0. Definition of linguistics

We define linguistics in a dialectical way that should imply an ecologically reflected organization of persons and problems concerned about the phenomena of language.

**Linguistics** is the enquiry primarily concerned with descriptions of, and prescriptions for,
- the phenomena of natural, living languages, and
- their contextual and situational implications, i.e. their genetic and constitutional conditions and consequences.

The linguistic research-object is defined as a complexity of living, natural, and cultural phenomena that constitute situations, and are constituted by situations, in their synchronic and diachronic dimensions. Languages cannot be isolated from their environments without which they don't exist. Every linguistic description and prescription is, too, a description and prescription of and for the environmental implication of the languages and dialogues in question. By environment we refer to the ideological environment (the mental organization), the biological environment (the physical organization), and the sociological environment (the social organization) in their dialectical relations.

The definition has some interesting implications for linguists. For if it is accepted, then linguists have to engage themselves into transdisciplinary studies, and to co-operate with theorists from other disciplines that have languages as their research-
object. The definition implies that the established linguistic "results" – theories, methods, data and evaluations – cannot be interesting on their own rights if they are defined as-if purely neutral or consistent in themselves (cf. e.g. N.CHOMSKY or L.HJELMSLEV and their followers). Nevertheless, they are socially and mentally (and, too, surely biologically) existing; and for the institutionalized linguist it might be a theoretical & practical task to transform the traditional formulations of linguistic truth by a discipline critical activity. Such a critical activity can be characterized by predicates as re-vision, recon-consideration, re-formulation, re-grounding; and the activity can only be done from the topos that every text has several and changeable meaning potentials, even a theoretical text, and that no natural language is reducible to a mere system in itself, because a living, natural language is a part of the dialectics of dialects and culture, changing over time, place, person, etc.

1. Some vital and essential ecolinguistical questions

For years linguists, psychologists, sociologists and philosophers have developed interesting and important theories which seriously concern about our modern culture and global ecological crisis. Now the time – and our discipline – seems ripe to ask some vital and essential questions:

a) What are the primary aims of theories of language?
b) What are the contributions of an ecolinguistic praxis?
c) What are the key categories of, and for, an ecological theory of language and an ecolinguistics?

Let us answer the questions very briefly. Our answer to the first question is that theories of language ought to contribute to the growth of healthier [inter-species] societies and healthier personalities. The answer to the second question is that an ecolinguistic praxis ought to improve everybody's awareness of the language we use in relation to the ecological problematic, to deliver theories and methods so that we can improve our understanding and knowledge
about ecological questions, and to make contributions to an ecological theory of language.

The third question is elaborated in this essay. We will present some of the answers we have given already (cf. e.g. our contribution to AILA '93) and some new development in our dialectical theory of language.

1.2. A dialectical theory of language

A dialectical theory of language is a kind of philosophical theory and it comprises both linguistics and other theories of language (used and developed by e.g. anthropologists, biologists, literates, psychologists and sociologists).

A dialectical theory is also an ecological theory: an ecological approach is one in which you investigate a research object in its relationship with its – and our – environment; a relational investigation.

1.3. A dialectical philosophy

A dialectical philosophy presupposes the following axioms:

- (i) Every entity exists in an interdependency with all the other entities and the environment, and
- (ii) The form of existence of an entity is determined by its interactivity with, and in its environment.

(Cf. J.Døør, Moral Meditations. Odense, 1998.)

Many linguists and philosophers, however, seem consciously or unconsciously to continue the Cartesian tradition because they implicitly or explicitly negates our two axioms, e.g. by postulating syntactic rules as if single words or word forms in a given or produced sentence could be separated from the whole text, discourse, situation and culture, which they are constituted with. An ecolinguistical model of the tacitly presupposed interdepen-dency and interactivity among relationated terms of main-stream-linguistics could be configured as follows:
The arrows indicate a dialectical relation, i.e. a constitutive relation between entities, where the dominance of determination is historically changing and changeable, whereas the relationship is a constitutive condition for the identity of the related entities. The three aspects, the syntactic, the semantic, and the pragmatic aspect, are dialectically interrelated in the dialogical topos.

We intend to illustrate that every segmentation of a text or speech is an abstraction; therefore it implies ontological and hermeneutical interpretations. No so-called linguistic "entity" or "level" exists in isolation from living dialogues and natural participants.

Fig. 1 seems very familiar to the structuralist conception of linguistics; it is our intention that it should function as a reminder for the linguist to recognize language as parts of human culture and dialogue.
In the following we present a dialectical and ecological model for ecolinguistics, where we define the dialogue as the minimal units in linguistics.

2. The dialogue is the paradigm for use of language

When we are talking of the dialogue as the minimal units in linguistics, we refer to a dialogue prototype that is sufficient heterogeneously constituted to explicate the genetical, constitutive and consequential dynamics of language and language use, e.g. involving the child's production of language. The dialogue model in Cours de linguistique générale shows two identical heads as symmetrical partners (cloned individuals); CHOMSKY (1965:3) writes about two completely competent persons, speaker and hearer, in a completely homogeneous speech community. Such models are monological models. Our conception of the dialogue is inspired by the works of MARTIN BUBER and the BAKHTIN-group.

