
Ordinary language (language of ordinary perception)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(0):</th>
<th>The dialogue takes place a Saturday morning and afternoon, spring 2000, in an ecological garden belonging to a couple. A group of friends are engaged in developing the garden, sharing meals, meditations and enjoying the cooperation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Female D:</td>
<td>Do you think we need to dig that deep in order to get rid of the ground elder?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Male L:</td>
<td>Yes, don’t you remember last year?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Male J:</td>
<td>We had to work the plot of land over and over again with the cultivator, didn’t we? But the soup we made by it was excellent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Female D:</td>
<td>Yes, it was hard work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Male O:</td>
<td>What are you doing? We have been working and you have been talking. Right?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Female H:</td>
<td>Right? Yes, indeed it is right to talk and enjoy good company. Why are you that busy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) Male O:</td>
<td>I was just kidding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) Female M:</td>
<td>Oh, I enjoyed the meditation. I feel calm and vigorous now. Let go and flow. Don’t you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) Male B:</td>
<td>Yes, but I am hungry again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10) Male T:</td>
<td>And I am thirsty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(11) Male J:</td>
<td>I will provide food and drink – just wait a moment!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Comments on Text 1:**

By means of the presentation in § 0, and my own experiences, I create an idea, an image, of a situation and context of and for the following texts, §§ 1-11. I’m reading the texts (§§ 1-11) to elaborate my idea of the situation and I’m reading the § 0 presentation to create my idea of the context of the dialogue and of the discourse, i.e. “the context of the situational constituents” and “the context of the universe of discourse”.

As ever there is a dialectical relation between the two aspects of the context of producers & production, (a) the more objective constituents and relations of the shared reality (bio-soc dominance), and (b) the more subjective constituents and relations of the shared fictionality (ideo-soc dominance).

The sequence of the segments presented in §§ 5-7 is a brilliant illustration of the every day use of language to create a common conjunction of different identifications of what’s real and what’s common fiction. The male O modalized
the utterance (5) as if he was offensive against the group of the female H; he defined himself as a member of the working part and the latter as the talking part. Perhaps the female H interpreted the utterance in the wrong way, or perhaps in the correct way; she answered the utterance (6) in a modality of defensivity-offensivity against the other part. A wrong interpretation if the first person intended the mood indicated in his next utterance (7): “I was just kidding”. And a correct interpretation if the intended mood was offensive. Perhaps the reactive answer of H was correct and affected O to change his mood in a different modality, a modality of more shared identifications and evaluations of the different activities of the two parts. Perhaps O changed his mind and meaning during the dialogue and used his reply to redefine the meaning (potential of meanings) of the first utterance by explicating a different modality as if it had been the intended one for the first utterance, too; even though the syntactico-semantical organization more literally pointed in a different direction. Even a joke is, however, a joke if, and only if, the participants share the conditions for the more fictive and paradoxical interpretation. Perhaps H really did interpret the first utterance as a part of a kidding communication and made her utterance (6) an intended part of the kidding, a collective game. If so, she succeeded or failed by doing her utterance and attitude too much realistic, so that O didn’t understand that H had accepted his invitation to play that game.

Who has the correct interpretation of the three utterances is an open question; even among friends kidding by means of offensive language is a dangerous game. The absent linguist cannot tell from the presented text what is the correct interpretation of the utterances in question; what is the modality shared by the participants and what are the differently identified and intended moods of the different participating persons?

The linguist cannot tell if the following utterance (8) of the female M – “Oh, I enjoyed the meditation. I feel calm and vigorous now. Let go and flow. Don’t you?” – is, or is not, a consecution in relation to the dialogue of O and H. The female M was, or was not, a participating part of that dialogue (a S2- or S3-person), and became a speaking part (S1) of that dialogue, or she was an intruder in that situation turning the situation into a new situation initiated by her utterance. Was she commenting the common dialogue by suggesting a shift of object for common consideration, or was she initiating a new situation without having been a present part of the precedent situation? Again it is difficult to determine the correct identification of the individual utterances in relation to the other utterances, whether they were belonging to the same situation-context, the same universe of discourse, and whether the persons agreed or disagreed in their interpretations and intentions.
Instead of discussing what is the correct interpretation and description of the given parts of a dialogue, or more dialogues, we prefer to discuss healthy comments from the point of view that any utterance is only a part of a dialogue and is more or less restricted as a potential of meanings by the syntactico-semantical organisation of the utterance, by the situational context constituted by the present persons and by the other utterances produced in direct or indirect relation to the utterance in question.