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity. And this active participation of every utterance in living heteroglossia determines the linguistic profile and style of the utterance to no less a degree than its inclusion in any normative-centralizing system of a unity language.

Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).

We differ, however, from BUBER og BAKHTIN because they by a dialogue mean a linguistic communication between two people; such a model we could call a duological model. Our model, a dialectical model, explicates three different persons, subjects, as dialectically implied in every linguistic communication, whether or not three persons are personally present in the actual situation. The three persons or subjects in our model configure e.g. the three deictic persons of a text, the speaker, the addressee, and the "observer". We thus define the observer as a participant in the dialogue and not as a neutral or non-influential or -influated part. Who is the dominating part is a historical question in the actual dialogue; sometimes it is the silent person that dominates the forms, functions, and values of the uttered parts of the dialogue.

In the following we present our model, first by a few definitions without much elaboration and then by a figure with a few comments.

(a) A dialogue is a linguistic communication between at least three persons,
(b) – that are of different ages, sexes, and dialects, and differently situated in their social praxis & universe of significance, e.g. mother, father, child.
(c) – that speak the same natural language, i.e. a common conjuncture of dialects and social praxis. They know some relevant portion of the core of the unitary features of their common language. We presuppose that a natural language has an identity, a dialectical identity, i.e. it exists in, and by, personal & textual symbolic systems of contradictions between similarities, differences, and originals/individuals.

The similarities constitute the homoglossia, or the homological part of the contradiction. The differences constitute the heteroglossia, or the heterological part of the contradictions. The whole identity of homo- and heteroglossia is called the dialectics of dialects.

(d) The three persons know each other already. They share some background knowledge and have participated together in earlier praxis and discourse, here and elsewhere. They share some collective knowledge, whether or not it is linguistically formed.
(e) The dialogue presupposes a question or problematic which establishes the *raison d’être*, or identity, of the discourse. Therefore, every utterance is inscribed in former questions/discourse and following questions/discourse, i.e. every utterance is part of a process of questions and answers, and is a part of ana-, cata-, and sym-phorical relations.

(f) There is in reality no fixed or permanent meaning of an utterance but only impermanent value of the implied (spoken or written) parts and their textual, co-textual and con-textual relations. There is no universally or context-free pre-defined correct use of a text independent of persons, logics, time and place, i.e. the deictical and topical cultural conjuncture. Meanings and values are changing and conditioned by the dialogue and the situation.

(g) The linguistic unit of a dialogue is an utterance, and all utterances are heteroglossial. Every use of a text is unique (and a text is only a text in use), and consequently every utterance is determined by a matrix of contradictions constituting and constituted by a dialectical hierarchy of complexity.

(h) It is the particular dialogue and the unique situation that dominates the text, and the existence of the text is inscribed in its co-texts.

A co-text is (1) a text implying the question which the text in question is an answer to, and (2) a text implying the answer it is structured to call forth in the participants. And (3) a text implying keys and matrices for interpretations of the text in question. (Consider the dialectics of explicit and implicit co-texts.)

When we are confronted with a text the meaning of which a certain group or person insists to be one and only one meaning, and an unchanging meaning too, we are confronted with a social force that tries to monopolize the dialogue, and to deform the dialogue into a monologue.

3. A Model of Dialogue & Discourse
By the following fig. 2 we try to indicate some of the constitutive conditions for what JOHN LYONS calls "the linguist's raw material", the utterance and the text. For linguistical reasons – and only for linguistical reasons – we put the traditional linguist's object in the center of the model surrounded by its context or con-textual features. We use, however, conflated personal fields in order to indicate that only a part of the situation and the media-material (text, speech) is identified or produced to be an utterance, and only a part is a common part. Some linguists, cf. G.LEECH, prefer to see the linguist as a person with the privilege to tell or describe what's actually said or written. This position is possible only if the linguist can produce a simple, coherent & ex-haustive description without no presuppositions that are not articulated (cf. HJELMSLEV). From a dialectical point of view every descriptor becomes a part of the dialogue, and every description is always also a self-description. The so-called decontextualizing or depersonalizing processes (well-known object-isolationing methods) are, in reality, methods to produce alternative texts and utterances, and do not extract the "pure" or "genuine" linguistic form or content of the observed original situation.
Some comments to the model
Any event, relation, process, state, or organism has a place, a topos, and it is a dynamic topos which is structured by three dimensions.
• The first dimension is the bio-logics. A present text, or an utterance, has a physical or biological conditioned existence - and without the biological dimension the text or utterance could not exist.
• The second dimension is the ideo-logics. The utterance, or text, has mental aspects, some mental conditions or implications without which it would not be identifiable as an utterance/text.
• The utterance is a form of social activity and therefore we introduce the term socio-logics. Without a social praxis there would be no natural language nor linguistic sign nor text. A natural language is a cultural medium which stylizes and formalizes forms of social interactions.

Every dialogue takes place in a praxis. A praxis is a field of forces, values and evaluations. Any dialogue is articulated in a situation and articulates a "context".

The linguistic part of a dialogue is the utterance or text. We distinguish between a text and an utterance:
• By a text we mean a structured sequence of signs which is also identified and interpreted as a part of a language. When a text is used in a dialogue its values are changed and it is turned into an utterance. (The signification of symbols & the symbolization of signs.)
• By an utterance we mean a system of symbols interpreted and understood as a part of a dialogue.

A symbol or a symbolic system is traditional, historical, moti-vated (adequate), and conventional; and it cannot be arbitrary, if it is not a mere symptom, a mere signal, nor nothing but itself, nor nothing noticeable at all;
• it uses already known (human and artificial) materials, forms and symbolic orders, and is a part of the available constituents of the situation;
• it is communicable, common, learnable by human beings (the new-born children), reproducible, recognizable, true & adequate to human praxis, reflexive & redefineable, usable by available means or constituents;
• it relies upon the common conditions for human life and reproduction; Therefore, linguists should study and explicate the sufficient con-ditions for language and communication,
rather than seeking the "complete" description of the indefinite possibilities or "free choices".

From our point of view an interpretation, or understanding, is always-also an evaluation (value implies intentions and inter-ests) and a re-evaluation.

An utterance participates in a continuos process of identifica-tions and re-identifications of the speakers, the addresseees, the third persons, the (textual, co-textual, and contextual) referents, the language, the signs and the symbol systems.

The utterance is an axiological, ontological, and epistemologi-cal articulation. It is part of a social activity and interacts with already present matrices of forces, values, and evaluations. By means of the utterance the speaker makes herself present in a certain way - she identifies, re-identifies and is identified or re-identified. The utterance is present before it is representative.

The open-ended character of the dialogue is manifested or con-ceptualized by the term universe of discourse. By a universe of discourse we mean a fuzzy-logical determined universe of past, present and future questions & answers in which the given utterance intervenes and interacts.

References
Notes

1. Cf. our Semantic Matrix Model and the comments in AILA’93 p. 32ff.:

\[ \text{General Context} \]

\[ \text{Universal Semantics} \]

Social Sense \( R_3 \) \( R_6 \) \( R_5 \) \( R_7 \) \( R_1 \)
Individual Meaning \( R_4 \)

Social Import \( R_2 \)
Personal Significance \( R_8 \)

\[ \text{Specific Context} \]

Particular Semantics

Notes

2. Cf. our Reference Model and the comments in AILA’93 p. 40ff.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension of reference</th>
<th>Dominating reference</th>
<th>Reference to</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lexical</td>
<td>Inter-textual</td>
<td>COtext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaphoric</td>
<td>Intra-textual</td>
<td>INtext</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deictic</td>
<td>Extra-textual</td>
<td>CONtext</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- COtext: social & individual lexicon & grammar
- INtext: cataphoric (forward), anaphoric (backward), symphoric (simultaneous)
- CONtext: C-prod, C-comm, C-cons, C-derivated

C-prod = the context of the producer(s)
C-comm = the context of the communicator(s)
C-cons = the context of the consumer(s)
C-derivated = the context of the recontextualizer(s)
The Dialectics of Ecological Experiences
An essay in Eco-Linguistics with a Deixis Analysis of a Newspaper Text commenting the Rio'92-Summit on the Human Environment.
JØRGEN DØØR & JØRGEN CHR. BANG

0. Preface
The following essay is a result of a long and lively dialogue. Unfortunately we are not able to present more than a rough sketch of what we have learned during the process. Our essay is a sequence of implicit and explicit confrontations with traditional linguistics from the view-point of an eco-linguistic theory. The elaborations of the various sections of our essay are to be presented in our lecture in Jyväskylä. In this sense each section and each figure is an invitation to co-operation and co-production with the participants in an ongoing theoretical and practical dialogue and praxis.

Please, remember what JOHN LYONS says in LYONS (1977:849),

[…] Languages are learned and used in contexts which are in part deter-mined by the variable assumptions and presuppositions of the people who use them; and these assumptions and presuppositions are not necessarily representable in terms of a set of determinable propositions. […] modality, as it operates in a good deal of everyday language-behaviour, cannot be understood, or properly analysed, otherwise than in terms of the indexical [deictical] and instrumental functions of language, to which its descriptive function is, at times if not always, subordinate.
[Our italics. jcb&jd]

If deixis and modality are essential features of every text- or utterance-understanding, then we, at least, could ask the question: “Is a linguistics that ignore these phenomena, or makes them subordinate, a misleading
discipline or praxis?” We think that traditional linguistics is a distorted mirror of culture and part of the ecological crisis.