The storyteller told a few characteristics of the situation to which the “direct speech” related. From this I can imagine a Funish garden in springtime, some persons who constitute a friendly group and now are going around in the garden doing some cultivating work. Sometimes they are near each other; sometimes some are in one part of the garden while some other is in a different part of the garden. The garden is a locality of a certain area, small enough for the persons to contact everybody by means of their fullest voice, vast enough to let some persons talk with each other in smaller groups private from the more distant persons. Thus the location is a shared room for all the participants, but not like a round table where all the participants address their utterances to one common centre so that everybody hears the same signals from equal positions. I don’t know from the text if my source was moving around during the reported sequence, or if he – or she, or the microphone – was standing at the same place. Neither do I know if the quoted persons were a present part during the whole sequence. Thus I don’t know if all the utterances are parts of an equally person-time-location-shared context. Thus I am not competent to identify what are the relevant inter-textual relations of the uttered parts. Therefore I cannot take for granted that the utterances are part of one, shared, co-operating discourse, being identified as comments to the other utterances, turns of the same dialogue, responses in relation to the previous utterances.

Nevertheless, I will guess from my experiences with similar sorts of situations and dialogues, that there was a group of at least four persons – the female $D$ and $H$, and the male $J$ and $L$ – who shared a co-operation of digging a specific part of the garden and shared the discussion on the solution of an identified problem about the best way of digging “in order to get rid of the ground elder”. They are co-operating in doing the job and in planning the appropriate way of doing the job using their relevant experiences from a similar process last year and the consequences of that way of digging. Moving from a distant part of the garden the male $O$ now entered the scene and tried to be a present part of the group without knowing much of the actual state of affair and history of the group. Perhaps he intended to join the group.

Paradoxically he introduced himself by defining himself (and some other partners) in a conflicting opposition to the group by addressing the members by the deictic ‘you’ and the predicate ‘are talking’. He addressed the ‘you’ group
from a position of being member of a ‘we’-group with the predicate ‘have been working’. Hereby he used the deictic ‘we’ in a way that excluded the addressed persons: being the speaker of the utterance he could deictically refer to himself by 1. personal singular pronoun ‘I’, or by 1.pers.plural ‘we’. Furthermore he could address the group by means of 2. personal pronoun ‘you’, what he did, or he could use ‘we’ with reference to both himself (1. pers.) and to the addressed group (2. pers.). Furthermore he could use the ‘we’ including both the 1. and the 2. and the 3. persons, i.e. both the two situational present parts and the absent parts of the entire group of friends in co-operation in the garden that Saturday.

He introduced a competing relation between the smaller parts of the whole group combined with a derogative evaluation of the part he was addressing. A common joke by equal fellows, perhaps, an “innocent” reproduction of winner-looser-games of the market, the institutions, the wage-labour-job, the families, the party conversations. The attitude of being the dominant part was here presented – and represented – in a different social setting, leisure time among friends, and could be interpreted as a –stupid – demonstration of the freedom from the competing forms of the professional and institutional life. Perhaps the female $H$ shouldn’t have accepted to be injured, but could have kept the dignity by ignoring the taste of indignity. She reproduces as well the competing and violent form in her answer and made herself an equally fighting part against him. Perhaps the female $M$, and the male $B$, $T$ and $J$, were the more ecological part when they turned the common situational awareness towards the mental and physical resources for all the persons, the enjoyed meditation and the provision of food and drink. Perhaps the stupid and violent utterances were symptoms of the needs for food and drink, and not for fighting against each other.

But again, I know very little about the situation, about the individual persons and the individual group and their internal and external constitution, history, vital problems and aims. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the absent social orders and persons sometimes play their destructive roles in the mind, the talking, and the acting of the present participants. Ecolinguistics has to elaborate our knowledge and awareness of the influences of bad patterns of language games, i.e. non-friendly and violent communication and description. We have to elaborate experiments of friendly and non-violent communication in order to develop language and patterns of language that are more healthy in communication, both in thinking, talking and acting.