We think that our readers will enjoy reading the beautiful, political text “What on earth can Rio achieve?” (The INDEPENDENT, Wednesday 3 June 1992, Published in London, p.1). The text is presented in the Appendix (p. 34ff.) together with some of our deixis indications that will be explained in the essay.

1. Introduction

For years or centuries philosophers and linguists have worked with the idea of a fundamental unit in and for a theory of language. Recent objects have often been some formal properties of symbolic structures (e.g. Montague-semantics) or instances of natural languages constructed by the linguist and stripped of the traits that constitute them as instances of language.

Our long and rich tradition of studies of languages has not, however, been a failure. We have learned a lot about language and more about what it is not. The situation is parallel to the situation in Psychology in which we are far from knowing what kind of questions to formulate and to answer. One way, but not the only one, however, to put things right, is to identify the proper research object.

Our proposal is that the proper research-unit in Linguistics is an utterance in a dialogue.

The proposal is to be interpreted as an invitation to reconsider the alternatives – its pro’s and con’s – and to try to apply our proposal and compare the experiences, implications and the consequences of our approach.

In order to connect our proposal to common traditions, we relate our methods and theory to that of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. He thought that if we want to interpret or understand an expression we ought to place it in its appropriate language-game. The appropriate language-game is the type of situations and contexts, its form of life to which it naturally belong and in which it was created.
WITTGENSTEIN says,

a) the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life. (PI §23).
b) To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (PI §19)
c) What has to be accepted, the given – one might say – are facts of life […] forms of life. (RPP §630)
d) It is characteristic of our language that the foundation on which it grows consist in steady forms of life, regular activity. Its function is determined above all by the action which it accompanies (PO 404)
e) […] not agreement in opinions but in form of life (PI §241)
f) The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language (PI: §206)

A dialogue is a unit, an ‘individuality’ (cf. J.Dør (1998), Moral Meditations), that comprises and articulates both a language-game and a form of life. So, according to Wittgenstein and us the proper method, or way, to investigate a text is to analyze it in a dialogue. None the less, there are differences between Wittgenstein’s theory and our philosophy.

Firstly, we define a dialogue as a communication between at least three participantsiii – whereas it seems as-if Wittgenstein’s paradigm case is a ‘duo-logue’, i.e. a particular situation and communication between only two persons. Secondly, we categorize the dialogue as conditioned by some cultural core contradictions. Thirdly, a dialogue implies a telos or a horizon of questions or problems; therefore there are no value-free communications or descriptions.

The raison d’être for the use of language is that some people are both similar and different, and that they for some reasons want to communicate (about) their differences and similarities. If it is a healthy dialogue both the articulated similarities and differences make a formal and existential difference.

Some interesting implications of choosing the “utterance in a dialogue” as the unit of linguistic research are that,

- language is conceptualized and experienced as part of a social praxis and defined by its relational and processual characteristics;
- the utterance is directly related to the participants experiential matrices and, consequently,
• the semantic dimensions of the utterance is part of the participants’ ideologies;
• the utterance contains no “pure”, descriptive constituents. Every semantic part is embedded in the participants’ experiential matrices and their ideologies;
• the utterance as a whole is a deictical phenomenon although there are some special syntactic features that indicate the deictical features more openly (directly, explicitly) than other parts;
• the utterance is understandable relative to some “patterns in the weave of our life”, Lebensmuster, patterns of activities. And our patterns of activities are conditioned and constrained by our biological form, social order and ideological definitions;
• the utterance has one, or more telos in order to be identified as a linguistic phenomenon at all.

2. Language & Experience

The decisive move made by WITTGENSTEIN is to transcend the immanent conception of language. For his thesis is that in order to analyse or understand an utterance you have to place it in its right, or correct, language-game and then explicate its relation to the constitutive life-form or social praxis. We prefer to talk about a discourse instead of a language-game.

A discourse is a fuzzy-determined system of texts and utterances that is dialectically determined by its culture. Like WITTGENSTEIN, we regard language, ideologies, or world-views, and culture as a dialectical unity. Consequently, a text and a discourse is interwoven with, and embedded in, non-linguistic activities, processes, relations and states. An utterance – a text, a discourse – is constituted by its context, situation and culture; and a language is a system of actual and possible utterances; consequently, a language system is constituted by its context, situation and culture; it cannot be defined as-if it was context-free, or cultural neutral.

Taking this for granted implies that you cannot use – produce or interpret – any utterance or text independently of a definite situation, a particular world-view, ideology, experiential matrix, or cultural logic.

To study, describe, analyze, explain, or make a critique of a language, a discourse, a text, or an utterance, is dependent on, or constituted by, a conjuncture of experiential matrices and cultural logics.
When you describe a text from a linguistic point of view

• you describe an articulation of an experience, and some **experiential conditions of and for production of such utterances**;

• you indicate your own particular experiences implied in your historical situation and your personal experiential matrix and specific cultural logic (cf. our Semantic Matrix Model (p. 18)).

When we understand each other’s languages the understanding is “not agreement in opinions but in forms of life” (PI §241). When we produce or interpret a text we depend upon an understanding of the **cultural logic and the situational logic** – we share some experiences and situations in order to understand each other through the medium of language.

When the linguist, sociologist, psychologist, teacher, or philosopher is concerned with languages s-he relies on the traditional and normal conceptions of “experiences”. Our dialectical and dialogical philosophy and theory of languages presupposes, however, a different conception of “experience”.

Our linguistic unit is an utterance in a dialogue. And a dialogue is a communication between at least three persons. Being part of the same praxis, situation, sharing a particular form of life and discourse, implies that the three persons share some experiences, i.e. the three participants have experiences some of which are dominated by similarities and some others by differences.

The dialogue is characterized by **creative contact**, by our touching (of) each other, by our listening to the music of the utterance of the Other, by our harmony creating activity, by symmetrical help and care, by interpersonal feelings and emotion, by trust and friendship.

An encounter between three persons is defined as a dialogue if the telos of the situation is communication, i.e. if the communicative aspect dominates in general or in critical moments of the encounter.

My Other (or my Next or Neighbour) is neither a stranger, nor an object, nor an enemy, nor hell, but a constitutive part of my existence. (Cf. the Indo-European semantico-pragmatical history of the Runic ‘gastir’, “gastiz”, Latin *hostis* and English *guest, host, hostile*: “Who are at home or who are guests on earth?”)
Therefore, it is more rational to say that my experiences are more or less private or more or less public; they are more or less articulated – uttered, “othered” – by my sign-creating gestures & activities, including my – spoken or written – linguistic utterances.

Some of our experiences are conceptualized (jd. refers to them as ‘percepts’) and articulated in language and utterances, and are as such, consequently, linguistic conditions for our social identity, linguistic consciousness and ideology. It is, however, only some of our experiences that are articulated as percepts and language; but all of them are implied in our understanding, our utterances and interpretations. The dialogue is a human natural mean to come to – internal (perceptual) & external (linguistic) – terms of our experiences; the dialogue is a constituent of our experiences and is constituted by our experiences.

When you read a text you are, or become, an interested (and interesting) person and a part in the dialogue(s) in which the text is a communicative utterance; you contribute to the common communication of experiences, and the common creation of conditions for communication and experiences. When you utter, articulate your descriptions of the text in public utterances – e.g. as a linguist and a teacher – then you explicitly partakes in the public definition of our social identity, linguistic consciousness and ideology. Therefore, y-your text selection as well as y-your modes (models & modalities) for understanding and description (i.e. y-your dialogue normalizations) are extremely important political and moral activities, even if and because we socially are considered (Eco-) linguistic, scientific or teacher authorities. (Pace G.LEECH and several other considering the linguist a neutral descriptor of languages and verbal utterances in a neutral language in neutral situations.)

In this context and situation we have chosen an interesting text that articulated, and articulates, comments on the interesting international Rio-Conference on Global Ecology in 1992. And we present a mode of text analysis that is a linguistic analysis that ought to produce categories, indications and common awareness on:

i) some clues concerning the sort of experiences the text is supposed to communicate, and

ii) some clues concerning the kind of ideology that is intended to be shared with the users of the text.
3. Text, Experiences & Ideology – Deixis

Traditional linguists define “Deixis” in the following way:

**deixis** *(deictic)* A term used in LINGUISTIC theory to subsume those features of LANGUAGE which refer directly to the personal, temporal or locational characteristics of the SITUATION within which an UTTERANCE takes place, whose MEANING is thus relative to that situation; e.g. *now/then, here/there, I/you, this/that* are *deictics* (*‘deictic’* or EXOPHORIC words). [...] (Crystal 1994:96)

We define deixis and deictic indication in a similar way with a few differences that make a difference:

**deixis & deictic phenomena** A category used in DIALECTICAL LINGUISTICS to INDICATE those ARTICULATIONS of language which refer DIRECTLY & INDIRECTLY to the PERSONAL, LOGICAL & TOPICAL characteristics of the SITUATIONS & CONTEXTS within which an utterance takes place and HAS ITS LIFE, whose MEANINGS ARE THUS RELATIONAL TO THOSE SITUATIONS & CONTEXTS.
(Bang & Dør 1996)

Or, in an alternative formulation:

**Deixis** A category used to subsume features of languages which indicate

(i) *personal, objectical, and medial*;
(ii) *topical (i.e. temporal-locational features)*;
(iii) *logical*, (iv) *modal*, and (v) *lexical* characteristics of
(a) the text-context-discourse, or language-game,
(b) the dialogue-situation, and
(c) the form of life/praxis

within which an utterance takes place and has its life, whose MEANINGS are dialectically determined by praxis. (Cf. our Semantic Matrix Model (p. 18) and Fig.1.)
Our dialectical theory of language is an explication of a dialectical-experien-
tial philosophy and its principles. We want to introduce one of its prin-
ciples here, the principle of dialectical description and indication which
states that every description and any indication is always-also at the same
time a self-description and self-indication, i.e. every instance of a deictical
indicator is related to a dialectical relationship between the persons invol-
ved in, or refered to in the utterance - and the discourse.