It is a bad linguistics that normalizes the patterns of language usually used in competing situations. The language of the winner of a bad game is not to be considered the correct and successful language.
**Text 2**

*Extra ordinary language (language of extra ordinary perception)*

| (0): | The life situation is a group of people gathered in the home of the meditation teacher in Spring 1997. The group has just finished a sequence of deep meditation. There are ten people present and one person gives the following feedback to the group: |
| (1) Female R (*FR*): | Just after we have finished the four point meditation a small figure turned up to the right of me. I was a little astonished and a little afraid. He looked so weird. |
| (2) Meditation Teacher (*MT*): | Do you wish to know who it was and what he wanted you to learn? |
| (3) *FR*: | Yes, I think so. |
| (4) *MT*: | Close your eyes gently and recall the image of the figure and give me a nod, when it happens! |
| (5) *FR*: | Yes, it is there now, but it is not quite clear. |
| (6) *MT*: | Look more closely! |
| (7) *FR*: | Yes, it is a small Chinese old man. He seems to be very friendly. |
| (8) *MT*: | Ask him who he is and what he will teach you! |
| (9) *FR*: | I knew it. It is me. He says that he is me. That is impossible – isn’t it? I cannot be both a female and a male at the same time. |
| (10) *MT*: | You mean it would be like sitting on your own knees? Might be it is you. Please ask him what he will teach you! |
| (11) *FR*: | He says that he needs to tell me to take care of myself. It is a bit frightening. I cannot be both him and me at the same time? |

**Text 2 Comments:**

This example is a presentation of a sequence of an earlier dialogue among several persons gathered in a common room and situation. Some of the persons uttered verbal utterances that hereby became shared parts of the situation. Each utterance might be considered a text and the individual text might be considered a part of a dialogue, a “turn of the dialogue”. The dialogue was constituted by the persons present in the room. A person became the speaker of a text, the S1-person of that text, when the person uttered that part of the dialogue, and then the other persons became S2- and S3-persons. When the next person uttered a text, that person became S1 and the other S2 and S3. For the linguist who didn’t participate in the original situation and only observes the presented and transformed extract, it is impossible to know in what way the persons identify the individual utterances formulated by an individual, as a shared utterance and
meaning, as a more or less common formulation of a common meaning and information. Of course the linguist can make some conjectures from the presented verbal parts, the verbal utterances made by the “meditation teacher” (MT) and the “female R” (FR). The situation and the dialogue implied, however, some more people, and their utterances and activities we cannot learn from Text 2. Indeed we cannot learn the non-reported utterances and activities made by the speaking persons from their reported verbal utterances. We can make conjectures on the communication by means of our own imaginations that depend upon our own experiences and willingness to create co-identifications with the persons of the situation and dialogue.

Of course we could reduce our task and aim to make registrations of words and syntactic constructions, but we couldn’t tell whether the words and syntax were appropriate or relevant use of language, without knowing what was the interests, intentions, meanings, knowledge, etc., of the participants constituting the situation.

Any linguistic description and comparison of verbal utterances implies general and specific identifications of the contexts and situations in which the utterances are communicative parts, and any verbal utterance is a more or less redundant and constitutive part of ongoing communication between persons.

We categorize the text (or the sequence of texts) as an example of ‘extra ordinary language’ and ‘language of extra ordinary perception’; the situation is constituted by persons who are engaged in communication on perceptions of phenomena outside the ordinarily “physical, objective, sensational” world; the persons consider the phenomena as being and becoming existent, relevant, interesting, significant, and shared parts of our common world. The language becomes extra ordinary language in the sense that the intra-personal perceptions are considered as being not a mere private or intra-individual fiction but also as being inter- and extra-personally related and existing. The deictic references are not considered to be of a mere metaphoric character without “real objects” or referents, but the language is used to closer examination and re-identification of the object – and in a deeper sense to communicate with the object. Not only to talk or learn about an object but also to become in a more dialectical communication with the object; thus the object turns into a co-subject. This is a kind of extra ordinary language that – at a different level – can be compared with the person with “green fingers” who is talking with the plants. So to speak, human language is not only for ordinary inter-human communication, but also important for human communication, and interfering, with other species and individualities of other levels of existence. Of course some linguists would prefer to identify such matters as extra-linguistic, or para-linguistic, phenomena,
or dimensions that should be sharply distinguished from linguistic communication and outside the nature or essence of language.

Extra-linguistic and para-linguistic phenomena dialectically constitute linguistic phenomena.

**Some interesting transformations of the deictic pronouns**

In her first turn (1) the female R, FR, tells about “*a small figure turned up to the right of me*”. She refers to the small figure by the deictic indefinite “*a*”, supposedly because the figure is not yet known by the partners of the dialogue. If the figure was known the definite particle “*the*” would be the appropriate deictic indicator. The figure is referred to in conjunction with the past tense indication “*turned*”, which indicates that the figure is not a present perception now; now “*it*” is a remembered perception of the past. In the past the figure was perceived in a modality of being “*to the right of*” FR, i.e. outside the perceiving person, just like an individuality that is a sensational part of the situation, like an object or another person participating in the situation as being a constitutive participant.

FR continues her presentation of the figure by means of the masculine pronoun “*he*”, by which the phenomenon by our co-imaginative identification turns into a male human-like person.

The meditation teacher, MT, says in his turn (2) both “*it*” and “*he*”; furthermore MT in the second part implies that the phenomenon was an individuality of subject-character who could want something in relation to FR: “*what he wanted you to learn*”. MT is in communication with FR in the zero situation, Sit-0, and he asks FR if she wants to know more about the “person” she met in an earlier situation, Sit-P. She confirms.

In the following sequence of communication the relations of Sit-0 and Sit-P interrelate in an interesting manner; by reconsidering the past situation Sit-P in the present Sit-0 the person FR becomes in a closer, transformed, and present relation to Sit-P and the “weird” participant:

In (4) the teacher asks FR to “recall the image of the figure”; in (5) FR tells that “it is there now, but it is not quite clear”; it is uncertain whether the “*it*” refers to the image or the figure; in the closer inspection the “*it*” – in (7) – becomes “a small Chinese old man” who is present and “seems to be very friendly”. By the MT-guidance (8) FR becomes engaged in a dialogue with the small Chinese old man who tells her, what she now realizes that she already knew, that he is her: (9) “I knew it. It is me. He says that he is me.” The transformation of “*it*” into “*he*” into the female “*I*” seems “impossible” for FR: “I cannot be both a female and a male at the same time”, she comments her own identifications. Supposedly at least two different logics are present at the same time, which ordinarily exclude each other from the same universe of commu-
nication and discourse; they belong to different levels, or modalities, of reality. Apparently FR identifies both him and herself as being herself at the same time; the “impossible” identification(s) frightens her “a bit” (11). Please notice the interpretation problems of the utterance, “He says that he needs to tell me to take care of myself.” Who says, who needs, who tells whom, who has to take care of whom? Does she realize that “he” is until now a forgotten or ignored part of herself, which she has to take care of? Or, is “he” her angel, or her-self in an earlier incarnation, who teaches her the learning to take care of herself? Or, is she learning and teaching herself to heal and unite her divided self?

Perhaps both the questions and the answers have been more developed during the continuation of the dialogues and afterwards. However, our little examination illustrates the fact, that sometimes, perhaps always, several logics might be implied in a dialogue; therefore an appropriate linguistic description should imply more than one logic of rationality and universe of discourse and situation. An important question is: How do we develop the relations of logics in a healthier way, healthier both for the persons directly involved and for the surroundings. That cannot be done by ignoring extra ordinary perceptions or by separating the different levels of reality and imagination.
Text 3
Extra ordinary language (poetic language)

(0): In a book, *British Poetry since 1945* by Edward Lucie-Smith (Penguin Book, 1970, p. 131-132), we find the following verse by PHILIP LARKIN. Larking is introduced with the following words: “On balance, Larkin is probably the most important poet to establish himself in England since the war.”

(1) PHILIP LARKIN:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are days for?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Days are where we live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They come, they wake us.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time and time over.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are to be happy in:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where can we live but days?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ah, solving that question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brings the priest and the doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In their long coats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running over the fields.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Text 4
Extra ordinary language (language of mental disorder)

(0): The text is written by a schizophrenic patient and is presented in Bent Rosenbaum and Harly Sonne: “Det er et bånd der taler.” (Gyldendals sprogbibliotek, 1979, p. 28-29):