A few comments on our Deixis-forms
PERSONAL DEIXIS, P-Deixis indicates the persons who talk, write, inter-
pret, or are talked-written about. P- Deixis are linguistico-social means for
making their bearers both subjects of the discourse and the explicit or
implicit co-producers of the text and discourse. P-Deixis is vital and essen-
tial for the identification of personal relations and organizations.

“The given” in and for any text or utterance is a pre-organization of the
personal relations and the human relations to our environment. Please note,
the deep affinities between the formulations of WITTGENSTEIN and our
point of action:

What has to be accepted, the given – one might say – are facts of life
[...]) forms of life.

We talk about the pre-organizations of persons and our relationships to, and
in our environment; LW talks about “the given”. Understanding implies
some sort of agreement; so, to understand an utterance implies a degree of
agreement, “not agreement in opinions but in form of life” and “the
sharing of steady forms of life, regular activity”.

We need to agree in some way about “the given” in order to understand
each other, and this implies that we share some experiences as our “recurs-
sive basis”.

• The deictical indicator “I” dialectically implies a pre-organization of
  “you, she, he, it, they, and we”
• The deictical indicator “you” dialectically implies a pre-organization
  of “I, she, he, it, they, and we”
• The deictical indicator “she” dialectically implies a pre-organization of “I, you, he, it, they, and we”
• The deictical indicator “he” dialectically implies a pre-organization of “I, you, she, it, they, and we”
• The deictical indicator “we” dialectically implies a pre-organization of “I, you, she, he, it, and they”. (Cf. Figs 1 & 2)

Because of the pre-organization of the persons and our relationships in, and to our environment it follows that a definite P-Deixis implies a historically determined L-Deixis and M-Deixis.

When a person articulates a text the person articulates a specific aspect of, and relation to the pre-organization of persons and a particular form of participation in our world. The use of a pronoun, e.g. “we” is not an indication of an isolated being or social or linguistic atom, but an indication of a particular historical organisation – logical relations and ways of existing – of certain individualities (both linguistic individualities and non-linguistic individualities).

LOGICAL DEIXIS

L - Deixis indicates the kind of relationships that exist between individualities or the kind of coherence between individualities or relations (i.e. relations of relations) that is a particular historical fact.
Logic-indicators are such as:

• therefore, hence, thus, so, accordingly, in consequence, prove that, consequently as a result, then, it follow that, we may infer, I conclude that, which shows that, which means that, which entails that, which allows to infer, which points to the conclusion;
• since, because, for, as, follows from, as shown by, inasmuch as, if, as indicated by, the reason is that, for the reasons that, may be inferred from, may be derived from, may be deduced from, in view of the fact that, supposed that;
• and, but, or after, before (topical deixis, too)
• causes, is a condition, is an effect of
• as-if
A second principle of dialectical experimentalism is the principle of dialectical being and becoming which states that every being and becoming is a kind of dialectical inter-dependent and interactive being-becoming (cf. Moral Meditations). This point of action implies that there are individualities but no autonomous or independent individuals. Every individuality coheres with everything else and with something in a particular way.

The ideology of “autonomy” and “individuals in splendid isolation” is not confirmed by experience but presupposes a distorted relation between our way of life and our language games. The ideology implies that contrary to our experiences we identify and feel ourselves as alienated from the Other.

The L-indicators articulates or indicates historically regular activities, events and occurrences and steady forms of life - and not relations between context-free ‘eternal sentences’ or ‘a third world’, W-3, ‘objects’ in the sense of GOTLOB FREGE and sir KARL POPPER.

We classify “modality” as a deictic phenomenon, because its meanings are relative to a particular situation and discourse. What drives deixis is partly a particular institutionalized practice of a linguistic community.

L-Deixis indicates a particular form of coherence, dependencies between individualities, and these forms are qualified through ‘modality deixis’.

MODALITY DEIXIS

M-Deixis indicates ways in which something exists, occurs or is presented.

- **De-dicto modality** is a kind of deixis which indicates the ways of being-becoming of an utterance or of the relations between utterances.
- **De-re modality** is a kind of deixis which indicates the ways of being-becoming which the utterance implies between different parts of, or individualities in, the non-linguistic reality.
- **De-medio modality** is a category of deixis which indicates the ways of existence of the dialectical relations between (a) de-dicto modality and (b) de-re modality, i.e. between language and reality (an example of a de-medio modality is the picture theory of Tractatus, in which
there is supposed an isomorphic relation between the logical structure of propositions and the structure of reality.