(1) A Schizophrenic Patient:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dagens båndende Spørgsmaal er det af de Sammensvorne stillede Forslag, som gaar ud paa at fjerne alt levende og dødt imellem Himmel og Jord.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herved mener disse at kunde give Plads til noget nyt og bedre, som skulde fremkomme af Solens Straaler.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeg vil dog indgive Ansøgning om Tilladelse til at danne en Undtagelse.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) A Translator:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Today’s burning question is the proposal made by the conspirators for the removal of all things living and dead between Heaven and Earth.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>They think hereby to be able to make room for something new and better, which should be produced by the rays of the sun.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>However, I’d like to hand in an application for permission to constitute an exception.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on Text 3 and Text 4
Both texts are belonging to the class of ‘Extra Ordinary Language’, T3 being of the genre ‘Poetic Language’, T4 of ‘Language of Mental Disorder’. The difference between the two genres is of contextual nature. The poetic genre is considered social significant, and communicative, in a socially accepted segment of social life, implying socially accepted but extraordinary semantics. The language of mental disorder is identified by considering the utterances being uttered by a socially non-accepted person and, therefore, without social and communicative significance and meaning.

The utterances of the poet are, or are becoming, parts of a social communication; the members of the ordinary public define and interpret the utterances in a way that makes the utterances socially significant, acceptable and valuable texts; the producer of the poetic text is considered being a part of society doing her or his valuable cultural work. Some poetic texts become parts of the shared universe of discourse, the shared social sense, the shared recursive base, the common sense and knowledge, for a minor or a major group of society. The poet is classified as a prominent person among the prominent persons, although of different class-positions depending of the society in question. So to speak, basically the poet and the audience share the identification of the sense and meaning of the text-context-relations; a basic agreement on the ontology of the
text and the imaginations, even though there are discussions and disagreements on the most correct hermeneutics.

The situation is different as to the identity of the schizophrenic person and her or his utterances. The ordinary society defines the utterances and the person as non-acceptable; the person becomes more or less a non-person with whom the ordinary persons share neither ontology nor hermeneutics, the person becomes an object for observation and treatment, not a partner of communication and shared meanings. If the poet doesn’t participate in ordinary dialogues between the extraordinary poetic productions and thus shares the identification of what’s ordinary and what’s extraordinary, then the poet turns into the class of disordered persons, or persons of mental disorder. Sometimes a society has canonized some texts as members of the poetic canon while the producer of the texts has been turned into the category of mad persons; sometimes some texts have been turned into the category of valuable poetry, even though everybody knows that the producer was an unhealthy person.

As a matter of fact it is not to determine from the organization of a text whether or not the text is part of a healthy communication without considering the conditions for its production and producers. To isolate the product from the conditions for production is, however, an ordinary and general mood in the societies of modern capitalism, whether the products are food, clothes, houses, Olympic records, illness, music, literature, poetry, candidates, or linguistic descriptions and criteria for proper language use.

Both Text 3 and Text 4 might exhibit poetic values for the reader listening to the sound of the language and feeling the depth of the imaginations created by meditative reading. And of course it is possible to use the texts as a means for deeper insight in the nature of language, human mind and the world, and perhaps to be a better and more sensitive listener and speaker/writer. However, by the praxis of ignoring the real conditions for the other relevant parts of the communication, in casu the producer of the texts, the praxis becomes an exercising in non-communication and thus an unhealthy mode of exercising. The depersonalised methods of text interpretation and description turn in reality the social communication into more like the mental disorder than into the poetic form of life and life-relations.

The deictics and the existentials can look similar, as the following examples show (capitals indicate stress).

- THERE’s a new Mercedes across the street (deictic)
- There’s a new MERCEDES across the street (existential)

Despite the superficial similarities, the deictic and existential *there’s* differ in at least the following ways:

- Deictic *there* refers to a specific location; existential *there* does not.
- Deictic *there* contrasts with *here*; existential *there* does not.
- Deictic *there* occurs independently of the deictic *there*-constructions; existential *there* does not occur outside of existential *there*-constructions.
- Deictic *there* is a locative adverb; existential *there* is not.
- Deictic *there* is not a grammatical subject; existential *there* is a grammatical subject.
- Deictic *there* almost always bears stress; existential *there* almost never does.

Comments on Text 5
We categorize Text 5 as an example of a) “Ordinary language” and b) “Language for Specific Purpose”. That means, a) we identify the text as being readable by persons sharing ordinary experiences with ordinary relations of a public market text and some more or less common co-texts and contexts; and b) we identify the text as being indicated as primarily interesting for persons belonging to a social segment of the general public, who share some more specific interests, in this case, participation in an academic discussions on language and philosophy of language.

The text example belongs to a major book with the title “Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things”. By such a title the author invites a broader audience – or public – to participate in the dialogue; on the other hand, by the fact that the book is published by the University of Chicago Press the invitation is more restricted to a narrower public part who deals with academic matters of more specific purpose.