A traditional classification of modality is
(i) sense modality, perceive, sense,
(ii) alethic modality, necessary, possible, contingent, may (cf. above)
(iii) deontic modality, obligatory, permitted, may, allow (cf. above)
(iv) epistemic modality, know, believe, suppose (cf. above L-deixis)

We regard and treat “deixis” in the way in which M. HALLIDAY looks at grammar, i.e. as a “theory of experiences, a theory that is born of action, and therefore serves as a guide to action, as a metalanguage by which we live” (HALLIDAY 1992:89; our italics, jeb & jd)

4. The WE-matrix of the text

As articulated above we have developed the category ‘deixis’ and ‘deictic phenomena’ into a dialectical category including both explicit form (‘deixis’) and (mostly implicitly) ‘deictic phenomena’. It is natural for a dialectical theory to consider (and articulate) linguistic form and function as dialectical related or constituted by the same conditions. iv

Furthermore we have developed the deixis definition to include more “characteristics of the situation within which an utterance takes place”, i.e. the THIRD person, the Object, the Media, and the Logics. Logical Deixis indicates the logics that constitute the meanings of the utterance (or text), the meanings that are “relative to that situation” within which the utterance takes place and has its life.
The Dialectics of Ecological Experiences

Fig. 2. **WE-Matrix**: Some Examples from the Text (§-reference)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syntactico-Semantic “We”-examples</th>
<th>Semantico-Pragmatic We</th>
<th>Syntactico-Semantic “They”-examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>we, ourselves (3, 10)</em></td>
<td><em>WE</em></td>
<td><em>Rio (0, 2, 4, 10)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>many (3, 8)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>the leaders … they (5, 8)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>rich North (4)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>poor South (4)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>man-made wealth (4)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>natural wealth (4)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>us, our generation (5, 8)</em></td>
<td><em>we</em></td>
<td><em>the next generation(s) (5)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>us…many…their (8)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>some…they (7)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Britain, British (7, 10, 11)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Third World (7)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Europe (9)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Africa (9)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ourselves - GB (10, 11)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>our politicians GB (10, 11)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>we [male?], our aid (11)</em></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>women with power…(11)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>themselves…their families</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I

The Author of the Article

**We**: The Leadership of The Independent

**I/WE**: The Reader(s)-Interpreter(s)

The figure illustrates the fact that “we” and “they” indicate:
- a person, a group of persons, i.e. P- and T-deixis
- a pre-organization of persons, i.e. L- and M-deixis
- a pre-organized relation between “we” and our environment

With reference to the text, and to our Fig.2, we can exemplify how the semantics of “We” is elaborated. The word “Rio” doesn’t primarily refer to the capital or the people living there but rather to a specific “summit” between global “leaders” or perhaps to everybody on the Earth, in GB, in London, ourselves, and the next and next generations. What “Rio” means is articulated in the text by means of reference to several more or less contradicting logics, and the text seems to articulate the telos: “How do we, the writer and the readers, define and create our (theoretical & practical) relations to and in the logics that seem to determine a bad future for all of
us on earth, if we continue to let the logics function that bad way?” As articulated in the text there are several logics implied which up to now have functioned as-if they are indispensable “rules” which guarantee rationality, neutrality and pure objectivity. The text explicates some of the logics and articulates essential constituents of their conditions, i.e. it tries (telos) to analyze and indicate how the logics are dependent upon human activity, including our talk, “hope and fear” (§4).

The Independent-text is a brilliant articulation of the fact that the governing logics are not themselves independent from “man-made” activity; “man-made” activity is our activity; and our lives (our life forms) ought to be altered “to make them environMENTALLY sustainable” (§8).

The Independent-text tries to explicate WHO are the IMPLIED AGENTS in the field of the logics. Furthermore, the writer turns the agent/subject/person analysis from the more hierarchical orientation (the leaders of policy and industry) into a more participant oriented problem-organization, or, with the framed words: “Politicians’ dithering holds up a mirror to the rest of us”. The text can be read as a linguistic-political contribution to a more healthy speech-community.
The Dialectics of Ecological Experiences

References

Notes

iv. According to our dialectical theory of language both ‘modality’ and ‘deixis’ are used in, and are constitutive for, syntactic (grammatical), semantic, and pragmatic analysis.
### Appendix: Text Presentation and Commentaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>§</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>P- &amp; T-deixis</th>
<th>M- &amp; L-deixis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>What on earth can Rio achieve?</td>
<td>Rio</td>
<td>can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>Politicians’ dithering holds up a mirror to the rest of us.</td>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>a mirror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>THE EARTH is not dying – not just anyway. But it is certainly a sickly planet.</td>
<td>EARTH</td>
<td>is not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Twenty years ago this month the first earth summit, the UN Conference on the Human Environment, was held in Stockholm. Two decades on, the environmental tide runs high once more as the second earth summit opens in Rio de Janeiro today.</td>
<td>Twenty years ago</td>
<td>was held</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>On this page we highlight 10 great changes between 1972 and 1992 which many will find deeply alarming. We could perhaps have picked an equal number of trends that give grounds for optimism. There has been progress: global wealth production has more than doubled over those two decades and a greater proportion of the world’s people are adequately fed, clothed and sheltered than in 1972 (even though the absolute number of the absolutely poor barely managing to exist, let alone live, has risen along with the global population.)</td>
<td>On this page we</td>
<td>will find</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Media- &amp; P-1-Deixis)</td>
<td>many</td>
<td>could perhaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the world’s people</td>
<td>grounds for optimism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>adequately</td>
<td>There has been</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>absolutely</td>
<td>progress: global</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>wealth production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>None the less, the importance of the environment and development problems under debate in Rio over the next 10 days cannot be overstated. Even before it starts, however, the event is polluted with pessimism, with talk of hopes having been raised too high, and fears of deadlock between rich North and poor South over a fairer share of the planet’s natural and man-made wealth. In short, the received wisdom is that Rio will be a flop.</td>
<td>None the less,</td>
<td>cannot be overstated</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>however</td>
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<td>rich North and poor</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>a fairer share of the</td>
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<td>planet’s natural and</td>
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<td>man-made wealth</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>In short</td>
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</table>
It would be much better for us, and certainly for our children and grandchildren, if the leaders gathering in Brazil show more courage and wisdom, if they go farther and faster, than they seem likely to do. In delaying we are only storing up greater hardship for the next generation or two.