We think it is vital that any academic discussion is public, and that it might blur this basic condition for production of science if only a *transformed* part of
science and scientific discussions and decisions is public. In this case we find Lakoff’s book beautiful in both aspects in order to increase our awareness on language among both the academic and the everyday creators of language.

The text example is a relatively small part of an extensive text, belonging to page 540 of the book. That means that the example has a lot of preceding text to be co-identified with as constituting parts of the universe of discourse and the constitution of the dialogue and situation of communication. The quoted sequence belongs neither to the introducing nor the concluding part, but is to be considered a sequence of the medial part of the individuality text. Therefore we have to make the imagination that the reader – following the author’s line of indications – now and here, p. 540, is familiar with the individual meanings of the author and the more and less shared social import (cf. our semantic matrix). The reader knows the initial presentations of the universe of discourse and has built up some relevant and shared images to which this text part is co-related. The reader knows the situational and contextual deictic relations of the text as a whole individuality related with ontological and hermeneutical existence.

Even though we present more than a single sentence, it is important to be aware of the fact that the presented part is only a little bit of the whole text. We have not to look after primary deictic and modal indications correlating the situation of communication and the fictive universe of the story, because the basic setting is already settled. We are intruders in a forth going communication and we know only in general terms and levels what the writer and reader now and here share of common interests and awareness. Nevertheless we here and now participate in the dialogue and make some comments to the referred part, because we find some parts of the part interesting in a general context and in our present context.

Lakoff discusses the phenomenon of ‘deictics’ in relation to ‘existentials’; in the text he appeals to the experiences of the reader introducing the two examples,

(1) THERE’s a new Mercedes across the street (deictic)
(2) There’s a new MERCEDES across the street (existential).

He implies that the reader is aware of the fact that language is present both in written and spoken media when he writes that “The deictics and the existentials can look similar, as the following examples show (capitals indicate stress)”. A more explicit formulation could imply an example (0) as follows,

(0) There’s a new Mercedes across the street (orthographic writing)
This example (0) could be presented as (a part of) a written text and we could ask for the meaning potentials of such a (part of) text; then Lakoff could present the two examples (1) and (2) as being two different interpretations of example (0), implying two differently spoken utterances that do not sound similar. The one implies an interpretation where the speaker indicates the deictic interesting referent to be a specific location of the situation shared by the speaker and the dialogue-partner(s), signalized by means of e.g. a pointing finger or the direction of the view, or by a preceding text-part referring to a specific location. The point is, that example (1) implies an established situation of shared identification, shared by the speaker and the communication partner(s), in which the ‘there’s’ can be used to co-ordinate the specific location of the intended object for shared and present awareness.

The second example implies a different interpretation of the situation and the intentions of the speaker (or writer of (2)). The prominent interesting object for shared awareness is the “Mercedes”, why the Mercedes gets the pointing stress by the speaker, while the location is postponed by means of the locative adverbial phrase, “across the street”, where the deictics is indicated by the deictic part “the”, which implies that the communicating partners share the relevant localization of the street.

Both interpretations imply a pre-established situation shared by the participants, and both interpretations imply a deictic reference to a more specific part of that situation. None of the utterances (1) and (2) is more deictic than the other, but they are used to focus different parts of perhaps different situations.

Both (1) and (2) might be transliterated as (0) and of course “they” look similar written in the same way. Lakoff continues by giving the similarities the predicate “superficial”; that’s misleading, we think, because the implied superficiality doesn’t differ from the superficiality of any written text, i.e. that any written text is to be considered to be a potential of meanings, the interpretation of which depends on the co- and con-texts and situation of communication to which the text is a constituting part. Similar written and oral sequences of language are similar if they are similar, and then the similarity is not superficial but a fact of that point of view and that aspect of consideration. To say that similar sequences of language might imply different meanings is correct. To say that one specific interpretation of a given sequence of language is more superficial than another specific interpretation of the same sequence, is both correct and of vital importance, and is in fact related with the core question, How do we make more healthy interpretations of texts and languages? Neither example (1) nor example (2) is generally the most healthy or deep interpretation of example (0), and none of them indicates the conditions for understanding the deictic references implied. It would be a superficial linguist that said that only of the two interpretations was the correct one, and as a matter of fact the example (0)
might be a correctly written form for several different meanings and oral forms, e.g. the following two interpretations using the similar stress indications:

(3) There’s a NEW Mercedes across the street
(4) There’s a new Mercedes ACROSS the street

However, Lakoff focuses on a few contrasting interpretations of the word ‘there’ used in the initial part of a sentence to indicate a deictic or an existential meaning. The term ‘existential’ means therefore something different from ‘deictic’. We could argue that both meanings, as every use of language, imply a deictic aspect as well as an existential aspect, and that the difference is a difference in dominant specificity; that means, that the Lakoff-called existential use of ‘there’ indicates a broader and less specific location of the uttered happening, whereas the deictic use indicates a narrower and more specific location of the happening communicated by means of the utterance. The Danish grammarian, Paul Diderichsen, used the term “formal situative”, while Kr. Mikkelsen used the term “indefinite subject” for apparently the same aspect which Lakoff calls “existential”. Historically, the deictic use is the most prototypical meaning of the WORD “there”, and the existential use is derived from the deictical. Today we use the “unstressed” form when we indicate that a location is implied, but is unknown, or of less importance in relation to some other constituents of the story; thus the unstressed deictic (or existential) “there” (or Danish “der”) is often used as initiator of fairytales, “Once upon a time there was a king […]”. The phrase is used to indicate a room or place or scene for the following actors and activities and particular locations within that frame of shared fiction. Therefore it is misleading to name the phenomenon “existential”, because it doesn’t imply real existence, but only existence for our common imagination of fictive or real phenomena.

As Lakoff doesn’t conceive the dialectics of the more primary and the more secondary deictic aspect, but tries to make a distinct contrast, a dualism, between deictic and existential, he misses some interesting implications of his contrastive examples. Let us consider a few points concerning grammatical and phonetic descriptions. Lakoff wrote,

− Deictic there is a locative adverb; existential there is not.
− Deictic there is not a grammatical subject; existential there is a grammatical subject.
− Deictic there almost always bears stress; existential there almost never does.
Why is existential “there” not a locative adverb, and why is deictic “there” not a grammatical subject, and why bears the one stress, the other seldom?
Of course we are able to describe the deictic “there” as a grammatical subject, if we say that there might be more than one grammatical subject implied, what we in reality say when we are dealing with subject and subject-predicative constructions such as “Man is an animal” or “Man is a holy creature and creator”. In the case of “there’s a Mercedes” it is possible to say, that both “there” and “Mercedes” are grammatical and situational subjects of different prominence according to their deixis-indicating relation to the already established universe of discourse, and that the situational prominence is stressed by phonetic stress while the grammatical might be indicated by the verb-inflection. Sometimes grammatical and situational subject is one and the same subject, e.g. “The Mercedes crossed the street” where “The Mercedes” is both situational and grammatical subject in the way that the Mercedes is presented as a known part of the situation that now becomes the acting part of the sentence.

To say that deictic “there” is a locative adverb might be a relevant description if the same could be said about the existential there; existence without locality for existence seems to be a nonsense existence. Both deictic and existential “there” imply a dialectical relation to the verb and sometimes to a more substantial subject, and both of them imply some existence in time and space. In Danish we often use both the more deictic “DER” and the more existential “der” (“there”) in the same construction:

(5) DER er der en Mercedes
(5b) *THERE there’s a Mercedes
(5c) Der er en Mercedes DER
(5d) *There’s a Mercedes THERE

To resume: The deictic and the existential aspect are dialectically related; deixis implies the existence of the indicated referent, and existence implies some topos to exist within and withby, some universe of both the situation and the discourse.

It’s fine that Lakoff observes that one and the same written text has to be interpreted in different ways according to different situational meanings. We have to know the situational meaning to decide the correct grammatical description, the correct locational description, and the correct phonetic description.

What is considered to be a grammatical subject, a locative adverb, a stress-bearing part, a deictic part, or an existential part, that is evidently a dialectical
question and cannot be decided without knowledge of the relevant co- and contexts and the situations of communication.

Lakoff indicates that there are more than superficial differences between what he calls deictic and existential indication by means of the word “there”. And he indicates correlative differences in some other dimensions: different ways of referring to location, different semantic contrast implication (there: here), different syntactic distribution (occurrence inside, outside and not outside there-constructions), different word class identification (locative adverb, not adverb), different verb relations (grammatical subject, not grammatical subject), different phonetic identification (stress, not stress).