A declaration of principles and an action plan will eventually emerge after two weeks of fraught negotiation, just as happened in Stockholm in 1972. True, this summit should go farther, in that two international treaties are expected to be signed. One deals with the man-made global warming likely to change climate in the next century. The other is concerned with protecting biodiversity—the richness of the earth’s plant and animal species found mostly in the forest, savannah and arid lands of the Third World. But those conventions will have little impact for years, perhaps decades, because they are a first attempt at the task, bargained down to a lowest common denominator on which near-unanimous agreement could be reached.

For some the conventions already seem to go too far, too fast. Several developed nations, including Britain, may decline to sign the biodiversity treaty because they fear it gives too much away to the Third World.
<table>
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<th>M- &amp; L-deixis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>How many in this relatively rich, well-educated and influential country have substantially altered their lives to make them environmentally sustainable? A little recycling of bottles, cans and newspapers is to be applauded, but what about carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels? How many have made substantial cuts in their energy use by, say, driving less or cutting down on annual flights to the sun?</td>
<td>their us many</td>
<td>However only relatively environmentally substantially little ? sustainable ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Environmental degradation is not the only global ill besetting humanity. There is modern Aids, old-fashioned malaria, crime, drugs, social breakdown and of course, war – the biggest and oldest of them all, responsible for so much of Africa’s famine and wretchedness, and now returned to Europe.</td>
<td>humanity</td>
<td>is not the only of course biggest and oldest responsible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>§</td>
<td>Text</td>
<td>P- &amp; T-deixis</td>
<td>M- &amp; L-deixis</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>How could we dare to hope that two week in Rio could transform everything? Why should environmental problems have a monopoly on being solvable? The best that we can do is to begin moving in the right direction ourselves and put pressure on our politicians to help. At home the Government needs to demonstrate that is paying more than lip service to sustainable development. Internationally, Britain could give the summit some badly needed momentum by indicating a greater determination than hitherto to achieve the United Nations’ foreign aid target of 0.7 per cent of Gross Domestic Product by 1997. Our aid is currently less than half of that. The amount of environmental degradation that hinges on the huge and growing gap between the planet’s rich and poor makes equity and redistribution unavoidable issues for the North, just as population growth is for the South.</td>
<td>we</td>
<td>How could ... dare</td>
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<td>we NB</td>
<td>should</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ourselves</td>
<td>solvable</td>
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<td>our politicians</td>
<td>The best</td>
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<td></td>
<td>At home</td>
<td>the right direction</td>
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<td>Britain</td>
<td>needs</td>
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<td>summit</td>
<td>that is paying more than</td>
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<td>greater ... than</td>
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<td>Our</td>
<td>hinges on</td>
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<td>the planet’s rich and</td>
<td>unavoidable</td>
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<td>poor</td>
<td>just as</td>
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<td>§</td>
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<td>P- &amp; T-deixis</td>
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</table>
| 11 | Above all, we should ensure that our aid addresses the crucial and controversial issue of overpopulation. Raising the frequently wretched status of women in the poor South is the only way of making progress. Women with higher educational attainment and greater purchasing power are better able to choose for themselves the size of their families – and experience shows that they will usually choose to limit the number of children they have. It may seem prosaic when measured against the scale of the threat to our planet, but there is probably no better way for British aid to be spent than on girls’ schools. | Britain … it [≠ we?]
countries
their … they
we
our
women in the poor
South
Women [I, we?]
themselves their [I, we?]
they
they
British [my, our?]
girls’ schools | should also
only … that
really want
even if
Above all
the crucial and
controversial
overpopulation
the only way
higher … greater
purchasing power
are better able to
choose
experience shows
It may seem
against … but
no better way…than
to be spent on |

(The INDEPENDENT, Wednesday 3 June 1992, Published in London; p.1: “What on earth can Rio achieve?”)