But he uses himself deictics and existentials as if there’s no relevant discussion whether deictics and existentials exist, how and where “they” exist, how and where “they” can be referred to as locational identities or individualities. He writes, “The deictics and the existentials can look similar”. By means of “the” he indicates that deictics and existentials exist as phenomena referred to by deictic reference implying a more specific location. He doesn’t tell anything about the specific location but implies it as known by the participants of the actual communication. When he furthermore organizes “the deictics and the existentials” as grammatical subject for the verb “can” he implies that “they” are something that can do something in our world, they can look. He implies that deictics and existentials are physical, visible individualities. Furthermore they are presented as very active individualities, they refer, they contrast, they occur independently and dependently, they are (or are not) adverb, grammatical subject, and they bear (or bear not) stress. Thus Lakoff subscribes to an idealistical linguistics (and philosophy) making no importance of the different modes of existence and the different locations of existence and the dialectics of the constituents of existence. The implied universe of discourse seems to be the network of linguistic terms constructed by and for linguists relating with a more or less shared conceptual map for descriptions of language in a way that can look like a neutral description without ontological, situational, or hermeneutic implications; and without presentation of the persons and media implied in and constituting the part of language described.

Nevertheless his text implies that there’s a dialectical relationship between the different parts of linguistic description and that this dialectics is constituted by the persons in communication.
Text 6
Extra ordinary language (avant-garde theory)

(0): Frontier Perspectives Volume 7, Number 1, Fall/Winter, 1998 (The Centre for Frontier Sciences at Temple University) contains an article by GLEN REIN, “Biological Effects of Quantum Fields and their Role in the Natural Healing Process”. He writes (p. 17):

(1) GLEN REIN: Thus quantum fields act as a bridge between the higher dimensional energies of spirit and classical EM field. EM fields then regulate the biochemical level as demonstrated by the bio-electromagnetics research community. Healing with energy therefore occurs by an infusion of energy from some external source that resonates with the level in the bio-field according to how subtle it is. Healing can also occur through internal sources of energy generated from the individual in a meditative state of consciousness.

Comments on Text 6:
What is a “healthy” text and what is a “healthy” interpretation, description, comment and characterization of a text?

This ought to be a leading and vivid question for any linguist and literary critical and language teacher. And any language maker.

Perhaps we are doing some more interesting communication when we are speaking and listening, writing and reading, than only sharing, producing, reproducing, creating meanings and information for conceptual purposes. Perhaps a vital aspect of our use of language in verbal communication, or verbal thinking, concerns our individual and inter-individual fields of energies of spirit. And perhaps these fields resonate with each other and our bio-electromagnetic fields, and perhaps some manners of speaking, listening, and thinking are healthier for all the parts involved than are other manners. Generally speaking it could be plausible that the more friendly and lovely modes of speaking, listening and thinking would imply a more healing resonance in ourselves and our partners (including both the persons engaged directly in the dialogue and the persons and individuals talked, or thought, about); while a more hostile or frightening mode is in dissonance with the healing energies and creative processes.

Such formulations don’t agree with ordinary language in the manner that does the formulations by Lakoff in Text 5. Nor do they immediately belong to an established branch, or a social segment, more or less understood as a part of the mono-cultural division of labour, or science. Then we could categorize the text as mad or outside reasonable science and production of science and theo-
ries. Or we can do what we are doing, namely to consider the text as a part of avant-garde theory and theorizing.

Because the text seems reasonable for us and in accordance with our own experiences.

Perhaps it could be a nice challenge for linguistics to be aware of the underlying, or higher level modality of our use of language. To quote the wise words:

\[
\begin{align*}
If \text{ a child lives with criticism} & \quad \text{she learns to condemn} \\
If \text{ a child lives with hostility} & \quad \text{he learns to fight} \\
If \text{ a child lives with ridicule} & \quad \text{she learns to be shy} \\
\text{But if a child lives with encouragement} & \quad \text{he learns confidence} \\
If \text{ a child lives with tolerance} & \quad \text{she learns to be patient} \\
If \text{ a child lives with praise} & \quad \text{he learns to appreciate} \\
If \text{ a child lives with fairness} & \quad \text{she learns justice} \\
If \text{ a child lives with security} & \quad \text{he learns to have faith} \\
\text{If a child lives with acceptance and friendship} & \quad \text{she learns to find love in the world.}
\end{align*}
\]
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